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iiAbstract
It has long been recognized that widely used contemporary systems have relatively
weak security and stronger operating system security models are required. In par-
ticular, the design of widely-used security models is such that the highest level of
privileges available on the system are often highly exposed. If an attack is successful
and the attacker attains a high level of privilege, all of the security mechanisms on
the system may typically be bypassed.
Despite such limitations, weak models remain ubiquitous as more secure alternatives
are complex and therefore harder to con￿gure and audit for correctness. This is
especially problematic when the user and administrator are the same person, as
is often the case in widespread workstation environments. To be used e￿ectively,
security models must be simple enough to be easily conceptualised by users and
consistent with their requirements.
Careful application of cryptography can often improve security. However, in the
domain of operating system security to date, the use of cryptography has largely
involved the creation of ad hoc, standalone mechanisms. Cryptographic ￿lesystems
exist to protect the con￿dentiality of data, but have little or no connection with
existing access control theory. For example, some allow sharing of data between
users but none provide all of the expected properties available in conventional,
fully-￿edged access control mechanisms such as secure and convenient revocation
and prevention of authorisation transference. Filesystem integrity checkers use
cryptographic hashes or digital signatures to ensure objects have not been mod-
i￿ed, thereby protecting against substitution of malicious code. However, exist-
ing schemes lack the supporting infrastructure of an underlying security model to
properly discriminate between veri￿ed and unveri￿ed objects. Furthermore, key
management-related interdependencies between these di￿erent mechanisms havenot been recognized and, as a result, work in this area has so far progressed in a
somewhat disjointed and piecemeal manner.
This research describes a new security model, known as Vaults, that utilises cryp-
tography to provide improved security. In particular, the new model aims to be
secure against an attacker who has achieved a high level of privilege on the system.
Vaults provides a cryptographically-enhanced access control model that protects
￿les from unauthorised read and write access. It also facilitates secure, authen-
ticated sharing of data between users using semantics consistent with traditional
non-cryptographic access control models.
The Vaults access control mechanism is supported by a ￿exible and convenient key
management architecture that can be used for both ￿le access keys and generic
application secrets. Access to these values is controlled by a mechanism for crypto-
graphically verifying the integrity of programs and the data objects with which they
interact. However, unlike previous schemes, Vaults not only prevents execution of
illicitly modi￿ed trusted code, but also assigns di￿erent privilege levels to veri￿ed
and unveri￿ed processes. Furthermore, partially-trusted processes can be con￿ned
to speci￿cally de￿ned objects if required. This approach provides a mechanism for
authenticated user interaction with security-critical system components and there-
fore represents a new interpretation of the traditional notion of a physical trusted
path that can be extended to any appropriate object on the system. Finally, all of
these mechanisms apply on both a global and local level, allowing administrators
to create system-wide policies, and users to extend and re￿ne these to suit their
own security needs.
However this ￿exibility does not come at the cost of great complexity and the basics
of using the scheme can be easily explained to users as they can be expressed using
conceptually simple abstractions such as ￿locking ￿les￿ and ￿sharing keys￿. The use
of cryptography in this way also serves to weaken the traditional association between
privilege and identity, as access is permitted or denied based upon possession of the
required token rather than the identity of the requesting process. Such a design
ivhas the dual e￿ects of constraining the powers of privileged users and lowering their
exposure to attack by reducing privileges to a token, which is generally easier to
protect than an identity.
After developing the model, a series of large-scale attack trees were constructed to
analyse its security. The attack trees were used to both re￿ne the design of the
security model and also evaluate the assertion that the model retains its security
properties when under attack by a user who has gained the ability to bypass the
security kernel and directly access the secondary storage device. The results of this
analysis demonstrate the advantages of applying cryptography to the problem of
operating system security and show that the Vaults model is able to maintain its
security properties in the face of attacks that are normally excluded ‘by assumption’
under existing computer security models. Vaults is therefore a novel and compre-
hensive model for integrating cryptography into the operating system in a manner
that improves security, while remaining both ￿exible and usable.
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Introduction
1.1 Background
1.1.1 The Need for Stronger Security Models
At the same time as societies and economies are becoming ever increasingly de-
pendent upon information technology, a constant stream of new computer security
vulnerabilities is being discovered [2,3]. Despite extensive development of mecha-
nisms to secure applications and networks, it has been recognised that the security
models utilised by contemporary operating systems are relatively weak and stronger
models are required to underpin even securely designed applications [4].
The privilege model found in the Unix operating system is a prime example of
this problem. It involves a two-tier approach consisting of a single, privileged user
account (the superuser or ‘root’), with all other users having no special privileges
and being essentially limited to their own ￿les and those shared by other users.
This concentration of privilege with a single, ultimately trusted user identity makes
the superuser account a primary target for attackers. However, it also has the e￿ect
of rendering the account almost impossible to defend since superuser privileges are
required for even the most basic administrative tasks. The result is a proliferation
of privilege boundaries by which attackers can seek to gain superuser access. This
1design property of Unix has been acknowledged as the principal security problem
of the system [5].
Nonetheless the Unix model, and other similarly weak models, are widespread,
both due to historical inertia and because their simplicity, compared to more secure
alternatives [6,7], makes them more attractive to users. In addition, more secure
approaches are also often problematic because their conceptual complexity makes
policy correctness di￿cult to verify [8￿10]. Because of these issues, it is di￿cult to
envisage such models becoming widely accepted in environments where security is
not an overriding priority. Instead it has been argued that ￿users need a clear model
of how the security operates (if not how it actually provides security) in order to
use it well￿ [11, p. 3] but a conceptually simple model that provides strong security
has so far proved elusive. Nonetheless, the extent of the security problem requires
that alternative and novel approaches be explored.
1.1.2 An Integrated Cryptographic Approach
This research describes the development of a new security model called Vaults that
utilises cryptography to provide a non-identity-based access control scheme that is
integrated with a code integrity veri￿cation and privilege management mechanism.
Despite cryptography being widely used in the domain of network security for com-
munication and authentication tasks, it has seen only limited application in the
area of operating system security. Cryptographic host security tools to date have
been rather piecemeal, having been developed on an ad hoc basis with the aim of
resolving a single, isolated security issue. For example, cryptographic ￿lesystems
protect the con￿dentiality of data in the event of a machine such as a laptop being
lost or stolen, but do not provide the properties expected of generic access control
mechanisms. Similarly, while stand-alone ￿le integrity checking tools exist to de-
tect and mitigate the risks of intrusion, they struggle to deal with practical concerns
such as updates to frequently modi￿ed objects and do not discriminate between the
privileges of veri￿ed and unveri￿ed code. One important role that integrity veri-
2￿cation tools could play is in the area of key management to ensure that securely
stored secrets are only released to authorised, authenticated code. However, this
requires taking an integrated, holistic view point that recognizes the interdepen-
dence between the key management infrastructure required to support a ￿exible
cryptographic access control scheme, and a code integrity veri￿cation mechanism
that prevents the compromise of both keys and ￿les by malicious software. The
Vaults security model described and evaluated in this thesis has been developed
upon such a basis.
More generally, cryptography provides advantages that conventional purely logic-
based mechanisms cannot. A security mechanism that depends solely on active
enforcement of security policy by a reference monitor will inevitably fail if the mon-
itor can be bypassed. In practice, attackers can often obtain an elevated privilege
level on the system and thereby bypass the enforcement mechanism [5,12]. For ex-
ample, an attacker who gains the ability to bypass the operating system kernel and
directly access the secondary storage device can read or modify trusted system ￿les
at will. By comparison, employing cryptography enforces certain additional limits
that are not otherwise achievable. For example, an encrypted ￿le remains secure
even if the attacker can bypass the security kernel and read the ciphertext directly
o￿ the disk. Additionally, if a highly privileged attacker makes unauthorised mod-
i￿cations to security-critical code, these modi￿cations can be detected through the
use of cryptographic integrity veri￿cation. These kinds of security guarantees can-
not be obtained with conventional active security mechanisms. Consequently, one
of the central security goals of the Vaults model is to maintain its stated security
properties even against a highly privileged attacker.
1.2 Research Objectives and Design Parameters
1.2.1 Research Objectives
The objectives of this research are as follows:
1. to develop a comprehensive computer security model that leverages crypto-
3graphic techniques to provide security advantages over traditional identity-
based models while being more intuitive than existing mandatory security-
based alternatives;
2. to demonstrate the security advantages of applying cryptography in an inte-
grated way to operating systems; and
3. to analyse the above using a threat modelling approach to evaluate the level
of security it achieves and, in particular, to demonstrate that the model is
secure, even against highly privileged attackers.
1.2.2 Goals, Principles and Assumptions
Before proceeding, it is important to identify explicitly the security goals for the
Vaults model, the principles according to which it has been designed, and some
general assumptions made regarding the security it provides.
Security Goals
The overall security goal of Vaults is to maintain a de￿ned set of security properties
in the face of an attacker who has achieved a high level of privilege equivalent to
Unix superuser access. This goal is achieved through the use of cryptography in the
model and thereby mitigates this underlying problem in existing security models
for systems such as Unix.
Speci￿cally, the con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity of protected objects on the
system is guaranteed within the security limits of the relevant cryptographic prim-
itives and algorithms. Note that, while the con￿dentiality guarantee is absolute in
the sense that an encrypted ￿le cannot be decrypted and viewed without access to
the relevant cryptographic access token, the integrity of a protected object is only
guaranteed to be veri￿able. Therefore the illicit modi￿cation of an object is not
guaranteed to be prevented. The changes, however, are guaranteed to be detectable
by those with legitimate access to that object. Furthermore, the user is shielded
4against negative impacts resulting from inadvertently utilising an illicitly modi￿ed
object. On ￿rst inspection, this implies that Vaults achieves a lower level of pro-
tection than traditional access control models, which actively prevent unauthorised
modi￿cation of designated objects. However, Vaults access controls are intended
to be layered on top of the existing access control scheme so the minimum level of
security achieved is that provided by the existing scheme. Conversely, even if all
forms of active protection failed completely and a highly privileged attacker were
able to write directly to the disk to modify cryptographically protected ￿les, these
modi￿cations would be guaranteed to be detected and the user shielded against any
deleterious e￿ects.
The security goal for subjects1 is that designated code to be executed will be cryp-
tographically authenticated, as will designated data objects accessed by this code.
Based upon this authentication, subjects will be assigned a trust level and this label,
along with the identity of the code, will be used to determine that subject’s access
to cryptographically protected objects. Further details of the security goals of the
Vaults model necessary to support the evaluation of these properties are given in
Section 6.3.2.
Design Principles
Saltzer & Schroeder [15] have previously identi￿ed general principles of secure design
and these apply extensively to di￿erent aspects of the Vaults model. However, in
addition to these general principles, the model has been developed upon the novel
principle that all security decisions are to be made based on cryptographically
derived or protected parameters. For example, access control decisions are not
made based on identity but rather on the cryptographic tokens available to the
process. Amongst other improvements to security, this approach has the e￿ect of
constraining the power of the superuser, which is normally based entirely on the
1The term ‘subject’ is widely used to mean both an active entity such as a user or a process
executing on the user’s behalf [13, p. 108], [14, p. 28], as the distinction between these two is
rarely important. However, in this context, the term is used speci￿cally to refer to processes rather
than users although users are also authenticated when accessing the system.
5identity of the subject. Also, as previously indicated, the trust level assigned to each
process is based on a cryptographic authentication of its code and dependencies.
Existing widespread security models are well entrenched and the alternatives devel-
oped so far have seen little success in displacing them. Consistent with this observa-
tion, Vaults has been designed to be backwardly compatible with the identity-based
models currently in use so that it can be layered on top of the existing models to
provide ‘defence-in-depth’. To re￿ect the practicality of this new approach, where
appropriate, the description of the model given here utilises Unix as an example
operating system upon which it could be implemented. Also, a number of issues
relevant to the integration of Vaults with Unix are discussed where relevant. How-
ever, the underlying principles and design of the model are not dependent upon the
Unix architecture. The Unix-speci￿c adaptations described here serve primarily to
demonstrate the model’s ability to be adapted to speci￿c access control contexts.
Assumptions
The following general assumptions have been made regarding the security provided
by Vaults.
Kernel isolation. The kernel is considered to be isolated from direct interference
at runtime, even from a highly privileged attacker. In particular, internal
kernel memory is assumed to be protected and cannot be accessed even by
privileged users. Memory belonging to other processes is similarly protected.
Since it is assumed that a privileged attacker may modify data stored on the
disk, the existence of a secure bootstrap mechanism to ensure kernel integrity
at bootup is assumed. This assumption encompasses the requirement for
a suitable hardware infrastructure as necessary to support these abstracted
features.
Correct implementation. It is assumed that all relevant components are cor-
rectly implemented and contain no errors of any kind that impact on the
6security of the system. That is to say, the issue of implementation ￿aws and
code assurance are considered to be out of the scope of the security provided
by Vaults. Other relevant practical prerequisites for security, such as su￿-
cient available entropy for key generation whenever required, security against
side-channel attacks [16], and an adequate level of physical security, are also
assumed to be satis￿ed2.
Secure cryptography. Suitable cryptographic algorithms for the relevant prim-
itives are assumed to be available and secure in design and implementation.
Also, while some low-level cryptographic implementation issues are considered
throughout this document, this section is not intended to be a comprehensive
or exhaustive treatment of such issues. Therefore, it is assumed that suitable
encryption modes are available and would be selected for implementation
where appropriate [17].
Acceptable performance. While e￿ciency has been a consideration in the de-
sign of the Vaults model, the primary focus of the design is on attaining a
high level of security and, where deemed appropriate, conservative design de-
cisions have been made in the interests of achieving this. Furthermore, any
use of cryptography involves an unavoidable concomitant reduction in per-
formance as a consequence of increased security. It is therefore assumed that
suitably e￿cient cryptographic algorithms, and hardware capable of achieving
an acceptable level of performance, are available as required.
1.3 Overview of Vaults Security Model
1.3.1 Key Management
At the core of the Vaults security model is the provision of a secure repository
for storage of security-sensitive data and a collection of straightforward rules for
controlling access to the data. The repositories are referred to as vaults, which is
2This is not intended to be a complete list of such issues.
7also an appropriate name for the model as a whole because of the signi￿cance of
these repositories to its security. The data stored in the vaults is maintained in
memory by the security kernel and is cryptographically protected when written to
the disk.
The vaults themselves are used in several ways for di￿erent purposes as outlined in
the following sections. However, their simplest application is as a general repository
for secret values utilised by various applications. These are known as application
keys and can include normal passwords and passphrases, as well as cryptographic
keys of all types. Each user has their own vault for storing their application keys,
and trusted programs that they execute can gain access to the speci￿c keys they
require. This controlled access is achieved by the application requesting a key from
the kernel, which maintains the security of this data by only releasing keys to pro-
cesses that have been cryptographically authenticated and speci￿cally designated
as authorised to access that particular key. This approach e￿ectively locks out
malicious code and isolates applications from security failures in other trusted pro-
grams. Note that this is one of the very few aspects of the Vaults model that is not
entirely backward compatible, as it requires the applications using these keys to be
aware of the architecture in order to issue requests to access them. However, this
request mechanism is designed so as to require only very minor changes to existing
code.
The application keys mechanism has both usability and security advantages. Users
no longer need to memorise numerous, complex and potentially confusing passwords
as they may be stored in their vault and automatically retrieved when required after
a once-per-session authentication process. Not only is this more convenient for the
user but it also encourages the selection of high entropy passwords that would oth-
erwise be too di￿cult to memorise. Additionally, eliminating the need to memorise
multiple passwords makes it more practical for users to select di￿erent passwords
for di￿erent purposes, thereby maximally limiting the damage in the event of an
individual password being compromised. Therefore, storage of application keys in
8vaults allows users to maintain their passwords and other keys in a single, conve-
nient location and make them securely and transparently available to authenticated,
trusted applications when required. However, this is by no means the only￿or in-
deed most signi￿cant￿role played by the vault structures. The vaults represent
generic key management mechanisms that enable a number of cryptographic secu-
rity enhancements to be deployed in an integrated and comprehensive manner. The
remainder of these features will now be outlined brie￿y.
1.3.2 Enhanced Access Controls
The ability to securely store and manage cryptographic keys within an operating
system has an obvious application in supporting the construction of a cryptographic
￿lesystem. However, the ￿le encryption mechanism in the Vaults model does not
simply encipher data before writing it to the disk. Instead, it is a complete generic
access control model that maintains the properties expected of traditional, non-
cryptographic access control schemes while providing improved security. In con-
trast to previous cryptographic ￿lesystems, the Vaults’ enhanced access control
architecture provides the following properties.
Independent protection modes. Objects can be both read-protected, by en-
crypting the data, and independently write-protected. By comparison, most
previous cryptographic ￿lesystems behave primarily as integrated ￿le encryp-
tion tools with no independent support for restricting modi￿cations to ￿le
contents.
Data sharing. Users can cryptographically protect objects and then grant access
to other speci￿ed subjects (users) as desired. Again, the mode for shared
access can be independently speci￿ed as being read, write or both.
Revocation. Users who grant others access to their ￿les may revoke this at any
time. This can be performed without requiring any computationally expensive
9processing, such as re-encryption of ￿le data, as users never gain direct access
to cryptographic keys.
Universality. Protection can be applied to any object that the user owns and is
not restricted to ￿les within a speci￿c directory or ￿lesystem. This also allows
cryptographic access controls to be applied to important system ￿les.
Non-transferability of privilege. Under some previous schemes, such as some
of those discussed in Section 2.5, a user who has been granted access to a
cryptographic key is able to duplicate that key and transfer it to other parties
at will. However, this is not possible with Vaults. Therefore, a subject who
has been granted access to a ￿le object belonging to another cannot transfer
these access privileges to a third party, either before or after revocation.
Identity independence. Unlike most traditional, non-cryptographic access con-
trol models, access to data under Vaults is not dependent on the subject’s
identity but rather on the values contained within their vault that are cryp-
tographically determined. This e￿ectively places limits on privileged users
and represents a step away from widely used identity-based access control
paradigms that have proved to be weak.
Simple conceptual model. The access control scheme is highly amenable to ab-
straction and can be easily explained to users in simple terms such as ￿locking
￿les￿ and ￿sharing keys￿ with other users. Use of the scheme does not require
any understanding of complex security models or cryptographic techniques.
Upon protecting a speci￿c ￿le that they own, a user will receive a cryptographic
token known as a primary ticket. This ticket is then stored in their vault and used
to subsequently access the object. The owner can then use the primary ticket to
construct additional tickets, known as secondary tickets, which are given to those
users to whom access is to be granted. The structure of the secondary ticket ensures
that it cannot be duplicated, transferred to another party, forged or converted into
a primary ticket by a malicious user, and the owner can revoke the ticket at any
10time, rendering it useless. In the case of both read and write access, a cryptographic
key is generated and used to protect the ￿le. This is achieved either by encrypting
it or by generating a message authentication code (MAC) to verify its integrity in
the case of write access. This key is maintained by the kernel and not released to
the users who access the ￿le.
Limiting the Privileges of the Superuser
The generality of the Vaults’ enhanced access controls has the e￿ect that the privi-
leges available to a process now involve two separate parameters. As previously, the
identity label, such as the UID/GIDs under Unix, with which the process executes,
still determines its privileges according to existing permissions. However, under the
Vaults model, access to an object now also depends on the tickets available in the
vault to which the process has access. This latter aspect is both cryptographically
determined and independent of identity. In e￿ect, a ‘locks and keys’ access con-
trol model [18, p. 396￿400] is layered on top of the existing identity-based access
control scheme, thereby limiting the privileges of the traditional superuser account.
While previously the superuser was able to bypass access control restrictions, this
is no longer the case. Access to a protected ￿le object will not be granted without
possession of the appropriate ticket, irrespective of the identity making the request.
Therefore, a new privileged account, known as the prime user, exists which is able
to bypass these access controls when necessary and within tightly de￿ned limits.
The prime user is also responsible for administrative matters relating to the Vaults
security model but does not have the broad range of privileges or responsibilities
of the traditional superuser, thereby limiting the ways through which the account
may be attacked. Partially separating privilege from identity in this way has some
of the security advantages associated with mandatory access controls, in that the
cryptographically enhanced access controls provide a strong security baseline that
cannot be arbitrarily violated by privileged attackers. Consequently, this signi￿cant
weakness in security models, such as those used in Unix, is largely resolved. How-
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access privileges are determined and speci￿ed by individual users on the basis of
their individual security requirements. While this may not be suitable for imple-
menting certain policies where centralised control is critical, it is consistent with the
￿exibility expected of (and currently found) in mainstream systems, albeit with sig-
ni￿cantly improved security. Furthermore, this is achieved without the imposition
of a conceptually complex or di￿cult to manage security model.
1.3.3 Trusted Fingerprinting
With widespread threats of a malicious code and intrusion [19,20], it is increasingly
important to protect the integrity of security-critical programs on a system. This
is particularly so where these programs may access sensitive data stored in a user’s
vault. Trusted Fingerprinting is the mechanism provided by the Vaults model to
verify the integrity of programs to ensure that they have not been modi￿ed, and
thereby protect users from malicious code. The mechanism works by generating
one-way hash values of security-relevant code, with these values stored in a vault
to ensure their integrity and authenticity. When these programs are subsequently
executed, their hash value or ‘￿ngerprint’ is veri￿ed and execution denied if the code
has been changed. Furthermore, as the behaviour of a program can be in￿uenced
by external objects￿such as shared libraries, con￿guration ￿les and even other
programs that interact with it at runtime￿these objects are similarly veri￿ed.
Local and Global Trusted Computing Bases
Using the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism, a security administrator can ￿nger-
print security-critical programs that are part of the system’s trusted computing base
(TCB) and the integrity of this code will be veri￿ed upon execution by all users.
This mechanism means that the user is interacting with TCB code that has been
cryptographically authenticated, similar to how a traditional physical trusted path
mechanism provides the user with a degree of certainty as to the authenticity of
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that is relevant to their own security requirements and so each user can ￿ngerprint
these programs and have them veri￿ed upon execution. This creates two tiers of
TCB: a global TCB (GTCB) determined by the security administrator that applies
equally to all users; and independent local TCBs (LTCB) that apply speci￿cally to
each user, re￿ecting their individual security requirements.
Process Trust Levels
Current real-time code integrity veri￿cation mechanisms have no means for discrim-
inating between veri￿ed and unveri￿ed code, and therefore create the opportunity
for redirection attacks to be mounted unless all objects on the system are veri-
￿ed [21￿23]. However, universal veri￿cation is often impractical, especially with
respect to objects that are frequently modi￿ed. This issue is compounded when
dealing with various non-executable data objects that are not necessarily veri￿ed
and can in￿uence otherwise veri￿ed trusted code at runtime. To address these prob-
lems, Vaults assigns a trust level to every process and this dictates its ability to
access the user’s vault. Programs without a ￿ngerprint are designated as L0 and￿
as these are regarded as untrusted￿they have no access whatsoever to the user’s
vault. This restriction further secures cryptographically protected ￿les and appli-
cation keys by preventing access from potentially malicious, unveri￿ed processes.
However, some processes require access to a limited number of cryptographically
protected objects but do not need to be granted full vault access. These are des-
ignated as L1 and, although they are ￿ngerprinted and veri￿ed on execution, their
access is restricted to speci￿cally designated tickets. This trust level allows pro-
grams that are exposed to extensive untrusted data to be con￿ned to a minimum
level of privilege and isolated from other sensitive data. Fully trusted applications
are designated as L2 and can access all tickets in the user’s vault. A very small num-
ber of programs are designated by the security administrator as L3 and this trust
level is reserved exclusively for vault administrative tasks. In contrast to previous
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processes to be distinguished. Under the Vaults Trusted Fingerprinting model, a
fail-safe default applies such that, even if the user is redirected to access malicious
code that will not be veri￿ed, this code is ￿agged as L0 and has no access to any
cryptographically protected objects or keys. Similarly, a simple mechanism exists to
allow updates to cryptographically veri￿ed data objects where these modi￿cations
are made by authorised, trusted code.
1.3.4 Advantages of Cryptography to Operating System Security
In the past, cryptography has been used most extensively in the domain of network
security, whereas computer security models have typically depended upon a speci￿c
set of rules required to implement the desired policy [18,24]. Examining the reasons
for this di￿erence in approaches is instructive and identi￿es how cryptography can
bene￿t operating system security. A fundamental problem in network security in-
volves two or more parties communicating over an untrusted channel where attack-
ers may either passively eavesdrop or actively manipulate the messages exchanged.
Here, cryptography is used as the primary mechanism for facilitating secure com-
munication over an untrusted medium. Within the limits of existing protocols,
algorithms and implementations, cryptography provides a degree of mathematical
certainty as to the security of these messages and e￿ectively excludes a range of
possible attacks. In contrast, the computer security approach of labelling subjects
and objects, and implementing logic to enforce the desired policy according to these
labels, would be unsuccessful if applied to network communication since attackers
are not bound by these rules and would simply ignore them.
However, labelling is successful in computer security as long as the attacker cannot
subvert the system by achieving a su￿ciently high level of privilege to bypass the
reference monitor that enforces the security policy. Unfortunately, the security
models used in mainstream systems mean that such security failures are di￿cult
to prevent [5]. In contrast, a security model based upon cryptography rather than
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that needs to be achieved before security policy can no longer be enforced. For
example, an attacker who is able to bypass the security kernel and gain direct
access to the disk can ignore the access control labels of objects stored there, and
this is analogous to the network scenario described above. However, if these objects
are cryptographically protected then, given a well-designed security model, the
attacker will be unable to compromise the policy. An additional related bene￿t is
that the cryptographic nature of the protection reduces the dependence of security
on enforcement logic, thus both reducing its complexity and the impact of any
failures in it.
Use of cryptography for computer security models also has other potential advan-
tages. For example, it is the only e￿cient and realistic way of performing in-
tegrity veri￿cation to guard against privileged intrusion and malicious code sub-
stitution [25]. Cryptographic tokens also represent a convenient mechanism for
breaking the link between the privilege of a subject and the subject’s identity. For
example, an attacker who achieves superuser privilege but does not possess crypto-
graphic tokens that grant higher privileges would have their privileges constrained.
This advantage also ￿ows down to ordinary users, although the overall impact on
security is less signi￿cant. Furthermore, basing high levels of privilege on the pos-
session of speci￿c tokens (objects) rather than the identity of the subject protects
these administrative accounts from attack by reducing their exposure. On conven-
tional systems, every instance of the superuser identity represents an opportunity
for attackers to ￿nd and exploit security ￿aws that will grant them unlimited ac-
cess to the system. In contrast, a cryptographically protected token denoting higher
privileges that rarely needs to be accessed has far fewer such privilege boundaries.
These issues will be explored later on in the thesis.
151.4 Signi￿cance of the Research
This thesis describes a number of novel and signi￿cant contributions to the ￿eld of
computer security. These contributions can broadly be categorised into two major
points.
1. This thesis identi￿es and evaluates the advantages of employing cryptography
as the basis of an operating system security model.
It is argued that cryptographically-based operating system security models
provide a number of advantages over purely logic-based approaches. The use
of cryptography allows the models to provide security properties that are nor-
mally either very di￿cult or impossible to achieve. In particular, it is claimed
that cryptographic models are capable of maintaining their stated security
properties, even when under attack by a privileged attacker. The security
properties achieved by the model that has been developed are described in
detail and their security, and success in meeting these goals, evaluated.
2. This thesis demonstrates the success of employing large-scale attack trees for
analysing a security model.
The use of several attack trees to analyse the security of the cryptographically-
based security model developed is described. These attack trees are excep-
tionally large, with the two largest both containing over 160,000 nodes each.
These trees were used to rigorously evaluate the success of the model to meet
its stated security properties in the face of a privileged attacker and were also
used to inform the design of the model during its development in order to
improve its general robustness.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature
review describing the current status of computer security and the limitations of
existing models. It also examines some relevant uses of cryptography, focusing
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properties of cryptography that make it bene￿cial when applied to OS security are
also discussed in detail.
Chapter 3 describes some of the underlying cryptographic infrastructure used by
the model including: the speci￿c types of vaults it provides and their purposes;
the mechanism by which applications can transparently access passwords stored
in vaults; the handling of administrative privileges; and a lightweight public key
infrastructure for inter-user authentication.
Chapter 4 describes the cryptographically enhanced access control model utilised
by Vaults and details how users are able to grant and revoke access to the objects
they own. Chapter 5 describes the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism used to
cryptographically verify the integrity of executed code and to constrain the trust
assigned to this code as appropriate.
Chapter 6 reviews the literature on security analysis and evaluation techniques,
focusing in particular on threat-oriented methodologies suitable for elucidating the
capabilities of a privileged attacker with respect to the Vaults model. It also de-
tails the speci￿cs of the attack tree-based methodology selected for use, de￿nes the
security properties that were analysed and outlines the assumptions employed to
limit the scope of the analysis.
Chapter 7 describes the attacks identi￿ed by the analysis while the trees were still
being constructed and discusses in detail how the model was adapted to address
these issues. Chapter 8 then presents the results of the attack tree analysis and
the nature and prerequisites of the attacks identi￿ed, considering in particular the
ability of the Vaults model to maintain its stated security properties in the face of
a privileged attacker.
Finally, Chapter 9 examines the advantages of the cryptographically-based security
model and considers the security of the Vaults model in particular. A range of
opportunities for future work in exploiting other advantages of cryptographically-
based OS security models is also discussed.
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Computer Security and
Cryptography
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the literature relating to the security model being developed
in this thesis. In the ￿rst half of the chapter, security models of mainstream sys-
tems are considered, as well as schemes to improve the security of such systems.
Following on from this, an overview is given on issues relating to use of the cryp-
tography, both for networking and operating systems. Various mechanisms that
employ cryptography to enhance operating system security are described in detail.
These include cryptographic ￿lesystems and access control models, mechanisms for
securely storing secret values, and schemes for cryptographic veri￿cation of ￿lesys-
tem objects. Interdependencies between the various weaknesses and limitations of
these di￿erent types of operating system-oriented cryptographic mechanisms are
identi￿ed and discussed, pointing the way towards the development of a model that
resolves these problems.
It should be noted that a further discussion of the literature is provided in Chapter
6, focusing on reviewing techniques and methodologies for analysing and assessing
security models. This latter discussion is used to identify the most appropriate
18methodology for evaluating the Vaults model described in this thesis and is not
directly connected with the literature underpinning the design of the model itself.
2.2 Security Background
2.2.1 The Nature of Security
While security is, to some extent, a relatively intuitive concept, de￿ning it pre-
cisely is often problematic. This is evidenced both by the variety of de￿nitions that
exist and the fact that many security texts avoid explicitly de￿ning the term at
all [3,24,26￿33]. Even Bishop’s [18] comprehensive 1000 page text on computer se-
curity does not attempt to present an all-encompassing de￿nition. Early de￿nitions,
such as that in Russell & Gangemi’s [13] introductory text, often consider physical
assets and infrastructure while generally being information-centric and heavily bi-
ased towards con￿dentiality issues [34]. More recently, security has been de￿ned by
distinguishing it from the property of reliability. Speci￿cally, reliable code should
do everything required, while secure code should do everything required and noth-
ing else [35]. This de￿nition requires secure code to behave correctly in response
to all possible inputs that might occur in an explicitly hostile environment, not
just those that are likely or plausible in a benign environment. An example of this
is a bu￿er over￿ow attack where the ‘shell code’ and o￿set pointer injected into
the program could only ever be regarded as malicious data and would never occur
coincidentally [36], [3, Ch. 7].
While Arce’s [35] de￿nition is simple and abstract, it does not identify the correct
behaviour of secure code which is a prerequisite for secure design [28,37,38]. More
importantly it cannot be used to identify the presence of security vulnerabilities
or con￿rm their absence. This point highlights why security is often so di￿cult to
de￿ne and achieve since, as Saltzer & Schroeder [15] observed, proving the absence
of security ￿aws in a design or implementation is extraordinarily di￿cult.
192.2.2 Dimensions of Security
As a result of the di￿culty in arriving at a suitable de￿nition, security is often
considered in terms of several non-overlapping properties variously referred to as
‘components’, ‘goals’, ‘aspects’ or ‘dimensions’ of security. Of these, the term ‘di-
mensions’ will be used in this document as it is the least ambiguous.
The dimensions most commonly considered are con￿dentiality, integrity and avail-
ability [5,13,18,26]. Con￿dentiality refers to the requirement that data, either in
whole or in part, must not be viewed by any unauthorised parties. Depending on
requirements, sometimes this extends to protecting additional metadata (such as
￿le names and sizes) that may reveal information about the data itself. The in-
tegrity dimension requires that data cannot be modi￿ed by an unauthorised party
or modi￿ed in an unauthorised way by those with legitimate access. Sometimes the
term is used to refer to the trustworthiness or authenticity of data [18] but more
often simply means modi￿cation [39]. A subset of integrity is ‘veri￿able integrity’
where unauthorised modi￿cations are not necessarily prevented but are guaran-
teed to be detected. The availability dimension concerns ensuring that computer
resources are accessible to a speci￿ed service quality level. In practice, this can
be easy to achieve within individual systems where centralised control may be en-
forced [5, Ch. 25] but is far more di￿cult to guarantee in distributed systems [26].
As a result, Needham [40] has argued that availability does not always receive the
same attention as the other two dimensions.
2.2.3 The Nature of Insecurity
Ever since the recognition of the importance of computer security in the 1970s,
vulnerabilities in software have represented a serious security problem [2, 3, 41].
Analyses of computer security trends over time show increasing sophistication of
attacks and exploitation of a variety of vulnerabilities in both the design and imple-
mentation of critical and widely used systems [19,42]. Such failures in application
software mean the weight of security responsibility falls heavily on to the operating
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and ￿nancially damaging [43,44]. In an especially worrying trend, one survey re-
ported a very high level of Trojan horse or ‘rootkit’ software that typically allows an
attacker to bypass operating system security measures and covertly re-gain direct
access to the system [20].
Such vulnerabilities occur due to di￿culty in ensuring secure design and imple-
mentation of software [15, 45, 46]. Researchers have examined the properties of
vulnerable software and attempted to identify where such vulnerabilities can occur.
For example, Manadhata & Wing [47,48] describe the notion of an ‘attack surface’
of a system as consisting of those system actions and resources that are externally
visible and therefore exposed to attack. A related notion discussed by Swiderski &
Snyder [3,49] is that of ‘privilege boundaries’, being the places within code involving
interactions between entities of di￿ering privilege. Similar concepts are referred to
by other authors [2,50] under di￿erent names such as ‘trust’ or ‘security’ boundaries,
highlighting the role that such boundaries play in determining whether a program
will be vulnerable to attack. However￿regardless of the degree of security at the
application level￿as Baker [51] has argued, a secure operating system is required to
provide a strong foundation for these high-level features. Operating system security
research will be discussed in the next section.
2.3 Computer Security
2.3.1 Early Trusted Systems and Outcomes
The recognition of the existence of a computer security problem by the US govern-
ment and military agencies in the 1960s led to an initial response of using ‘tiger
teams’ to attack systems and identify vulnerabilities [52,53]. However, this ad hoc
‘penetrate and patch’ approach did not produce secure systems, which led to a
search for a more comprehensive solution [54]. Notable products of this work in-
clude the related notions of a ‘reference monitor’ and ‘security kernel’ described by
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model.
There have been many signi￿cant outcomes of this early research, both positive
and negative. Important security concepts were identi￿ed during this time and
still have an impact on contemporary systems [58]. Examples of these include
the distinction between user-centric discretionary access controls and mandatory
access controls that are enforced according to global security policy and cannot be
bypassed by individual users [13]. Other concepts also originating from this period
are the notion of a trusted computing base (TCB) representing the collection of
system components responsible for enforcing security policy [55] and a physical
trusted path by which users can ensure they are interacting with the TCB and not
malicious code [26].
However, there have been many criticisms of this early work. For example, while
the BLP model has been extremely in￿uential, its con￿dentiality-centric approach
is not appropriate for most modern security requirements where, as Clark & Wil-
son [59] have argued, integrity is typically more relevant. The model’s practical
weaknesses in requiring trusted subjects, and the di￿culty in eliminating covert
channels, demonstrate the obstacles involved in implementing an abstract, formal
security model [57,60,61]. Additionally, the usefulness of its Basic Security Theorem
has been heavily criticised, most notably by McLean [62,63]. The evaluation crite-
ria developed to assess the security of these systems have also been criticised. Some
evaluation criteria have been criticised for being too in￿exible and con￿dentiality-
centric [13,26]. Meanwhile, others, such as Shapiro [64], have criticised more ￿exible
criteria for being so complex as to be meaningless to the average consumer. The
length and cost of the evaluation process is also of concern [13,34,65,66]. As Neu-
mann [67] has observed, a consequence of this is that trusted systems have not been
widely deployed, with most contemporary operating systems utilising discretionary-
based approaches.
222.3.2 Security Models of Mainstream Systems
Mainstream systems such as Unix and Windows NT utilise discretionary access
control models, where users specify permissions or access control lists (ACLs) on
objects they own to determine who may access these [68, Ch. 5]. Mandatory
access schemes are not integrated into these systems, although extensions that
provide these features are available and will be discussed in the next section. Other
features associated with trusted systems are also relatively rare, although one well-
known counter-example is Windows NT’s ‘Secure Attention Sequence’ that allows
a physical trusted path between the user and TCB to be established [69]. In this
case, a trusted path is achieved through the kernel responding to a Control-Alt-
Delete key sequence, which cannot be trapped by applications, and allows the user
to perform some limited, prede￿ned administrative tasks such as changing their
password, logging out and killing system processes.
As is typical with discretionary access control schemes, access rights are granted
based upon the identity of the subject and so this is sometimes referred to as
identity-based access control [18, p. 103]. Given the importance of identity, users
are authenticated before being granted access to the system by being required
to supply the password or passphrase associated with the identity of the account
they are logging into. Therefore, password security is a critical issue as password
compromise￿whether achieved by interception, or by dictionary attack on low en-
tropy passwords￿inevitably leads to security failure. Notably, schemes that enforce
mandatory security also depend on the successful authentication of a subject’s iden-
tity for the assignment of the correct sensitivity labels [34]. Consequently, a great
deal of work has been conducted on the issue of password security [12,70￿75].
Security Model Weaknesses
Loscocco et al. [4] have argued that the discretionary security models found in main-
stream systems, such as those described in the previous section, do not provide an
adequate foundation for application layer security features. Instead, they state that
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However, use of discretionary access controls is a far less frequently criticised feature
of Unix than its privilege model [2,3,5,26￿28]. This privilege model involves two
tiers of users: standard user accounts who can access ￿les according to discretionary
permissions, and the superuser account (known as ‘root’) that holds all administra-
tive privileges and is not constrained by any access controls whatsoever. Gar￿nkel
et al. [5, pp. 105￿108] observe that ￿the superuser is the main security weakness in
the Unix operating system￿ and that, as most Unix vulnerabilities grant superuser
access, ￿most Unix security holes result in a catastrophic bypass of the operating
system’s security mechanisms￿ [5, p. 108].
The reasons why such compromises are so common are twofold. One reason is that,
as Gar￿nkel et al. [5] note, the power of the superuser account makes this the only
meaningful target for attackers. However, the breadth of the superuser’s privileges is
an equally signi￿cant reason, since the requirement of superuser privileges for even
the most basic administrative tasks causes the superuser account to be broadly
utilised and thereby far more exposed to attack than non-privileged accounts. This
creates a large number of privilege boundaries and makes the superuser account
almost impossible to defend. Furthermore, the superuser’s privileges are indivisi-
ble so that a process which requires minor administrative privileges automatically
inherits unrestricted access to the system. For example, superuser privileges are
necessary to authenticate and change passwords, bind network servers to trusted
ports, access most hardware devices, and con￿gure the network. Thus, superuser
privileges are encapsulated in many network servers, most system service programs
(‘daemons’), special programs designated to run with root privilege (set UID pro-
grams), the graphical environment subsystem (X Window System server) and every
program executed by the administrator. The sheer extent of the attack surface this
creates means that a single vulnerability leads to a global security failure. Some
responses to this ￿awed privilege model will now be discussed.
242.3.3 Mainstream Alternative Privilege Models
BSD securelevels
One technique for limiting the privileges of the superuser under Unix is the creation
of di￿erent security levels at which a system may operate. Details of the scheme are
described by Gar￿nkel et al. [5, pp. 118￿119] in their text on Unix security. The
levels begin at ‘securelevel 0’ with this incremented to 1 when the system changes
from single user to multi-user mode at boot time, and optionally from there up
to securelevel 2. Each increment cannot be reversed and enforces additional re-
strictions on what processes may do, including those executing as root. While
the securelevels mechanism provides limitations on the superuser which have the
potential to improve security, as Kamp & Watson [76] have observed, this comes
at the cost of signi￿cant hidden complexity, as the impact of setting a higher se-
curelevel throughout the system can be di￿cult to predict. Furthermore, Gar￿nkel
et al. [5] criticise the mechanism for being impractical because reboots are required
for many common administrative tasks after the securelevel has been raised. This
requirement makes the mechanism unsuitable for most production systems. Both
Gar￿nkel et al. and Dowd, McDonald & Shuh [2] suggest that a su￿ciently mo-
tivated and privileged attacker could still bypass the additional security a￿orded
by the securelevels mechanism, by modifying system ￿les to allow bypassing of the
restrictions upon the next reboot.
Linux Capabilities
The Linux operating system provides a more ￿nely grained mechanism for limiting
superuser privileges where individual administrative rights, known as ‘capabilities’ 1,
are created. Under the scheme, a process can only perform a privileged operation
if it holds the corresponding capability, irrespective of which user executed it. By
1Traditionally, the term ‘capabilities’ refers to an access control architecture where capabilities
￿encapsulates object identity￿ [18, p. 390]. The technique is used by some systems and models in
place of more common access control lists [77￿81]. The way the term is used in this case is in a
more general sense where a right is encapsulated into a ￿ag or token.
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enforced and the impact of security failures thereby limited. Linux capabilities are
therefore more ￿nely grained than BSD securelevels. However, Dowd et al. [2] have
criticised the scheme for its increased complexity, which has already resulted in
security ￿aws having been identi￿ed. Furthermore, as Gar￿nkel et al. [5, p. 121]
have observed, the e￿ectiveness of the mechanism is dependent upon software being
aware of its existence and dropping capabilities when they are no longer needed.
As few programs currently do this, the lack of backward compatibility signi￿cantly
limits the bene￿ts of the scheme.
2.3.4 Mandatory Security in Mainstream Systems
Following from the observation by Loscocco et al. [4] that mainstream operating
systems do not include mandatory security features, there has been some work to
build extensions that incorporate this kind of functionality. For example, Spencer
et al. [82] propose the Flask security architecture and this has been implemented on
the Linux operating system under the name Security-Enhanced Linux or SELinux
[7,83]. The SELinux system has been integrated with a number of Linux-based
systems [84], giving it a relatively wide deployment for a mandatory security-based
scheme. SELinux attempts to address limitations of traditional mandatory access
control implementations, most particularly their con￿dentiality-centric approach.
The scheme is able to support a variety of security policies, such as role-based access
control [85], type enforcement [86,87] and multilevel security [56]. The proponents
of SELinux attribute this ￿exibility to the mechanism’s design that separates policy
from enforcement.
Another similarly ￿exible security extension is the Rule Set Based Access Control,
presented by Ott [88]. This mechanism can also be adapted to a variety of required
security models, including a ‘role compatibility’ model that is similar to the type
enforcement module provided by SELinux. Although having been developed from
fairly di￿erent origins, the two approaches are quite similar and the di￿erences in
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such as Novell’s [89,90] ‘AppArmour’ and ‘grsecurity’ [91] also aim to provide similar
sorts of security infrastructures for the Linux system, either as patches to the main-
stream kernel or using the standard Linux Security Module (LSM) interface. The
Flask architecture has also been ported to FreeBSD in the form of the TrustedBSD
project [92]. A version of the Solaris operating system from Sun that incorporates
mandatory access controls is also available [93].
Limitations and Obstacles to Adoption
Mandatory security-based models, such as SELinux, provide a far more compre-
hensive response to the problem of superuser omnipotence than securelevels and
Linux capabilities as they both limit the superuser and provide a strong alterna-
tive generic security model. From the user’s perspective, this latter point may be
a signi￿cant disadvantage as it has been observed that the imposition of an alien
security model often causes frustration [13, p. 75￿76]. Such complaints have been
observed in user online postings related to SELinux where users indicate that they
feel the model is too complex, unsuited to their security requirements, and ￿forces
too many changes on fundamental unix [sic] concepts￿ [94,95]. This is problematic
as the lack of user acceptance can lead to limited adoption and attempts to bypass
or disable security features.
The issue of SELinux complexity has also been discussed in the academic literature.
While Smalley [10] provides an overview on the con￿guration of SELinux security
policies, researchers have raised concerns regarding the di￿culty of constructing a
complete policy and obtaining su￿cient assurance that the con￿guration is correct.
Archer, Leonard & Padella have criticised the policy language as being ￿very low-
level and detailed, making the high-level properties of a policy di￿cult to check by
inspection￿ [96, p. 158]. Zanin & Mancini observe that interrelationships can occur
between the rules within a policy con￿guration, making it ￿extremely di￿cult to
understand their overall e￿ects in the system￿ [9, p. 136]. Adapting the con￿gura-
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of rules in the policy potentially growing to well over 50,000. As Jaeger, Sailer &
Zhang state, con￿guring the system securely becomes ￿an arduous and error-prone
task￿ [8, p. 59]. This task is both a critical and complex one, with any ￿aws in
either policy or its speci￿cation within the SELinux framework leading to security
failure. This is borne out in one user’s report on his experiences con￿guring an
SELinux policy where this needed to be adjusted several times as speci￿c ￿aws and
limitations were identi￿ed [97].
Security Model Requirements
It is not clear that the models developed to date have achieved the right balance
between usability, ￿exibility and security. While the design of architectures such as
Flask and SELinux is secure and ￿exible, the signi￿cant paradigmatic di￿erences
compared with those widely deployed and the additional complexity involved make
them problematic as alternatives to existing weak models. Ultimately, to gain
widespread acceptance, a security model must be able to be readily abstracted and
understood by the user and also not interfere with or make more complex or onerous
the tasks that the user must complete. It has been argued that ￿users need a clear
model of how the security operates (if not how it actually provides security) in
order to use it well￿ [11, p. 3] and the replacements that have been developed to
strengthen existing models have failed to achieve this. What is required is a model
that enhances security by limiting the power of administrative users while being
conceptually simple to use and aligned with common user requirements. No models
that meet these criteria have been developed to date.
2.4 Overview of Cryptography
Modern cryptography involves the application of di￿erent cryptographic primitives
for the construction of protocols in order to achieve some security goal. The primi-
tives typically considered are symmetric encryption, one-way hash functions, public
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algorithms for each primitive are available with di￿erent security and performance
properties [100￿109]. Protocols exist for di￿erent purposes, with the most nu-
merous and widely used category being that of authentication and key exchange
protocols [110￿117]. These protocols are used to establish a secure channel across
which two or more authenticated parties can communicate. Design of these types
of protocols (and others) is problematic due to the wide variety of potential cir-
cumstances that may arise during a protocol run and the di￿culty in ensuring that
the protocol is secure against all possible attacks. In general, assumptions cannot
made about either the security of the network or that of remote systems. Fur-
thermore, protocols must be resistant against a wide variety of passive and active
attacks. Schneier [118] provides an in-depth description of common algorithms and
protocols, along with an analysis of their security.
2.4.1 Relevance of Cryptography to Networking
Cryptography is particularly relevant to networking as messages exchanged between
parties usually travel across untrusted networks￿such as the Internet￿via nodes
controlled by other parties. Cryptography is the mechanism by which remote parties
may authenticate one another and protect the con￿dentiality and integrity of the
messages exchanged [80,81,119￿124]. As a result, cryptography is far more widely
used today than it has been in the past [125].
However, the underlying property of cryptography that makes it so signi￿cant in
securing network communications is rarely explicitly examined. Existing computer
security models involve a centralised, trusted control agent such as a security kernel
that can enforce the rules and policy required on that system. However, in a
networking environment, each system is largely autonomous and it is not generally
possible for one node to impose an arbitrary security policy on another. This can
only be accomplished if there is a trusted enforcement mechanism and no such
mechanism exists in an open network. However, the universal applicability of the
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that the desired policy will be enforced on a remote autonomous system, even
if no other trust can be placed in the hardware or software on that system. It
is this property that, for example, prevents a user from maliciously modifying a
Kerberos ticket to gain access to a service for which they are not authorised [81,126].
A number of other schemes, such as Gi￿ord’s cryptographic sealing, CNFS and
SiRiUS [127￿129], that demonstrate this property will be discussed in more detail
in Section 2.5.
2.4.2 Use of Cryptography in Operating Systems
Use of cryptography in operating systems is less common than in networking, with
the most frequent use being in the form of standalone tools that accomplish some
speci￿c purpose such as ￿le encryption. The lack of integration of these tools limits
their e￿ectiveness and convenience [130] and more closely integrated approaches
have subsequently been pursued. The three categories of these approaches that
are relevant to this work are cryptographic ￿lesystems, ￿le integrity veri￿cation
mechanisms and secure storage of secrets. These three will be discussed in detail
in the following sections. Other miscellaneous uses of cryptography in operating
systems, which are largely orthogonal to this research, include cryptographically
secured audit trails [131￿135], virtual memory encryption [136], interfaces to cryp-
tographic hardware [137] and random allocation of identi￿ers in order to stymie
certain attacks [138￿140]. Finally, cryptography is typically used to facilitate stor-
age of passwords on the system for the purposes of authentication [141]. Storing
hashes of passwords leverages the non-invertibility property of one-way hash func-
tions to limit the usefulness of these values if recovered. However, the low entropy
nature of user passwords means that dictionary attacks are often feasible and secure
storage of passwords remains a signi￿cant problem [12,70￿74,142]. A related use is
the construction of one-time passwords that can be used to authenticate only once
and reveal nothing to an attacker concerning the next valid password [143￿145].
302.5 Cryptographic Filesystems and Access Control
One use of cryptography in operating systems is encrypting ￿le data. Although data
encryption can be implemented by individual applications, moving this functionality
into the operating system or ￿lesystem layer is a more transparent, interoperable
and convenient approach [130]. Often the primary goal is to protect data in the
event that an attacker gains unrestricted physical access to a machine, such as in the
case of the stolen laptop. However, some schemes utilise cryptography to construct
an access control scheme rather than simply to protect low-level con￿dentiality.
Unfortunately, the designs produced to date have numerous limitations and these
will now be discussed.
2.5.1 Cryptographic Filesystems
Blaze’s Cryptographic File System
The CFS scheme developed by Blaze [130] is an early cryptographic ￿lesystem and
largely established the mould for later designs, with its successors only making in-
cremental improvements [146,147]. Its design recognizes that standalone encryption
software is inconvenient, error-prone and creates interoperability problems, while
low-level hardware-based encryption is too coarse an approach and cannot provide
per-user security. Instead, Blaze argues, a middle ground OS layer approach is
superior.
CFS involves each user creating their own encrypted directory that can then be
‘attached’ to some part of the ￿lesystem tree through the provision of an encryption
key in the form of a passphrase. Access to encrypted ￿les under this directory is
subsequently transparent to all applications. Implementation uses a custom, user-
space NFS server and this approach is portable, requires no kernel modi￿cations
and allows CFS to be used transparently over a network [147]. A symmetric block
cipher is employed for encryption with a novel combination of output feedback
mode and electronic code book mode (ECB), which allows random access to ￿le
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later described a key escrow system involving smartcards to extend CFS.
Zadok & Wright [146,149] have criticised CFS for its poor performance resulting
from the use of a user-space server, which creates the need for many context switches
and reduces the scope for in-kernel caching. Furthermore, access to encrypted but
attached data is also controlled based upon the user ID (UID) of the process making
the request. Consequently, the superuser can bypass the cryptographic protection
for attached ￿les under the normal Unix rules for access control. This anomaly
further highlights the ￿aws in the Unix security model that have already been
discussed.
Transparent CFS
Cattaneo et al. [150] describe the Transparent Cryptographic File System (TCFS).
TCFS is intended as an improved version of CFS using a very similar architecture,
but which operates in a more transparent manner. For example, TCFS no longer
relies on the concept of attaching an encrypted directory to the ￿lesystem tree but
instead allows encrypted ￿les to be accessed transparently once the password has
been supplied. TCFS allows for ￿les to be individually marked as encrypted or
otherwise, meaning that both types of ￿les can be contained in the same directory.
Unlike CFS it allows for group sharing of encrypted ￿les using a threshold scheme
[118, pp. 71￿73] where each user in the group holds a ‘share’ representing part
of the secret key and where, if a su￿cient number of the group load their shares
into the kernel, the encrypted data becomes accessible to the entire group. Cipher
block chaining (CBC) mode is used to encrypt the data but this is done with a
separate key per ￿le block to facilitate random access, which CBC mode normally
inhibits. TCFS is also integrated with the kernel and is therefore generally faster
in operation than standard CFS.
Although TCFS does incorporate some improvements over Blaze’s CFS scheme,
most of these improvements are marginal and there are some areas where TCFS is
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on the cryptographic keys stored in the TCFS database, amongst other weaknesses.
Cattaneo et al. [150] contend that the security of TCFS can be improved through
use of Kerberos to support key management. However, doing so requires that the
applications involved be aware of the mechanism and thereby sacri￿ces the scheme’s
supposed transparency. TCFS also has the undesirable properties that ￿les created
under encrypted directory trees are not automatically encrypted and, if encrypted
￿les are copied, the duplicates automatically and silently also lose their encrypted
status￿this applies even if the destination is under the same protected directory.
Finally, the threshold scheme used for group sharing is awkward and does not re￿ect
the way users typically collaborate; it requires su￿cient users with a share to be
logged into the system simultaneously in order for any user to access the shared
￿les. Avoiding this requires that a threshold of one be used, which makes the use
of a threshold scheme entirely redundant.
Encrypting File System (EFS)
Microsoft Corporation developed EFS as an extension to the NTFS ￿lesystem and
it has been supported since Windows 2000 [152,153], [69, pp. 343￿356]. It involves
the user marking a ￿le with the ‘encrypted’ attribute causing it to be encrypted
with a symmetric key (termed the File Encryption Key or FEK), which in turn is
encrypted with the user’s public key and this ciphertext is then stored in the ￿le’s
header. The corresponding private key is kept symmetrically encrypted with the
user’s login passphrase. EFS is integrated into the Windows GUI and, once enabled
for a ￿le, the decryption process is entirely transparent.
EFS also has extensive support for key escrow and data recovery with all FEKs
being automatically encrypted with a public key belonging to the speci￿ed Data
Recovery Agent (DRA), of which there may be several. Windows XP provides
some support for sharing encrypted ￿les by manually selecting the users involved,
but there is no group functionality. Sharing is implemented by encrypting the FEK
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upon revocation and the ￿le is not re-encrypted. Kher & Kim [151] suggest that
this design allows a revoked user, who can gain physical access to the device, to
manually decrypt the ￿le and read its contents.
EFS has four notable limitations. Most obviously, it is restricted to selected Mi-
crosoft Windows environments with no support for or interoperability with other
platforms such as Unix. Another limitation observed by Wright & Zadok [146] is
its dependence on userspace components for encryption and authentication, which
prevents the scheme from encrypting the contents of system directories. Its design
also involves encrypting and decrypting data just prior to accessing the disk and
therefore it cannot be wrapped around distributed ￿lesystem protocols as can most
other systems described here [147], although one reference [151] suggests this is not
the case when ‘web folders’ are used. And ￿nally, as Wright & Zadok [146] have
noted, the use of login passphrases to protect private keys makes these vulnerable
to dictionary attack and also creates potential reliability problems if an attacker
resets the user’s password.
Cryptfs and NCryptfs
Zadok, Badulescu & Shender [154] describe Cryptfs, a proof-of-concept crypto-
graphic ￿lesystem developed using the notion of ‘stackable’ ￿lesystems [149], and
designed to improve the performance and security of previous systems such as CFS
and TCFS. It relies on the vnode abstraction used in Unix ￿lesystems that hides the
details of the physical ￿lesystem underneath. More speci￿cally, it uses the notion
of ‘vnode stacking’ where one vnode interface can call another. To improve security
over previous schemes, Cryptfs uses both the UID and process session ID to identify
whether access to an encrypted ￿le is permitted, thereby making it more di￿cult
for users with root privileges to access encrypted ￿les belonging to others.
Wright, Martino & Zadok [155] have subsequently presented NCryptfs, an improved
version of Cryptfs that adds several signi￿cant new features, including a generic,
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ity to revoke access when required. NCryptfs also allows the owner of data a great
deal of ￿exibility in determining how long another party may interact with this data.
For example, not only may their access to the data expire after a speci￿ed amount
of time, but they may also be required to re-authenticate themselves to the system
while accessing the data after another speci￿ed interval, and even to re-authenticate
after a speci￿ed period of inactivity2. An improved encrypting ￿lesystem, which
supports integrity veri￿cation of encrypted ￿les, is described by Sivathanu, Wright
& Zadok [156].
Unfortunately NCryptfs’s ￿exibility is also a potential weakness. The design of the
access control scheme is complex and arbitrary, and therefore contrary to estab-
lished secure design principles, such as those described by Saltzer & Schroeder [15],
which recommend an economy of mechanism. This is also problematic from a user
perspective, as the design involves a degree of conceptual complexity in order to
be used e￿ectively and securely. As Whitten & Tygar [157] have argued, if users
cannot properly conceptualise a security mechanism then they are likely to misuse
it or not use it at all. NCryptfs lacks the simplifying abstractions, recommended
by Cox et al. [11], by which the architecture can be easily explained to end users.
For example, in order to facilitate group sharing in situations where the underlying
Unix permissions do not allow this, the owner must grant these users the ￿Bypass
VFS Permissions￿ right3, which allows the recipient to take on the owner’s identity
in a manner analogous to the set UID mechanism. This approach requires careful
programming to be implemented securely and also demands the users have a de-
tailed, low-level understanding of Unix security primitives in order for the feature
to be used safely and e￿ectively.
The scheme also exhibits other security problems. File encryption keys are gener-
ated from user-supplied passwords leading to the potential for dictionary attacks.
2These restrictions are somewhat weak as they can be bypassed for read protection by making
a copy of the protected ￿le which can be accessed inde￿nitely although this will not include
subsequent updates or modi￿cations.
3This is one of seven di￿erent rights which may be set by users, with two additional rights able
to be set by the administrator.
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based designs such as CFS, ultimately this is not a cryptographic link and can still
be bypassed by a suitably privileged and motivated attacker. This problem occurs
because most cryptographic ￿lesystem designs are not designed as generic access
control schemes, but rather as tools for dealing with speci￿c security threats such
as the physical theft of a machine. So far, work on generic access control architec-
tures that utilise cryptography and take advantage of the unique properties that it
provides have been relatively limited. One early approach that meets these criteria
will now be examined.
2.5.2 Gi￿ord’s Cryptographic Sealing
Gi￿ord [127] describes a scheme that he refers to as ￿cryptographic sealing￿, which
is unique in that it represents not only a cryptographic access control scheme, but
also e￿ectively a protection primitive that can be used to construct other speci￿c
access control architectures. Cryptographic sealing is essentially a locks and keys
approach [18, p. 396￿400] that combines features of capabilities and access control
lists by splitting the informative access control data into two parts: one residing
with the object and the other with the subject. These are the lock and the key
respectively, and access to a given object is dependent upon the subject having the
appropriate key for that object’s lock.
Gi￿ord distinguishes between an ‘active’ protection system that requires some
agent, such as a security kernel, to enforce the appropriate policy and ‘passive’
approaches (such as Gi￿ord’s) where protection is always enforced and there exists
no enforcement entity to be bypassed. This concept is related to the notion of us-
ing cryptography to enforce security policy remotely as described in Section 2.4.1.
However, purely passive mechanisms are limited in that they can only provide con-
￿dentiality and authentication, while traditional active schemes can also enforce
integrity and availability requirements. Gi￿ord acknowledges this limitation and
introduces a ‘guard’ to which a password must be supplied in order to gain write
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The scheme involves two types of key with which objects may be encrypted. A
‘basic key’ is essentially a randomly generated symmetric key, while a ‘derived
key’ is calculated from an existing key in some manner. The means by which it
is calculated depends on how the key is to be used. Derived keys are used to
implement threshold schemes whereby, not only can access to a particular object
be granted to other users as the owner of that object wishes, but a highly ￿exible
set of restrictions can also be enforced whereby the object may only be accessed
when a certain combination of keys are available to the subject 4. This is done
through the notion of ‘Key-OR’ and ‘Key-AND’, which require either or both keys
respectively. As these may be combined, an enormous variety of security policies
can be constructed; this is what gives the scheme its high degree of ￿exibility.
The primary advantage of Gi￿ord’s scheme is its highly ￿exible nature. In particu-
lar, the use of a threshold scheme creates the possibility of a large number of access
control con￿gurations that are not available with more conventional approaches.
Gi￿ord demonstrates this by describing how the scheme can be used to implement
capabilities, access control lists and also a multilevel secure system. That a single
underlying access control scheme could be used to implement these considerably dif-
ferent approaches is impressive and demonstrates the ￿exibility of Gi￿ord’s design.
Another, perhaps even more signi￿cant, advantage is the reduction in importance of
the reference monitor through the passive, self-enforcing nature of Gi￿ord’s scheme
which potentially reduces the attack surface area of the system. However, the need
for a guard mechanism to enforce integrity protection means the privilege boundary
cannot be entirely eliminated.
Disadvantages of Cryptographic Sealing
The chief disadvantage of Gi￿ord’s scheme is its inherent complexity. While base
keys are simple and linear in their behaviour, the recursive nature of derived keys
4Note this threshold scheme works on the basis of a single user rather than a collection of users
as in TCFS as described in the previous section.
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ingly di￿cult as more keys and rules become involved. Not only does this make it
di￿cult to evaluate the security of a speci￿c policy but it is also problematic in the
requirements it sets for administrators and users working with the system. These
parties already have extensive experience with existing access control mechanisms
and, as a completely new and unique way of enforcing access control, Gi￿ord’s
scheme shares little similarity with existing, widely used schemes. Gi￿ord’s model
therefore cannot leverage the substantial experience that users and administrators
have gained over years of working with and managing existing access control archi-
tectures. The fact that the non-linear, recursive and largely unstructured nature
of the scheme rapidly becomes much more complex outside of extremely simple
security scenarios using base keys, only serves to magnify fundamental di￿erences
between Gi￿ord’s approach and those currently in widespread use. This makes it
extremely di￿cult for users to be able to visualise how the security model works,
making it di￿cult to use in practice [11].
Therefore, while the technique can emulate alternative access control mechanisms,
given that reliable implementations of these already exist using conventional tech-
niques, it is not clear that there is any advantage in using Gi￿ord’s scheme in this
way. Furthermore, the model gives no consideration to important issues, such as
revocation, except to note that an active mechanism is required to enforce this.
Finally, the scheme is also vulnerable to unauthorised transference of keys from
one party to another and therefore lacks the expected properties of existing, non-
cryptographic access control models.
Despite these issues, Gi￿ord makes strong arguments regarding the advantages of
passive mechanisms using cryptography. Arguably, what is needed is a scheme
that provides the advantages inherent in cryptography, while being able to prevent
unauthorised sharing of access tokens between users and lowering the barrier to
adoption by being conceptually similar to existing access control models.
382.5.3 Other Cryptographic Access Control Models
Cryptographic Access Control and CNFS
Harrington & Jensen [128] describe a locks and keys access control scheme that they
term ￿cryptographic access control￿. The scheme is intended for use in a distributed
system and has been implemented as an cryptographically-enabled version of the
network ￿le system (NFS, [158]), referred to as CNFS.
One of the guiding principles of the work is to transfer the reference monitor and
TCB away from the server and towards the client through use of cryptography.
This is closely related to Gi￿ord’s notion of a passive enforcement mechanism and
represents another example of cryptography being used to remotely enforce security
policy, as discussed in Section 2.4.1. The client places a ￿le on a remote server,
having encrypted it with a symmetric key, and then digitally signs it with a private
key that is referred to by the scheme, somewhat confusingly, as the ‘encryption
key’. The server is provided with the corresponding public key (‘decryption key’)
and veri￿es the attached signature to ensure that the ￿le is valid. However, as the
server does not possess the symmetric key, it is unable to read the original data. No
mechanism is speci￿ed for limiting access to the server so a naive implementation
would allow uploads from anyone. No additional protection is required for the ￿les
on the server since it is impossible for anyone to read the data unless they possess
the symmetric key and the server does not allow modi￿cations to the data unless
they are signed with the appropriate encryption key. This signi￿cantly diminishes
the server’s role in enforcing security policy as all that is required of it is the checking
of signatures. As a result, the extent and complexity of the security-related logic
implemented by the server is also reduced. Access can be granted to other principals
by giving them the symmetric key and either the decryption key for read access or
the encryption key for write access.
Unfortunately there appear to be a number of security-related problems with this
scheme. Some relate to the use of cryptography in the system; for example, the ￿le
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a number of reasons [118, pp. 41￿42]5. The scheme, as described by Harrington &
Jensen [128], is also vulnerable to replay attacks where an attacker can e￿ectively
roll back a document to an older version unless some mechanism for ensuring fresh-
ness is incorporated. Another signi￿cant oversight is the lack of a key distribution
mechanism, without which it becomes impossible to share data with other remote
users, thereby negating a signi￿cant advantage of a distributed ￿lesystem. More
seriously, the scheme provides very limited support for revocation as this requires
deletion of the object, re-encryption with a new key, and distribution of this key to
all other authorised parties. However, deletion is problematic as the server has no
ability to distinguish between the owner of the object and someone who has been
granted write access. Therefore, any user with write access can delete and recre-
ate the object, e￿ectively taking possession of it and locking out authorised users,
including the original owner. Finally, the scheme does not prevent users who have
been granted access to an object from ‘gifting’ these access keys to other unautho-
rised parties who can then do likewise. These ￿aws undermine the security of the
scheme in terms of facilitating remote collaboration.
SiRiUS and Plutus
Goh, Shacham, Modadugu & Boneh [129] describe the ‘SiRiUS’ distributed crypto-
graphic ￿lesystem, while Kallahalla, Reidel, Swaminathan, Wang & Fu [159] present
a similar scheme named ‘Plutus’. Both models aim to provide independent con￿-
dentiality and integrity protection for ￿les with the ability to grant these rights
to other users. Files are encrypted with a symmetric key, the possession of which
grants read access. They are also signed with a private key which, in conjunction
with the symmetric key, grants both read and write access. Neither scheme allows
for write access to be granted separately from read access. One notable di￿erence
between the two is the elegant and e￿cient notion of ‘￿le groups’ used by Plutus
5A well-known attack exists against the extremely widely-used RSA public key cryptosystem
when a message is encrypted and then signed [118, pp. 473￿474]. A brief analysis suggests that
this scheme is not vulnerable, however, a closer examination would be required to con￿rm this.
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encrypted with the same key.
In SiRiUS, metadata is stored on the server in a separate ￿le and a public key is
included for verifying the ￿le’s integrity. No active mechanism exists to prevent ma-
licious modi￿cations, although they are guaranteed to be detected. Plutus avoids
this problem by issuing those granted write access with a ‘write token’. A hash of
the write token is stored on the server, which must be trusted to verify the token
before allowing modi￿cation of the ￿le. Another di￿erence is that Plutus lacks a key
distribution mechanism, which must be achieved independently. Revocation is awk-
ward under both schemes, with a new encryption key needed for all relevant ￿les.
The a￿ected ￿les must then be re-encrypted and the new key securely distributed
to all relevant parties. Plutus minimises the impact of revocation through an opti-
misation strategy known as ‘lazy revocation’ where a ￿le will not be re-encrypted
until it needs to be updated, although the e￿ect of this approach on access control
semantics is not considered. Both schemes also fail to prevent users passing on keys
they have been granted to unauthorised parties and therefore many of the problems
exhibited by Gi￿ord’s cryptographic sealing and CNFS also apply here. So far, no
cryptographic ￿lesystem or access control model has been developed that avoids all
of these limitations.
2.6 Secure Storage of Secrets
2.6.1 Secure Coprocessors
A fundamental issue in cryptographic systems is storing and maintaining the con-
￿dentiality of ‘secret’ values such as keys and passwords. While such secrets can
be encrypted, this new encryption key must in turn be stored, making it a cyclic
problem [160]. One option, summarised by Smith [161], is the use of secure copro-
cessors where secret values (and sometimes security-critical processing) are moved
from the untrusted machine to a separate, limited functionality, physically-secure
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is sometimes the case with add-on hardware, but rather to leverage separation to
improve security.
A design issue in the use of coprocessors is the amount of functionality moved into
the secure device and Gutmann [160] identi￿es ￿ve ‘tiers’ of coprocessor function-
ality, which highlights the paradox of this approach. If too little functionality is
contained within the secure device then there is signi￿cant potential for it to be
mis-used by malicious external code in undesirable ways (such as digitally sign-
ing documents without the user’s consent) because it will contain insu￿cient logic
to adequately determine the context of the requests it receives. However, if too
much functionality is moved into the coprocessor then it becomes too complex to
be su￿ciently trusted and its original purpose is diluted.
2.6.2 Secret-Protected Processors
The design of the ‘secret-protected processor’, or SP-processor, proposed by Lee,
Kwan, McGregor, Dwoskin & Wang [162], and McGregor & Lee’s [163] ‘virtual’
secure coprocessor from which it evolved, highlight some of the limitations of
hardware-based secure storage. These involve changing the microprocessor to sup-
port coprocessing in conjunction with a ‘trusted software module’ (TSM), which
runs in a ‘concealed execution environment’ so no other processes on the system
(including the OS) can interfere with or observe it. Secrets are encrypted as part
of a hierarchical ‘key chain’ with the ‘user master key’ at the root. This can be
generated from a passphrase that must be input directly to the TSM, bypassing the
OS.
The ￿rst problem with this approach is that it requires extensive hardware and
software support. This support includes ￿ve new CPU registers, two new cache line
￿ags, hardware support for encryption and hashing, six new instructions and secure
I/O modes including two external LEDs and buttons. Specialised OS support is
also required and applications must also be aware of the scheme and be able to
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would be required for the scheme to ever be deployed and, with the emergence of
the Trusted Computing Group (Section 2.6.4), this seems unlikely.
However, a more fundamental ￿aw exists. While the TSM executes in a concealed
environment and all data it transmits is encrypted and hashed, the secrets it stores
must at some point be released to external applications. To maintain con￿den-
tiality, these applications must be authenticated to ensure they are not malicious
or have otherwise been subverted, but no mechanism for this is provided by the
SP-processor. The designers suggest that ￿in many scenarios, a veri￿ed and trusted
TSM [will provide] su￿cient protection￿ [162, p. 6]. However, this claim assumes
the TSM is not being attacked, which is a highly questionable assumption given the
goal of the mechanism. Alternatively, the TSM should ￿attempt to verify the trust-
worthiness of the caller to its functions￿ [162, p. 6], either through the use of a secure
bootup mechanism (such as that described by Arbaugh, Farber & Smith [164]) or
utilising a trusted security kernel to ￿correctly identify caller processes, and then re-
strict access based on this identi￿cation￿ [162, p. 6￿7]. However, both approaches
require trust to be signi￿cantly extended beyond the ‘virtual’ secure coprocessor
provided by the scheme, with security now depending primarily on these external
components, as it would do if the secure coprocessor did not exist. This highlights
the need for any scheme for securely storing secrets to adequately authenticate the
code to which the secrets are released.
2.6.3 Plan 9 Factotum and Secstore
Cox et al. [11] describe a redesign of the security architecture of the Plan 9 dis-
tributed operating system involving the introduction of two new components known
respectively as ‘factotum’ and ‘secstore’. Factotum is a per-user self-contained agent
that is essentially an evolution of the SSH authentication agent developed by Yl￿-
nen [122] as part of the SSH remote login system [165], with two key di￿erences.
While the SSH agent manages keys only for the SSH client, factotum is not restricted
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techniques, with the capacity for more to be added. Secondly, both the client and
server in a Plan 9 distributed system have factotum agents that negotiate with one
another on behalf of the server and client processes to complete the authentication
process. This makes the factotum agent a far more active player in the protocol,
and allows authentication and cryptography code to be removed from general ap-
plications and replaced with a simple interface to the agent. The second relevant
component of the Plan 9 security architecture is the secstore network ￿le server
where keys normally held by a user’s factotum are stored in encrypted form when
this agent is not running. Keys are loaded from the secstore when the factotum
process is started during bootup using Boyko, MacKenzie & Patel’s [166] provably
secure password-based protocol, PAK.
Although proponents of hardware-based secret storage mechanisms argue that software-
based approaches cannot provide the same level of security [160￿163], Cox et al. [11]
note that their design improves security and also makes the system easier to use.
Furthermore, as discussed previously, the operating system and related software
components are often better placed to determine whether a secret should be re-
leased to a speci￿c application than hardware schemes such as the SP-processor ar-
chitecture. Plan 9 also includes a ‘con￿rm’ mechanism that allows the user to mark
speci￿c secrets as requiring user con￿rmation before they are used to authenticate
a process. However, it would be inconvenient to ￿ag all secrets as requiring con￿r-
mation and, even though factotum never releases actual keys, secrets not ￿agged in
this way may be potentially used by factotum to authenticate on behalf of malicious
processes. This is because the factotum agent has no way of authenticating the pro-
cesses involved and discerning whether a speci￿c key should be used or not. This is
therefore a similar problem to that a￿ecting the SP-processor, albeit in a di￿erent
form. The scheme also requires that applications be aware of the factotum agent
and able to interface with it, although the work involved in modifying applications
to add this functionality is minimal. Nonetheless, the Plan 9 factotum/secstore
architecture represents an interesting, user-friendly and relatively secure approach
44to managing secrets within an operating system.
2.6.4 Contemporary ‘Trusted Computing’
A combined hardware and software approach to managing secrets is demonstrated
by the speci￿cations released by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 6 industry
consortium [167]. At the centre of this approach is the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) chip, summarised by Reid & Caelli [168], which is e￿ectively a cryptographic
coprocessor providing support for the cryptographic primitives and a small amount
of protected key storage. This chip is designed to be a ￿xed part of a speci￿c
machine and has been incorporated in some PC systems since 2003 [169].
The TPM provides a basic cryptographic hardware infrastructure that can be used
in a variety of ways, principally surrounding digital rights management [170] and
high assurance computing [171￿174]. The two main generic features supported by
the TPM are protected storage and remote attestation [175]. Protected storage
leverages the ability of the TPM to provide hardware-based protection of certain
secret values. This allows construction of a tree-based key hierarchy with a Storage
Root Key (SRK) at the root and stored in the TPM itself. Utilising this, various
data and keys can be stored securely outside of the TPM. The protected storage
mechanism therefore supports the construction of a custom secure coprocessor sys-
tem, such as that proposed by Marchesini, Smith, Wild & MacDonald [169].
Remote attestation is the ability for the system to cryptographically prove to a
remote party the status of its con￿guration and software. This is achieved through
an authenticated boot process, partially based on the scheme by Arbaugh et al.
[164], where a hash function chain is constructed involving each piece of code to
be executed being hashed, combined with the previous hash value in the chain.
This result is stored in a TPM register and is ‘extended’ with each subsequent
‘measurement’ (hash) taken. The ￿nal value represents all of the code that has been
executed in booting and can be digitally signed by the TPM and sent to a remote
6Formerly known as the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA).
45party for veri￿cation. The objective of this approach is to provide surety for remote
parties as to the software executing on a given system. In this context, as Abad￿
[176] has argued, the TPM e￿ectively acts as a built-in trusted third party for use
in certain protocols. However, Sadeghi & St￿ble [177] have criticised this approach,
arguing that assurance as to the security properties provided by a remote system is
of greater importance than the speci￿c software it is running. Indeed, these authors
suggest that attestation based upon the speci￿cs of an individual con￿guration could
be used to exclude systems running software belonging to a competitor. The use
of the TPM architecture to potentially enable draconian digital rights management
(DRM) [168,178] has also been heavily criticised by some, notably Anderson [179].
However, a scheme that uses it more generally for code veri￿cation will be discussed
in Section 2.7.3.
2.7 Cryptographic File Integrity Veri￿cation
There has been a variety of data integrity schemes proposed [180￿184] and cryptog-
raphy is widely used to authenticate code in distributed systems [185￿191]. How-
ever, the following discussion will focus on cryptographic mechanisms for verifying
object integrity within a single system.
2.7.1 Tripwire
Kim & Spa￿ord [25,192] developed the Tripwire ￿lesystem integrity checker de-
signed for Unix-based systems [25,192]. It is intended to detect changes to critical
system ￿les in the event the system is compromised and the attacker gains super-
user access. For example, an attacker may install a ‘root kit’ that modi￿es system
programs to disguise his or her presence and to facilitate easy re-entry, even if
the original vulnerability is closed. Tripwire works by creating a database of ‘sig-
natures’ (hash values) of administrator-speci￿ed system ￿les and their attributes,
with this being stored on a read-only device such as read-only ￿oppy disk, CD-
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automated manner through the standard Unix cron facility and the output is man-
ually inspected to identify problematic changes. A variety of hashing algorithms
are supported and an arbitrary number of these functions can be used to generate
signatures for each ￿le.
Weaknesses and Limitations
The designers of Tripwire state that ￿security tools should be completely self-
contained, needing no auxiliary programs to run￿ [25, p. 23]. However, in practice,
Tripwire has numerous external dependencies that undermine its security. For ex-
ample, removing or corrupting the cron job used to automatically execute Tripwire
would conceal an intruder’s presence (at least temporarily) in most con￿gurations.
Although Tripwire’s signature database and con￿guration ￿le may reside on read-
only ￿lesystem, an attacker can also trivially redirect Tripwire to use ine￿ective,
alternative ￿les. A more sophisticated attack involves replacing the Tripwire bi-
nary with a corrupted version that does not report speci￿ed modi￿cations. This
circular set of dependencies is analogous to the subverted compiler attack famously
described by Thompson [193]. This task is made easier by the availability of the
Tripwire source code and would be very di￿cult to uncover. Finally an attacker
can target the layer below the Tripwire program, namely the operating system ker-
nel and shared libraries it depends upon for correct operation7. This is entirely
feasible for an attacker with superuser privilege and, in fact, allows them to subvert
the behaviour of any program on the system￿this being the very problem Tripwire
was designed to prevent. These attacks demonstrate that Tripwire can only provide
e￿ective security against an attacker who is unaware of its existence.
The causes of Tripwire’s limitations are twofold. First, Tripwire is a passive mech-
7The current state-of-the-art in terms of root kit technology involves the use of hardware-based
virtualisation where the root kit software actually places itself between the operating system and
hardware, thereby becoming completely undetectable. Examples of such mechanisms include the
‘SubVirt’ system developed by King et al. [194] and Rutkowska’s [195,196] reported ‘Blue Pill’
mechanism.
47anism that can simply detect modi￿cations but not prevent them or actively alert
users to the presence of the modi￿ed code they may be executing. This problem is
magni￿ed by the signi￿cant detection latency involved, which increases an attacker’s
options in bypassing detection. The second reason is Tripwire’s dependence upon
the underlying infrastructure in terms of the ￿lesystem, system services, shared li-
braries and operating system kernel. This gives the attacker numerous opportunities
to bypass detection by attacking Tripwire at a lower layer and subverting the infras-
tructure it depends upon to operate correctly. This weakness could be remedied by
closer integration with the kernel, thereby allowing proactive, automated responses
to integrity violations. Use of an alternative cryptographic primitive, such as dig-
ital signatures, could also reduce an attacker’s options. The CryptoMark scheme,
which incorporates both of these approaches, will now be examined.
2.7.2 CryptoMark
Beattie, Black, Cowan, Pu & Yang’s [21] CryptoMark scheme is a code integrity
and authentication mechanism implemented on Linux that deals with some of the
weaknesses inherent in Tripwire. It involves generating digital signatures for im-
portant system programs and embedding them into the binary itself. The kernel is
modi￿ed to verify the signatures before the program is executed and, if the code
has changed, then the system will either abort execution or allow it to continue and
report the incident to an intrusion detection system. Thus CryptoMark is capable
of proactive responses in a way that Tripwire is not. The scheme operates in one
of two modes where either all system binaries are required to be signed in order
to be executed or where all programs executing with superuser privilege (either by
virtue of the set UID bit or simply because the program is executed by root) must
be signed.
The scheme’s implementation depends heavily on the Executable Linkable Format
(ELF) used for executable binaries. An MD5 hash is calculated across the exe-
cutable portions of such a ￿le (other segments are not included) and the ￿nal sig-
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non-ELF binaries (for example, programs in the a.out format) are not protected,
although the designers suggest that an auxiliary table ￿le could be constructed to
hold signatures for them.
Comparison with Tripwire
While the objectives are similar, the architectures used in Tripwire and CryptoMark
are markedly di￿erent. Tripwire is entirely user-space and requires no kernel sup-
port at all, while CryptoMark is tightly integrated with both the kernel and the
binary executable format used. This makes CryptoMark more resilient to low-level
attacks but simultaneously reduces its portability. The use of digital signatures in
CryptoMark, rather than hash values in Tripwire, eliminates the need to protect the
signature database ￿le. However, use of signatures also means that CryptoMark
must keep the private signing key secret and prevent substitution of the public
key. CryptoMark also has a much greater impact on performance due to the slower
signature veri￿cation process, which must be performed upon execution of every
signed binary. Finally, as CryptoMark can prevent execution of compromised code,
it can potentially actively prevent intruder re-entry and also protect users from
inadvertently revealing passwords and cryptographic keys. These properties make
CryptoMark superior to Tripwire from a security perspective.
Attacks and Limitations
The design of Beattie et al.’s CryptoMark, which limits veri￿cation to code in ELF
executables, leads to incomplete mediation of code and other objects that in￿uence
the code’s behaviour. This design weakness is contrary to established secure design
principles [15] and can be exploited in a number of ways. One set of attacks involves
modifying external con￿guration ￿les relied upon by trusted code. Because only
the executable code itself is signed, an attacker can modify other static inputs to
the program, such as con￿guration ￿les, to alter this code’s behaviour. Examples
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and subverting ￿rewall rules to open up a speci￿c port where they could install a
shell process executing superuser privileges.
Numerous other similar attacks exist depending upon system con￿guration and
features. A signi￿cant class of these attacks involves non-ELF executable formats
such as the scripting languages that are widely available on modern systems 8. While
the interpreter executable may be signed, it is the unsigned scripts it executes that
primarily determine its behaviour when executed. This allows the attacker to write
practically as much malicious code as desired. CryptoMark would not detect these
attacks because no signed code would actually have been modi￿ed. A secure code
veri￿cation scheme must recognize the dependency of trusted code upon parameters
and other external objects for correct execution.
Improvements to CryptoMark
The weaknesses described in the previous section stem from the reliance of Cryp-
toMark on embedding signatures in ELF executable ￿les. As CryptoMark’s devel-
opers suggest, one solution would be a separate table storing signature information
for other non-ELF ￿les. However, this approach makes it problematic to identify
which objects need to be veri￿ed and which do not. While CryptoMark’s previous
policy for determining where veri￿cation is required avoided the circular integrity
dependencies exhibited by Tripwire, placing this information in a separate table
simply makes the table the target for attack. Given that an attacker with super-
user privilege can potentially modify the table, e￿ectively no additional security is
gained by its existence, thus the same vulnerabilities already discussed still apply.
Furthermore, creating an arbitrary distinction between programs that are veri￿ed
and those that are not provides scope for redirection attacks where a user is tricked
into executing a di￿erent program to that intended. This form of attack means that
the reliability of matching objects to entries in the veri￿cation table is critical.
8Examples of scripting languages that could be used in this kind of attack include Java, Perl,
Tcl, Python and the various shell scripting languages (Bourne, C and Korn shells, for example).
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the system. However, as Reid & Caelli [168] have observed, such an approach is
highly impractical. For example, a universal veri￿cation would impose an enormous
performance penalty, and is an especially ine￿cient approach as the majority of
these objects would likely have little or no security signi￿cance. Finally, it is unclear
how such an approach would deal with the creation of new ￿les or modi￿cation of
existing ones as these would be unsigned and, therefore, presumably inaccessible
unless automatically signed by the system. Aside from the questionable security
semantics of automatic signing, which would need to be examined very carefully,
this approach would require that the private signing key be kept on the system
securely and would therefore create another avenue of attack.
2.7.3 A TCG-Based Approach
Sailer, Zhang, Jaeger & van Doorn [22] present a scheme that uses the measurement
capabilities of the TPM chip found in TCG-compliant computer systems (discussed
in Section 2.6.4) to verify the integrity of general objects beyond the operating
system. Veri￿cation can include objects such as con￿guration ￿les, scripts and
other data that can in￿uence program execution. While the scheme could be used
for remote attestation, this would depend on the challenger being able to determine
the validity of a hash value for any given object. However, as Reid & Caelli [168]
have identi￿ed, this seems certain to be problematic given the inherent diversity
of such values. A more practical alternative is to use this functionality to verify
the integrity of programs before they execute by caching known-good measurements
and aborting execution if the hashes do not match. This approach achieves a similar
outcome to CryptoMark.
The limitation of Sailer et al.’s [22] scheme is that it is essentially a binary sys-
tem, as either a program’s measurement matches and the program runs, or the
measurement is di￿erent and execution is denied. Given that many data objects
will change frequently, these objects could not be included in the cache otherwise
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could subvert the behaviour of otherwise veri￿ed programs, this introduces a vul-
nerability. Such a weakness is especially problematic as all code executes with the
same privilege level, regardless of whether integrity has been veri￿ed or not, and
the issue is exacerbated by the lack of a convenient mechanism for updating object
measurements. Furthermore, interactions between veri￿ed code and unveri￿ed code
or data are not addressed. Therefore, while Sailer et al.’s approach is an interesting
alternative application of the TPM chip, its practical and security limitations make
it unsuitable as a general-purpose integrity veri￿cation mechanism.
2.7.4 I3FS
I3FS is a ￿lesystem integrity mechanism, presented by Patil, Kashyap, Sivathanu
& Zadok [23], that follows the Tripwire paradigm of storing caches of system ￿les
but avoids many of the problems with this, as well as those of CryptoMark. This
success is achieved by storing policy and hash databases in encrypted form and
integrating the mechanism with the ￿lesystem. Because of this, the ￿lesystem must
be manually mounted and the appropriate passphrase input. Upon access to a ￿le,
the system checks for the existence of a hash and, if found, veri￿es that the ￿le
data has not changed. If a change is detected, access may be denied and/or an
appropriate message written to the log. The scheme includes a number of means
for trading o￿ security in favour of performance, such as extensive caching and a
con￿guration option for reducing the frequency of checks. However, the security
implications of employing these options are not analysed.
Security Issues with I3FS
I3FS has a number of security problems, some speci￿c to its design and others more
general in nature; for example, privileged attackers can divert or delete log messages
recording veri￿cation failure by accessing the ￿lesystem directly. There are also
serious questions regarding the approach taken to trading-o￿ security to optimise
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￿le contents, an attacker can again avoid detection by bypassing the ￿lesystem and
writing directly to the disk. Similarly the checking frequency mechanism would need
to be used judiciously and analysed carefully for security implications in practice.
Finally, as the ￿le data of previously veri￿ed objects is not cached, a privileged
attacker writing directly to the disk can insert malicious code in place of that
which has been previously veri￿ed.
The necessity for the ￿lesystem to be manually mounted and its databases decrypted
means that the boot process itself cannot be veri￿ed and creates the possibility
that an attacker may insert their own malicious code to subvert integrity checking.
Alternatively, the attacker could steal the I3FS database encryption passphrase by,
for example, replacing the legitimate version of the mount program. Such an attack
could be easily achieved on System V Unix by adding code to the appropriate rcn.d
directory and this would not trip integrity checks in I3FS prior to reboot, since it
involves the addition of new code rather than modi￿cation of existing code. The
use of a passphrase to encrypt hash and policy databases also exposes them to the
threat of dictionary attack.
However, the easiest way to attack the I3FS scheme, as described by Patil et al. [23],
is by subverting the matching of the ￿le being accessed to a corresponding entry in
the database that determines whether the ￿le must be veri￿ed or not. This matching
is achieved by comparing the inode number for the object accessed against those
contained in the database, thereby avoiding ￿unnecessary string comparisons￿ [23, p.
70]. However, this design decision allows an attacker to trivially substitute malicious
code for trusted code that should be veri￿ed. This substitution is achieved by
renaming the legitimate object to an alternative name under which it is unlikely to
be recognized and substituting the malicious object in its place with the previous
path name. The legitimate object will retain its previous inode and, if executed,
will be successfully veri￿ed. However, the malicious replacement will have a new
inode number with no corresponding database entry and therefore I3FS will not
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from their perspective, they are simply executing a program with its normal path.
2.7.5 General File Integrity Protection Problems
Of all problems described, it is the inode redirection attack just described that high-
lights the most serious limitation of schemes such as I 3FS. If an object is found not
to have a checksum, then access is allowed and the program or data concerned is
treated in exactly the same way as if the object had its integrity cryptographically
veri￿ed. This problem could be avoided if all objects on the system are veri￿ed.
However, universal veri￿cation is typically not feasible since many system objects
will change frequently, the integrity of newly created objects may be uncertain,
and because of the signi￿cant performance overheads involved￿especially as many
of these objects will have no impact on security. Therefore, what is needed is a
mechanism to manage the privileges assigned to a process based upon whether its
integrity has been veri￿ed. Once the trust level of a process is established, modi￿-
cations that the process makes to trusted objects can be assessed allowing for the
automatic updating of veri￿cation data. The lack of a key management infrastruc-
ture is also problematic in terms of the requirement to manually input passphrases
and a similar issue exists with the storage of the private key in CryptoMark. Fur-
ther discussion of these issues and a model for dealing with them will be discussed
in Chapter 5.
2.8 Summary
Of the security models developed to date, mandatory approaches provide strong
security but are complex, unintuitive and often do not match users’ requirements.
Widespread discretionary-based models are simpler to understand and use, but
concentrate too much privilege with the administrative superuser account. Such a
design is the principal security weakness of systems such as Unix. An alternative
54approach is needed that provides an intuitive and conceptually simple paradigm,
stronger security (including limits on the superuser) and is consistent with user
expectations and requirements.
Cryptography provides a convenient mechanism for implementing a locks and keys
access control model. In addition to enhancing security generally, a cryptographic
approach can also be e￿ective at constraining superuser privileges. However, exist-
ing uses of cryptography in operating systems have been rather limited. A number
of ￿le encryption mechanisms have been discussed in this chapter but all have prac-
tical and security limitations and none provides all the properties expected of a
generic access control scheme. This is because these schemes have largely been
developed as stand-alone security tools with little or no reference to existing access
control theory.
A cryptographic access control model is signi￿cantly dependent upon an underlying
cryptographic infrastructure, particularly the existence of a mechanism for securely
storing keys. While both hardware and software secure storage mechanisms exist
and have been discussed in this chapter, they lack the means to determine whether
a key should be released when a given program requests it. As a result, keys can be
inadvertently released to malicious or subverted code, which completely undermines
the security the mechanism is intended to provide. Avoiding this problem requires a
means for authenticating code. However, while code integrity veri￿cation schemes
exist, none has been integrated with a key storage facility. These code integrity
veri￿cation schemes also have signi￿cant practical and security weaknesses, par-
ticularly in relation to identifying which code should be veri￿ed. These problems
can be signi￿cantly mitigated through the provision of a means for limiting the
privilege with which unveri￿ed code executes. However, this requires a supporting
access control and privilege model, something that all current integrity veri￿cation
schemes lack.
In summary, therefore, all of the di￿erent cryptographic security features that cur-
rently exist in operating systems are, in fact, interdependent. This notion is illus-
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trated in Figure 2.1. However, the ad hoc and fragmentary nature of their design
means that, so far, these interrelationships have not been recognized. Consequently
these mechanisms remain limited from both a security and practical point of view,
with the result being that they have not been widely deployed and their potential
bene￿ts not fully realised. An integrated, holistic approach that recognizes the
mutual bene￿ts and synergies possible through combining these di￿erent types of
mechanisms allows for signi￿cant security improvements. Such an integrated ap-
proach also provides an enhanced security model for discretionary-based systems
without the additional complexity of mandatory designs. Vaults, a security model
that meets all of these criteria, will be described and analysed in the remainder of
this dissertation.
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Vaults Infrastructure
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a number of elements that form the infrastructure on which
the Vaults architecture is based. The chapter begins by delineating the di￿erent
types of secure repositories or ‘vaults’ that the model provides. It then describes
the Vaults Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that allows users to cryptographically
authenticate one another when exchanging privileges. Also discussed are the mech-
anisms for storing and retrieving keys belonging to speci￿c applications in the user’s
vault, a model for administrative privileges and the management of Vaults-related
credentials associated with processes, including the trust levels assigned to them.
The prominent security features of the model, namely cryptographic ￿le access con-
trol and code integrity veri￿cation, that are described in Chapters 4 and 5 depend
upon this infrastructure for their operation.
3.2 Vault Types and Properties
The centrepiece of the newly-developed architecture is the concept of a vault which
is a repository used to securely store a variety of items. There are ￿ve di￿erent
types of vaults: User, Global Private, Global Public, Escrow and Fundamental.
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The Global Private, Global Public and Escrow Vaults are referred to collectively
as the ‘system vaults’. All of the vaults are stored on disk in encrypted form
and loaded into secure memory when needed. The encryption used is required
to be authenticated such that modi￿cations to the ciphertext are detected upon
decryption. This may involve use of a message authentication code (MAC) [17] in
addition to encryption or an authenticated encryption mode such as OCB [197].
Each vault type plays a di￿erent role in the overall model and has di￿erent rules for
access to stored items. These rules are enforced primarily through cryptographic
means, with supporting enforcement logic provided by the security kernel. Details
of all types will now be described.
3.2.1 User Vaults
All users of the Vaults architecture have their own, individual vault, known collec-
tively as user vaults. User vaults hold sensitive data items belonging to that speci￿c
user and these contents determine that user’s privileges on the system. The three
main categories of items held in a user’s vault are application keys, ￿ngerprints and
tickets. The symbols used to represent these items in future diagrams are given in
Figure 3.1. The general layout and relationships of items stored in a user’s vault
are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Application keys are secret values pertaining to speci￿c applications; for example,
an e-mail account password used by a mail client. Application keys are bound
to the program or programs that require them and cannot be accessed by other
non-administrative software. Application keys are distinct from the cryptographic
keys used by Vaults to protect ￿les, which are not stored in the user’s vault but
rather in the Global Private vault controlled by the kernel. Instead, the user’s vault
stores ￿le access tickets which are linked with these keys. ‘Fingerprints’ stored in
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a user’s vault are generated for programs and their dependencies (such as shared
libraries) that the user has identi￿ed as relevant to their security requirements.
These programs are veri￿ed upon execution to ensure they have not been modi￿ed,
which protects the user against malicious code. Application keys, ￿ngerprints and
tickets are discussed further in Section 3.5, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively.
3.2.2 Global Private Vault
The purpose of the Global Private vault (GPRIV) is to store values for which
con￿dentiality and integrity must be maintained. No users, including the privileged
prime user, are able to directly access items held in GPRIV. All interactions are
indirect and strictly mediated by the security kernel.
A common type of item held in GPRIV is ￿le protection keys. When a user initiates
protection (either read or write) of a particular ￿le, a key is generated by the kernel.
This key is placed into GPRIV and therefore users never gain direct access to these
keys. Instead, a ticket for accessing the key is generated at the same time as the
key and it is the ticket that is kept in the user’s vault. The ticket is uniquely
cryptographically linked with the protection key and access to the protected ￿le
therefore depends upon possession of the ticket. Consequently, GPRIV plays a
pivotal role in the secure operation of the Vaults model. Some of the di￿erent
aspects of its operation are illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 as discussed in the
related sections.
593.2.3 Global Public Vault
The Global Public vault (GPUB) contains information that is intended to be pub-
licly accessible in a reliably authentic way to all users on the system. For example,
the vault stores globally-applicable ￿ngerprints, users’ public keys and encrypted
￿le protection tickets that are being exchanged between users. The role of this vault
is to act as an authoritative source that allows the authenticity and integrity of in-
formation it makes available to be relied upon. Ordinary users can only read data
from GPUB and cannot directly modify the values it stores. All access is therefore
mediated by the security kernel.
3.2.4 Escrow Vault
The purpose of the Escrow Vault is to hold copies of escrowed tickets for protected
￿le objects. The Escrow Vault is kept encrypted with a key held in the Fundamental
Vault and only the prime user has a ticket to access this key. This means that only
the prime user can access the Escrow Vault, which represents one of the special
privileges held by the prime user. Note that even with access to the Escrow Vault,
the prime user does not gain direct access to the ￿le protection keys themselves
but rather to the ￿le access tickets that relate to them. Details of the key escrow
mechanism are discussed further in Section 4.8.3.
3.2.5 Fundamental Vault
The Escrow, GPUB and GPRIV vaults must be stored encrypted on the disk to
prevent unauthorised access. However, their contents must be accessible by the
security kernel when the system boots up. To facilitate this, the keys used to
encrypt these vaults are stored in the Fundamental Vault and are this vault’s only
contents. This relationship is shown in Figure 3.3. These keys are therefore known
as ‘Fundamental Keys’. Unlike ordinary ￿le protection keys, the only tickets that
exist for access to Fundamental Keys are held by the prime user. This design is
discussed further in Section 3.6.
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At boot time, the Fundamental Vault must be decrypted and so the key (‘Funda-
mental Vault key’) with which it is encrypted must be securely stored. There are
a number of ways that this could be achieved, depending upon how the system is
used and its security requirements, and each approach has di￿erent advantages and
trade-o￿s. These options are detailed below and summarised in Table 3.1.
Manual Passphrase The security administrator or machine operator can supply
the appropriate passphrase at boot time. In this scenario, the system will not
boot until the appropriate key has been provided. This approach is appro-
priate for scenarios where the machine is a personal workstation that is only
ever used interactively and the administrator (user) is always present at boot
time.
Smartcard or Key Disk Another approach involves storing the decryption key
on a physical device such as a smartcard or, more cheaply, a ‘key disk’. The
latter involves storing the key on a ￿oppy, CD-ROM or USB ￿ash drive and
could facilitate unattended bootup if physical access to the machine itself is
secured. Such a device could also be used for attended bootup for machines
that lack physical security, as a more secure and user-friendly alternative to
a passphrase.
TPM Chip An ideal solution in many scenarios is the use of the TPM chip avail-
61Property Manual Smartcard Key Disk TPM
Unattended Boot no yes yes yes
Hardware Expense none moderate v. low none
Req. Physical Security low high high low
Security A￿orded moderate/high low/moderate low/moderate high
Table 3.1: Comparison between Fundamental Vault decryption key storage mecha-
nisms
able in TCG-compliant systems (Section 2.6.4), which are virtually ubiqui-
tous [198]. This chip incorporates a small amount of on-board secure storage
suitable for the Fundamental Vault key. The authenticated boot process facil-
itated by the chip ensures the integrity of the kernel software before the key
is released. This approach allows a high security unattended boot without
requiring extensive physical security and with no additional hardware costs
for TCG-compliant systems.
3.3 Vaults Public Key Infrastructure
3.3.1 The Need for a PKI
Public key cryptography can facilitate secure key exchange over an untrusted chan-
nel and authentication of messages through digital signatures. In the Vaults security
model, public key cryptography is used in an analogous way for exchanging privi-
leges between users. However, public key cryptography is problematic in the need
to be able to authenticate the public keys themselves in order to prevent man-in-
middle attacks [118, pp. 48, 49]. The most common solution for this problem is the
use of a public key infrastructure (PKI), where a centrally trusted authority issues
certi￿cates binding public keys to speci￿c identities by virtue of the trusted certi￿-
cation authority’s (CA) digital signature [199, pp. 270, 271]. Although subject to
numerous practical problems and much criticism (cf. [200]), in a decentralised dis-
tributed architecture, such as the Internet, few alternative options currently exist.
An equivalent need exists in Vaults as it is necessary for users to be able to crypto-
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Figure 3.4: Abstract bindings created by the VPKI
graphically authenticate one another. Without such cryptographic authentication,
an attacker with superuser privileges can potentially impersonate users on the sys-
tem and thereby obtain unauthorised access to ￿le tickets being exchanged between
these parties in what is e￿ectively a man-in-the-middle attack. As these tickets
are exchanged using public key cryptography, a PKI allows this exchange to be
authenticated.
3.3.2 VPKI Architecture Overview
There are a variety of issues relating to the notion of user identity in computer
systems [18, Ch. 14]. The identity of the user as a person typically dictates the
rights and privileges assigned to their online identity within the context of the
computer system. Also, while the system may use an internal identi￿er, such as a
user ID, in making access control decisions, interactions between di￿erent users on
the system still depend primarily on that person’s name. This is important because,
when one user shares a ￿le with another, they are primarily granting access on the
basis of the person’s name and real-world identity, rather than an impersonal user
ID. Therefore, in considering interactions and privilege sharing between users, it is
important to achieve an authenticative link between the user’s real-world identity
and the privileges being shared.
The Vaults Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) addresses this problem by binding
together the user’s identity and their privileges on the system in a cryptographically
authenticated manner as represented in Figure 3.4. This allows users to ascertain
the real-world identity of the party to whom they are granting privileges, rather
than simply dealing with a non-descriptive user ID.
In a more concrete representation, the VPKI links the name of the person with their
public key pair (which is the purpose of traditional PKIs), but then further connects
the key pair with the vault belonging to that user (Figure 3.5). This association
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Figure 3.5: Concrete VPKI bindings description
re￿ects the fact that it is the contents of a subject’s vault that determines their priv-
ileges when attempting to access an object, rather than their identity. However, as
indicated above, the user’s identity remains relevant in determining their authori-
sations, such as when exchanging privileges with other parties. Cryptographically
linking these elements together therefore secures the exchange of privileges.
3.3.3 VPKI Certi￿cates
As with most PKI schemes, VPKI uses certi￿cates as constructs to create a veri￿able
binding between an identity and a public key. Being more speci￿c in purpose,
VPKI certi￿cates have a simpler structure than, for example, X.509 certi￿cates
[17,120,201]. There are also a number of practical requirements for certi￿cates,
such as speci￿cation of algorithms and related parameters, but these details are
tangential to the model and will not be considered here.
The following describes the structure of the certi￿cate:
Version The VPKI version to which the certi￿cate adheres. The structure de-
scribed here is considered to be ￿1.0￿ and the existence of this ￿eld allows for
future enhancements.
Identi￿er The name of the principal. This should be represented in a manner that
is unambiguous and unique within the scope that the certi￿cate is to be used;
for example, their full name and title.
Username The label used to identify the user on the system. This will be unique
only to an individual system.
User ID A non-negative integer number uniquely identifying the user’s account
on the system.
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properties and semantics of the Vault ID (VID) will be discussed in the next
section.
Certifying This ￿eld can have the values ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to indicate whether the
owner of the key is considered to be a CA and will only be set to ‘yes’ for the
prime user. The default value is ‘no’ and certi￿cates cannot be loaded into
GPUB with any other value. In order to switch this ￿ag on, the certi￿cate
must already be stored in GPUB, which e￿ectively restricts the setting of this
￿ag to the prime user as only they have the privilege necessary to modify the
contents of GPUB. Furthermore, modifying this ￿eld invalidates any certifying
signatures previously appended to the certi￿cate.
Public Key The representation of the user’s public key in an appropriate format.
Creation Timestamp A timestamp indicating when the certi￿cate was created.
Certifying Signatures The digital signatures belonging to those who have ver-
i￿ed the ownership of this certi￿cate. Unlike the previous ￿elds, which are
static, this ￿eld can be changed (appended to) during the life of the certi￿cate
and so is not included in the authenticated part of the certi￿cate.
3.3.4 User and Vault Creation
The process for creating a new user account, the instantiation of their vault and
the initialisation of credentials is important for ensuring system security. However,
the best approach is one whereby these three processes are decoupled and do not
necessarily happen at the same time. The reasons for this are explained below.
User Creation
Before a vault can be created, the new account must ￿rst be established by assigning
a user name and user ID etc., along with any other system-speci￿c tasks. This
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this process from that of instantiating a vault maintains backward compatibility.
This is because it facilitates migration to Vaults without requiring that all user
accounts be recreated, and also allows user accounts to exist that do not have a
vault. This design also aids security as it reduces the trust that must be placed in
the administrator creating the account and, consequently, this step does not need to
be performed by the prime user. Once the account is created, the user should then
be supplied with the VID belonging to the prime user, which is the only account
creation step not independent of Vaults.
Vault Creation
After the user’s account has been created, they may log into the system. However,
as they do not yet have a vault, the system will behave largely like a non-Vaults
aware system. The user may then proceed to create a new vault. The process of
creating the vault involves three main stages and an L3 program will be used for
automating these tasks.
1. Key Generation
This step involves generating the user’s public/private key pair that will be
used for authenticating the transfer of tickets.
2. Certi￿cate Construction
From the public key, the user can generate their VID (as detailed in the
next section) and they will now have all the information necessary for the
construction of their certi￿cate as described previously. The user then adds
their own signature as the ￿rst of the certifying signatures.
3. Vault Instantiation
This step involves the user submitting their new certi￿cate to the kernel along
with the corresponding private key (proving their ownership of the certi￿-
cate) and a suitable vault encryption key. On many systems, this is likely to
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￿ash drive, which facilitates the use of a high entropy key and two-factor
authentication if this is further encrypted with a password. The kernel then
veri￿es the relationship between the private key and certi￿cate and between
the public key and the VID. It also performs a number of basic consistency
checks, namely that the certi￿cate does not already exist in GPUB, that the
Certifying ￿ag is not set on the certi￿cate, and that there are no collisions
between other items such as username and VID. If the certi￿cate passes these
tests, a new vault will be instantiated containing the private key and the
calling process labelled as being associated with this vault (Section 3.4.1). A
copy of the new vault is written to disk, encrypted with the supplied key. The
user’s certi￿cate is then added to GPUB.
Finally, the user issues a request to the prime user to sign their certi￿cate. While
this request itself can be made through the system, the authentication of the user
and veri￿cation of their possession of the appropriate private key must be done
out-of-band.
3.3.5 Vault IDs
The Vault ID (VID) is similar to a User ID (UID) under Unix as it determines the
privileges held by the subject. However, the VID is cryptographically derived and
also establishes a veri￿able link between the user’s identity and their credentials as
stored in their vault.
The VID is calculated by applying a one-way hash function to the user’s public key.
This establishes an irreversible binding between the user’s identity (as stated on
their certi￿cate) and their vault, as the VID is now veri￿ably linked with both (cf.
Figure 3.5). This design is used to control and manage the assignment of privileges
to di￿erent users on the system by linking tickets directly to a speci￿c vault as
identi￿ed by its VID (Section 4.3.1). This design also simpli￿es key veri￿cation
when certifying public keys. Assuming the user’s name is known (a prerequisite
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intrinsically and uniquely speci￿es both a particular vault on the system and the
user to whom that vault belongs. The VID can then be exchanged between users of
the system via an out-of-band means, allowing the recipient to verify that a speci￿c
public key belongs to the other user and that the vault involved belongs to them.
Therefore, in addition to connecting a user’s identity with their vault, the VID
serves a similar purpose to a key ￿ngerprint in PKIs (such as PGP [202]) as a more
convenient means for specifying and identifying a certi￿cate.
While recent one-way hash functions [107] provide outputs of 256 bits or more, in the
context of the VID such length is largely unnecessary and is an inconvenient number
of characters for users to exchange out-of-band. However, signi￿cant attacks have
been reported against earlier, shorter hash functions and there is general movement
towards alternative algorithms [203,204]. In practice, this problem could be resolved
by discarding excess output or using an XOR operation to fold the hash in on itself
to arrive at a suitable, standardised length.
3.3.6 Prime User Certi￿cation of Key
After a new VPKI certi￿cate is lodged in GPUB and the user’s vault created, the
user will issue a key certi￿cation request to the prime user. Although the exact pro-
cedure involved will vary depending upon the organisation’s structure and security
requirements, the new user must present themselves to the security administrator
(or their delegate) with their VID and suitable documentation necessary to prove
their identity. After retrieving their unsigned certi￿cate from GPUB, the prime
user will verify the details it speci￿es. The prime user will verify the certi￿cate’s
self-signature, con￿rm that the name and identity details on the certi￿cate match
the authenticating documentation presented, and verify that the public key hashes
to the VID. If veri￿cation of these details is successful, the certi￿cate is signed by
the prime user. This signature is appended to the Certifying Signatures ￿eld
and allows others to authenticate the new user.
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When users exchange tickets they must authenticate one another. Authentication
is achieved by virtue of the prime user’s signature on their respective certi￿cates.
Each user retrieves the other’s certi￿cate from GPUB, along with the prime user’s
certi￿cate, and veri￿es the prime user’s signature on the certi￿cate. Assuming the
prime user account remains secure and the user’s identity has been properly veri-
￿ed prior to their certi￿cate having been signed, this represents a cryptographically
strong basis for mutual authentication. The only additional requirement in the
process of authenticating another user’s certi￿cate is to access the certi￿cate revo-
cation list held in GPUB and con￿rm the user’s certi￿cate has not been revoked.
Revocation is discussed further in Section 3.3.8.
Certi￿cate Caching
The ￿rst time that a user authenticates another, they will need to verify the prime
user’s signature on the other party’s certi￿cate as described above. However, on
subsequent occasions when tickets are exchanged between these two parties, it is
not necessary to repeat the cryptographic veri￿cation of this signature. This is
because the other party’s certi￿cate can optionally be cached in the authenticating
user’s vault after the initial veri￿cation. An additional timestamp indicating the
date that it was cached is attached to the certi￿cate and, within a user-speci￿ed
timeframe, the certi￿cate will be retained and the public key used for exchange of
tickets. This approach improves e￿ciency by streamlining the authenticated ticket
exchange process and also creates an additional barrier inhibiting the subversion of
the process. However, it remains critical that the revocation status of the certi￿cate
is still checked upon each use.
The Role of Inter-User Certi￿cation
While certi￿cate caching streamlines the re-authentication process, it does not cre-
ate additional trust relationships. However, the VPKI certi￿cate structure allows
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signing one another’s certi￿cates. This process would require users to authenticate
one another out-of-band using their respective VIDs in the same way as is required
for prime user certi￿cation. However, inter-user certi￿cation in this manner is not
equivalent to certi￿cation by the prime user. This is because the model assumes
the security of the prime user account cannot be violated and hence the prime user
is implicitly trusted as a CA. This is not the case with ordinary users whose ac-
counts and vaults are not as well protected and also cannot necessarily be relied
upon to verify the other party’s identity as carefully before signing their certi￿cate.
Therefore a mechanism would be required for users to rate the trust they place in
another’s certifying signature similar to the ‘owner trust’ label in PGP [202]. Such
a mechanism would introduce signi￿cant additional complexity and would only be
advantageous if the prime user’s key has been compromised, which would mean
that both inter-user authentication and global system security would have already
substantially failed. Because the advantage of such a feature would be so marginal,
it has not been included in this version of the VPKI although the OpenPGP stan-
dard provides a clear blueprint for how this could be implemented if a need became
apparent in the future.
3.3.8 Revocation of VPKI Certi￿cates
As with most authentication systems, there is a need for the VPKI to deal with
scenarios where an authentication token (speci￿cally a user’s key pair) has been
compromised. In such an event, steps must be taken to limit the impact of this
compromise by publishing the fact that the key can no longer be used securely.
One approach for dealing with such a scenario￿sometimes used in other PKIs such
as X.509￿is a ‘certi￿cate revocation list’ or CRL [199, pp. 276, 277]. While this
mechanism can be problematic in distributed systems where it can be di￿cult to
ensure that an up-to-date list is available to large numbers of clients spread over a
wide area, this is not the case in the context of the Vaults PKI where a ready-made,
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revocation information is available from a secure and reliable source to all users on
the system.
The VPKI revocation list must be checked upon every action where certi￿cates are
either used directly to authenticate another user or where previous authentication
is relied upon. The principal example of this is where one user grants access to a
￿le to another by creating a secondary ticket and encrypting it with the recipient’s
public key. However, as indicated above, this applies regardless of whether it is
the initial authentication for using the certi￿cate or the use of a cached, previously
authenticated certi￿cate. The CRL is also checked when a user attempts to access
a protected ￿le using a ticket, to ensure that the user’s vault and privileges have
not been compromised in this way.
Implementing VPKI Revocation
As indicated, a certi￿cate revocation list for the VPKI is stored in GPUB as it
has the properties required for such a mechanism. Since certi￿cates are uniquely
identi￿able by their VID, the CRL simply consists of a list of revoked VIDs. The list
is maintained by the prime user but any user can request that the kernel revoke their
certi￿cate at any time by virtue of their possession of the corresponding private key.
After the revoked VID is added to the list, the security kernel will then remove any
unclaimed secondary tickets held in GPUB that have been granted to the revoked
VID. All secondary tickets issued to this VID are also revoked. Further details of
this process are discussed in Section 4.8.1.
The primary scenario where a user’s certi￿cate needs to be revoked is where their
private key has been compromised, possibly as a result of their vault having been
compromised also. Revocation prevents an attacker from using their knowledge of a
user’s private key to obtain secondary tickets granted to the key’s owner. However,
revocation may also be appropriate if the user’s account is being downgraded to
one that does not use Vaults for security or if their account is being removed alto-
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protected ￿les that they should not be able to access.
3.4 Process Credentials and Vault Session Initiation
3.4.1 Process Credentials and Metadata
In order to determine the privileges and other relevant parameters of any given
process, the security kernel maintains a collection of metadata associated with each
process currently executing. These new credentials associated with the Vaults model
are stored in addition to existing credentials such as user and group IDs. All of these
new items are either derived cryptographically or obtained from cryptographically
secured sources. The new process credentials are described below.
VID The vault ID with which the process is associated. If the process is considered
untrusted (L0), or the user has not yet initiated their vault session, this will
be blank.
Parent VID The VID associated with the process’s parent. When one trusted
process executes another, the VID and parent VID (PVID) ￿elds will be the
same.
Speci￿ed Trust Level The STL is the trust level (L0￿L3) with which the pro-
gram will normally execute as speci￿ed in either local TCB (LTCB) or global
TCB (GTCB).
E￿ective Trust Level The ETL is the actual trust level that the process currently
has. There are a variety of reasons why processes may have their trust level
set lower at runtime than their STL states and these are discussed further in
Section 3.4.4.
Parent ETL The ETL of this process’s parent. Abbreviated to PETL.
72Fingerprint The ￿ngerprint of the veri￿ed process or blank if the process has a
trust level of L0.
Runtime Digraph Entry Reference This ￿eld references an entry in the run-
time digraph data structure that speci￿es which other objects on the system
this process depends upon for its security. Further details concerning these
concepts are discussed in Chapter 5 on Trusted Fingerprinting.
Protection Status Index The PSI of the process is used to cryptographically
verify the protection status of the executable ￿le and is described in Section
4.5.
Path The ￿lesystem path of the executable program.
3.4.2 Process Trust Levels
When a new process begins execution, it is assigned a trust level. The actual
trust level assigned re￿ects a number of things, including whether the code has
been cryptographically authenticated through Trusted Fingerprinting; the level of
privilege the process is intended to have in the Vaults security model; and the trust
level of the process’s origins. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the
remainder of this section and in Chapter 5. Four hierarchical trust levels apply,
labelled L0, L1, L2 and L3. Additional vault access privileges are assigned to each
higher level, as illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Level 0: Untrusted
Processes at Level 0 (L0) are those with no privileges under the Vaults security
model. Their code is not veri￿ed by Trusted Fingerprinting and they cannot access
application keys or cryptographically protected ￿les. L0 processes have no access
to the user’s vault at all. In practice, these processes will usually include newly
obtained software, software being tested or developed, and any other minor utilities
or tools that require little or no interaction with other software and are not required
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Figure 3.6: Vaults’ hierarchical process trust levels
to have any access to important data. Any software of uncertain origin (for exam-
ple, downloaded from an unfamiliar website) or where there are any other doubts
regarding the potential behaviour of the program, should not be ￿ngerprinted and
will therefore execute as an L0 process. L0 processes therefore have no special
access to trusted parts of the system.
Level 1: Con￿ned Trust
Level 1 processes (L1) are those that must have some access to security-sensitive
data or programs, but whose access is restricted to speci￿cally identi￿ed items.
For example, many applications maintain their own data and con￿guration ￿les
and have limited need for general access to other protected objects on the system.
Particularly if an application is also interacting with data from an untrusted source
(for example, from over the Internet) then the application can be con￿ned to its own
domain [26, p. 202]. Examples of potential L1 applications include web browsers,
electronic mail clients and other non-management related network software. More
general application and productivity software, such as word processors, may also
be con￿gured as L1 programs, and this may be bene￿cial where these programs are
dealing with externally-obtained unauthenticated or untrusted data.
The con￿nement of L1 programs is implemented by granting them limited access
to speci￿cally identi￿ed protected objects, in addition to the unprotected ￿les that
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protection tickets that have been speci￿cally bound to that application. This allows
L1 programs to execute with the minimum of privileges required. L1 processes must
be ￿ngerprinted and this trust level will be speci￿ed by the user in the program’s
dependency record. Note that L1 trust levels are designated on a per-user basis
and are not set for globally ￿ngerprinted objects.
Level 2: General Trust
Users may also assign a program a more general level of trust by designating it as
Level 2 (L2). Such programs can access any protected ￿le for which the user has
the required ticket in their vault. However, they may only access application keys
that are speci￿cally bound to them. L2 programs must have a trusted ￿ngerprint
and again the trust level for the program is indicated in its dependency record. The
trust level L2 can be applied to programs both by individual users within their own
vault and by the prime user globally. However, the trust level speci￿ed by a user
for a program will override that set globally. Software that needs general access
to a variety of potentially protected ￿les (rather than being limited to a speci￿c
subset of ￿les that it is used to access) are designated as L2. Examples of candidate
L2 programs include those with a management or administrative role and some
general application software that cannot be con￿ned at L1. The setting of the L2
trust level depends upon the user’s practical and security needs, as well as general
system security con￿guration, policies and practices.
Level 3: Unmediated Trust
Level 3 (L3) is a trust level reserved for programs that require administrative access
to a vault. While L2 processes may access all protected ￿les for which the user
has a ￿le protection ticket, they do not have direct access to these tickets and
other contents of the user’s vault. Instead, the selection and usage of the ticket
is performed by the security kernel in response to the program’s access request.
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loaded vault as con￿rmed by matching the VID of the process with that of the
vault.
Because of their security-sensitive nature, L3 programs must be carefully designed
and implemented to ensure they can only be controlled interactively by the user
and not manipulated by inputs through channels such as command line parameters
or environmental variables. L3 applications are therefore designed speci￿cally for
administrative tasks within the Vaults security model. In practice, this means there
will be relatively few such applications on a system and the L3 trust level can only
be assigned by the prime user through setting this value in their dependency record
in GPUB.
3.4.3 Session Initiation Process
Prior to Session Initiation
Users log into the system in the same way as on the systems that are not Vaults-
enabled. This re￿ects the backwards compatibility of the architecture as not all
users will have vaults. However, some aspects of Vaults will still be in e￿ect as
programs speci￿ed as being globally trusted (in the GTCB) will still have their
￿ngerprints veri￿ed when executed. Therefore the initial login program is globally
trusted and executes as an L2 process. However, if the user does not yet have
a Vaults session running (or does not have a vault), then there is no signi￿cance
to this beyond the program having been veri￿ed prior to execution. User interface
shell processes also execute at L21, although other programs spawned from the shell
will execute at their globally speci￿ed trust levels, or L0 if they have no ￿ngerprint.
However, while there is no Vaults session initialised, there will be no L1 processes
as they can only be speci￿ed on a per-user basis. Regardless, it is expected that
1Specifying these programs as globally trusted at L2 is necessary to allow the subsequent
execution of the L3 vault login program and ensures that there is a chain of trusted programs
leading up to it. Further details concerning this and related issues are discussed in Section 5.6.
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soon or immediately after logging in.
Vault Session Initiation
To initiate a new Vaults session, the user executes an L3 vault login application
that prompts them for their passphrase or vault decryption key. Note, it is not
necessary to prompt for their VID as this can be obtained automatically by search-
ing certi￿cates held in GPUB for their current UID. While the use of a passphrase
may be appropriate for low-security scenarios2, a superior approach is the use of
a randomly generated key stored on an external device such as a magnetic stripe
card, smartcard or USB ￿ash drive. Further encrypting the key with a user-selected
passphrase is also advisable to obtain two-factor authentication. A physical trusted
path mechanism for the input of any passphrases must also be employed where
appropriate.
The vault veri￿cation and instantiation protocol then proceeds as follows:
1. The kernel locates the vault stored on disk corresponding to the VID associ-
ated with the requesting user’s UID. As shown in Table 3.2, vaults are stored
on disk with the VID in a plaintext header to facilitate this.
2. After obtaining the vault decryption key KV from the user, the kernel decrypts
the vault that has been located. Note that user vaults are encrypted using an
authenticated encryption mode so this step also involves con￿rming that no
tampering with vault data has taken place.
3. The kernel hashes the user’s public key P, obtained from their certi￿cate, and
con￿rms that H(P) = VID. This step veri￿es the link between the public key
on the certi￿cate and the VID of the vault to be instantiated.
2If a passphrase is used then this should not be the same as the user’s main login password
due to the risk of dictionary attack against the system password ￿le.
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Private Key p
(remainder of vault)
...
plaintext
ciphertext
Table 3.2: Overview of Vault structure on disk
4. Next, the kernel calculates P(z); a random number encrypted with the user’s
public key P. It then decrypts P(z) with the private key p found in the ￿rst
record of the decrypted vault and con￿rms the value of z. This step veri￿es
that the vault actually contains the private keys corresponding to the VID.
If the vault decryption process is unsuccessful then a message is displayed, the
vault login process terminates, and the user is returned to their previous shell.
However, on successful authentication, a new shell is executed with its VID set to
that belonging to the user’s vault. This VID is then inherited by all subsequent
trusted processes and process trust levels set by the user now take precedence over
global settings.
3.4.4 Process Credentials Maintenance
When a new process is executed, the security kernel must ensure that the process
credentials are correctly maintained and adjusted according to the parameters as-
sociated with the new program. Initially the VID, the process’s ￿ngerprint and
STL are blank as this is the default for untrusted (L0) programs. The ETL is also
set to L0 and the PVID and PETL ￿elds are set to the parent’s VID and ETL
respectively. These defaults are set prior to the creation of every new process and
apply uniformly.
The ￿ngerprint matching process then occurs to identify whether a ￿ngerprint per-
taining to the program concerned exists in either the LTCB or GTCB. Fingerprint
matching is described in more detail in Section 5.3. If no ￿ngerprint exists, the
program will execute untrusted and its credentials do not need to be modi￿ed from
the previously set defaults. If the ￿ngerprint matching process identi￿es a trusted
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process will be modi￿ed. The ￿ngerprint and STL values are set based upon those
contained in the veri￿ed ￿ngerprint record and the VID is copied from the PVID
￿eld. The ETL is then set according to an algorithm designed to prevent a trusted
program from being misused by a malicious parent process. Details of this algo-
rithm are described in Section 5.6.3. However, the typical outcome is that the ETL
is set to the lower of the STL and the PETL.
Trust Level Variations
There are three scenarios where the setting of a process’s ETL may vary at runtime
from that just described. If a program accesses one of its data ￿le dependencies
where this object has a trust level lower than the program’s current ETL, then
its ETL will be lowered to match it. This situation applies, for example, where
the program is a command interpreter opening a script ￿le for execution. Here the
script may execute at L1 even though the interpreter normally executes at L2. This
design ensures that the trust level of scripts re￿ect the trust level the user intends
them to have. Alternatively, a program can voluntarily lower its ETL at any point.
While this requires applications to be aware of the existence of the Vaults model,
in this scenario programs can e￿ectively reduce their privileges if, for example, they
no longer need it.
Finally, users can require that a particular trusted program have its ETL reset to
L0 at runtime if it accesses an object that is not explicitly speci￿ed as one of the
program’s dependencies. This involves setting the Require Trusted Data ￿ag
on the program’s ￿ngerprint record and is useful for dealing with interpreters which
may execute both trusted and untrusted scripts. This ￿ag also mitigates the need
for applications to manually request that their trust level be lowered at runtime,
which enhances the backward compatibility of the Vaults scheme.
All issues associated with the di￿erent scenarios where a program’s trust level will
vary at runtime are discussed extensively in Chapter 5. Also note that, in all cases
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process are automatically closed by the kernel. If this does not occur, the process
may retain privileges in relation to the ￿les it can access that are not appropriate
to its new trust level.
3.5 Application Keys
Users can store sensitive values such as passwords or program-speci￿c cryptographic
keys in their vault. These are known as ‘application keys’. Each application key
can be bound to a speci￿c set of trusted applications and only these applications
(along with L3 applications, which are able to access the vault directly) are able to
access that key. The application keys mechanism therefore provides a way for users
to store secrets of various kinds in their vault and have these securely accessed in a
transparent manner by designated applications, thereby improving both usability
and security.
3.5.1 Application Key Entry Format
Each application key entry record in the user’s vault consists of the following ￿elds:
Application Label This identi￿es the application or applications to which the key
is bound and also uniquely indicates the purpose of the key. This ￿eld can
have multiple values in the event that the key is used by multiple applications
or by the same application in di￿erent contexts. The structure of each value
is described below.
Fingerprint This is the ￿ngerprint of the trusted application to which the key
is bound and, as with the label, this ￿eld may consist of more than one
value. However, there must be the same number of label and ￿ngerprint
values forming corresponding pairs as determined by their order.
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Figure 3.7: Application Key label structure
Key Value The value of the key that may be accessed by the speci￿ed application.
This is stored as provided, with no speci￿c encoding to allow applications to
store any value, binary or text, as required. The application is responsible for
any encoding or decoding required for this value.
Description A textual description of the purpose of the key for the bene￿t of the
user.
Flags A small number of con￿guration ￿ags may be used to adjust the way the
key access process is managed.
Label Structure and Default Keys
The structure of each application label value is shown in Figure 3.7. Essentially
the label consists of three parts, separated by colons. These parts are the applica-
tion’s name, its version, and a free-form descriptor that allows the application to
speci￿cally distinguish between multiple keys it may need to access. Note that, as
described above, labels and ￿ngerprint values must exist in pairs, as this allows a
key to be bound to multiple applications if desired.
As many applications will only need to access a single key, applications may specify
a default key. Default keys are indicated by an empty string as the label value.
This allows an application to access the default key by requesting a key from the
kernel without specifying any label. This design simpli￿es the task of adapting an
application to retrieve keys from a user’s vault. The kernel then searches the user’s
vault for a key with an empty label value and a corresponding ￿ngerprint matching
that of the application making the request. Note that this means subsequent keys
added for that application are required to have a non-empty label.
It is important to note that labels exist only to allow applications to distinguish
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security. The right of an application to access a given key is determined solely by
the ￿ngerprint stored in its process credentials and whether this matches with the
￿ngerprint associated with that key. Therefore, the ability to access an application
key is determined on a cryptographic basis.
Application Key Flags
Two ￿ags are de￿ned that can be set for application keys.
Release Trust Fail If the ETL and STL values are not equal, this indicates that
the trust level of the process has been downgraded. In this case, the process’s
behaviour may be uncertain and, if this ￿ag is switched o￿￿as is the default￿
then application keys will not be released to this instance of the program.
However, this behaviour can be overridden by the user switching on the ￿ag.
Con￿rm Release Switching this ￿ag on requires that the user be prompted and
speci￿cally con￿rm the release of this key to the application. For keys with
particularly high sensitivity, the user may switch the ￿ag, but this is unlikely
to be necessary for most keys and therefore the ￿ag defaults to Off.
3.5.2 Creating Application Keys
The process of creating application keys may be either driven by the user or by
the application itself. Both approaches have similar security properties but apply
in di￿erent scenarios, depending upon whether the key originates with the user or
with the application. In either case, the application key creation process can only
proceed where the application process is executing at its STL and has not had
this downgraded. Also, application keys can only be bound to natively executable
programs and not to non-natively executable programs such as scripts.
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In some cases, the key to be bound to an application will be provided by the
user. Examples of when this applies include secrets such as e-mail or remote login
passwords. The procedure for a user-driven application key creation is as follows:
1. The user executes the application to which the key is to be bound and this
program registers with the kernel, via a system call interface, one or more
label and description pairs for the keys it can accept, according to the formats
described previously.
2. Using an L3 vault administration program, the user selects an option to create
a new application key.
3. The kernel compiles a list of suitable processes that have registered labels.
It searches the ￿ngerprints held in the user’s vault (LTCB) for those which
correspond to that speci￿ed in the processes’ credentials and, from the ￿n-
gerprint dependency record, obtains those programs’ execution paths. If a
suitable entry is not found, then GTCB ￿ngerprints are also searched. Note,
it is not possible to bind application keys to programs that do not have a
￿ngerprint.
4. Using the L3 program from step 2, the user selects the application to which
the key is to be bound from a list of eligible processes. The user should
con￿rm that the program’s execution path is correct.
5. The user supplies the key or keys as required for the label and descriptions
indicated. They can also customise the Description ￿eld as desired.
6. Once this is completed, the kernel instantiates the new application key entry.
Application-Driven Key Creation
In other scenarios, the application key creation process will be driven by the pro-
gram itself. This will apply where the program has generated the key itself and
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ware such as PGP when generating a new key pair. However, it is also common
for applications to receive keys such as passphrases directly from the user, which is
likely to make the application-driven key creation process more practical and user-
friendly in many circumstances. For example, a web browser may wish to establish
new authentication credentials when a user ￿rst visits a web site that requires them
to sign in. In these cases, the following procedure for creating application keys
applies:
1. The application creates or obtains the key and submits a key creation request
directly to the kernel via a system call. This request includes the label,
description and key value itself.
2. The kernel obtains the path for the application by searching on its ￿ngerprint
in LTCB and GTCB in the same way as for the user-driven key creation
process.
3. The kernel executes an L3 vault administration application and passes it
the parameters provided previously and the execution path obtained in the
previous step.
4. The user veri￿es that the parameters of the key creation process are correct
and then con￿rms that the process should proceed, possibly adjusting param-
eters such as the Description ￿eld as desired. If the parameters are incorrect,
or the user does not wish the key creation to occur for some reason, they may
abort the process at this point.
3.5.3 Application Key Release
The process by which an application gains access to a key is straightforward and is
as follows:
1. The application requests the key from the kernel, specifying its label. If the
label is blank, this indicates the default key for that application.
842. The kernel obtains the ￿ngerprint, ETL and STL of the process from its
credentials. If the process is an L0 process and no ￿ngerprint exists, the key
release request is denied.
3. The kernel searches for a ￿ngerprint corresponding to the value in the process’s
credentials in the list of application keys stored in the user’s vault.
4. Once matching ￿ngerprints have been found, if the ETL and STL of the
process are equal, the key corresponding to this label is released to the appli-
cation. However, if the trust levels are not the same (indicating that the trust
level of the process has been downgraded), the key will only be released if the
Release Trust Fail ￿ag is set on the application key concerned. Otherwise
the key is not released and the request is denied.
3.6 Administrative Privileges
One of the main objectives in developing an alternative, cryptographically-based
security model is to correct de￿ciencies in current models by limiting the unre-
stricted powers of the superuser and to reduce the vulnerability that this omnipo-
tence causes. Consequently, under Vaults, the superuser cannot, for example, access
other user’s protected ￿les without possession of the required ticket. Therefore the
model is designed to be able to continue to ful￿l its security goals, even if the
superuser account has been compromised.
However, con￿ning the superuser in this way means that there are certain admin-
istrative tasks that this account can no longer perform without recreating the vul-
nerabilities that existed before. Therefore, there is a need for a new administrative
account, which is known as the prime user.
3.6.1 The Design of the Prime User Account
In creating a new privileged account, it is important that it not become e￿ectively
a surrogate for the existing superuser, which inherits all of the same de￿ciencies
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designed to deliberately avoid these problems.
A key design goal is that the prime user is strictly an administrative account that
need only be used in a limited number of situations. Although the prime user has
the privileges to potentially subvert system security, the account is not trivially
omnipotent in the manner of the traditional superuser. In addition, the account
is not required for frequent or general usage. As a result, the prime user account
has far fewer privilege boundaries compared with the superuser. Its privileges are
clearly de￿ned, which makes the security properties of the account simple to con-
ceptualise and model. Finally, access to the prime user account is cryptographically
determined, consistent with the stated design principles of the Vaults architecture
given in Section 1.2.2.
3.6.2 Prime User Privileges
The prime user has four special privileges that di￿erentiate it from the traditional
superuser and these are:
1. GPUB Maintenance The prime user has the ability to modify the data stored
in GPUB. Amongst other things, the prime user can create, delete, update and
modify global ￿ngerprint (GTCB) dependency records that apply to all users.
They are also responsible for removing user certi￿cates, deleting uncollected
secondary tickets and maintaining the CRL.
2. VPKI Certi￿cation Authority The prime user is the CA for the system and
is therefore responsible for ensuring that users can exchange privileges in
an authenticated manner. The designation of the prime user as the CA is
indicated by the Certifying ￿ag on their certi￿cate held in GPUB (Section
3.3.3) and therefore this privilege is essentially a derivative of the previous
one.
3. Kernel and L3 Program Maintenance The prime user is responsible for the
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all L3 programs. This task cannot be delegated to the superuser as subversion
of these programs could allow that account to compromise the system. This
privilege is implemented by the prime user holding write tickets for these
objects allowing them to be modi￿ed as required; for example, when upgrading
this software.
4. Escrowed Ticket Recovery The prime user has the ability to obtain tickets
via the Escrow Vault in order to bypass cryptographic access controls and
thereby access protected ￿les belonging to other users. This is equivalent to
the superuser’s ability to bypass discretionary access controls, although far
more controlled. Further details of key escrow are described in Section 4.8.3.
Note that, as with all users, the prime user does not have any access to GPRIV.
3.6.3 Fundamental Privileges and Tickets
Unlike superuser privileges under discretionary access control models that are based
upon the identity associated with the process, all of the prime user privileges are
cryptographically determined. The kernel maintenance privilege (3) depends upon
the prime user possessing the required write tickets to modify the relevant objects.
It is the prime user’s possession of these tickets, rather than anything intrinsic
about this user, that results in this privilege. The VPKI CA privilege (2) can only
be exercised by a user who possesses the private key corresponding to the public
key ￿agged as a CA’s key as stored in GPUB. However, the ability to ￿ag public
keys in this way requires the GPUB maintenance privilege (1) and this, along with
the escrowed key recovery privilege (4), are referred to as ‘fundamental privileges’
as they do not derive from any other privilege.
Fundamental privileges are granted to the prime user by their possession of ‘fun-
damental tickets’. These are di￿erent from ordinary tickets as they grant access to
one of the system vaults rather than cryptographically-protected ￿lesystem objects.
87Fundamental tickets are therefore associated with keys held in the Fundamental
Vault (see Section 3.2.5 and Figure 3.3 on p. 61) rather than ￿le protection keys
held in GPRIV. Also, unlike ￿le access tickets, fundamental tickets may only be
used by processes executing with an L3 trust level. The structure of a fundamental
ticket is given as
TF
V := KF
V (H(KF
V ; VIDP)); (3.1)
where the fundamental ticket TF
V to access system vault V is constructed by en-
crypting a hash of the Fundamental Key KF
V for vault V and the VID of the prime
user, VIDP. Unlike ordinary primary tickets used to access protected ￿les (which
will be described in Chapter 4), fundamental tickets contain no timestamp. Also,
unlike ￿le access tickets, fundamental tickets can only be accessed by highly-trusted
L3 processes and cannot have additional or ‘secondary tickets’ generated for them.
Two fundamental tickets are de￿ned corresponding to the two fundamental privi-
leges just described. The ￿rst references the key for the GPUB and authorises the
prime user to make modi￿cations to this vault, which can already can be read by
all users on the system. The second fundamental ticket authorises the prime user
for limited use of the Escrow Vault (discussed further in Section 4.8.3).
Since both fundamental privileges are granted based upon possession of their re-
spective fundamental tickets, they could potentially be granted independently to
di￿erent users. In this respect, the collection of privileges associated with the prime
user is not strictly atomic in the manner of traditional superuser privileges. How-
ever, it is not clear that a clean division can be made between these privileges and
further analysis would be required to determine the security of this arrangement.
Therefore, it is assumed in the remainder of this thesis that both fundamental tick-
ets are held in the same vault and that there is only a single prime user account.
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The prime user account is created as part of the process of installing the Vaults
architecture. It involves the following steps:
1. Obtain or generate an encryption key for the prime user’s vault.
On systems with low security requirements, this key could simply be a passphrase.
However, given the signi￿cance of the prime user account, a randomly gen-
erated key stored on a removable device encrypted with a passphrase for
two-factor authentication is a far better approach. Another alternative could
be to store the key in the TPM chip and, based upon a secure system state
as determined by measured code, biometrics could be used to locally verify
the identity of the prime user and subsequently authorised the release of the
vault decryption key.
2. Create vault and key pair.
A new vault for the prime user must be instantiated, followed by the gen-
eration of a public/private key pair and calculation of the VID, in the same
manner as for non-privileged users. This vault is then written to disk en-
crypted with the key obtained in the ￿rst step.
3. Fundamental Vault construction.
The Fundamental Keys used to encrypt the system vaults are generated and
the Fundamental Vault created. These keys are then stored in this vault.
4. System vault construction.
The system vaults (GPUB, GPRIV and Escrow) are created. These vaults
are then encrypted with the Fundamental Keys.
5. Fundamental ticket construction.
The fundamental tickets to access the GPUB and Escrow Vaults are con-
structed and stored in the prime user’s vault.
896. Kernel protection.
A list is compiled of the ￿lesystem objects making up the security kernel
and its dependencies. Write protection tickets are generated for them and
stored in the prime user’s vault. Specialised vault administration programs
(L3 applications) are also write protected in the same way.
7. Prime user certi￿cation.
An unsigned certi￿cate is constructed for the prime user based upon the
public key generated previously and is then loaded into GPUB. The prime
user uses their fundamental ticket for GPUB to modify the contents of this
vault to set the Certifying ￿ag for this certi￿cate and append a self signature
to the certi￿cate copy held in GPUB. The private key is then stored in the
prime user’s vault and bound to the L3 application used for signing the user’s
certi￿cates, limiting access to the key to this and other highly trusted L3
programs.
3.6.5 Prime User Security
A comparison between the traditional superuser and prime user accounts demon-
strates the security advantages of the latter.
Superuser privileges are granted to a process through an identity-based label that is
assigned, whereas prime user privileges require the possession of the relevant tokens
in the form of the fundamental and kernel write access tickets. This property re￿ects
Vaults design as a locks and keys access control scheme as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
In traditional models, the full set of superuser privileges are automatically held by
all processes executing with this label and typically include system and network
servers, set UID programs, and programs executed directly by the superuser. In
contrast, prime user privileges can only be utilised by highly trusted L3 processes
spawned from one that has decrypted the prime user’s vault and therefore prime
user privileges can only be held as part of an interactive login session. There are also
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access to these tokens. For example, the ability to access the prime user’s vault is
automatically lost if that user executes an L0 program (one which has no ￿ngerprint
and has not had its integrity cryptographically veri￿ed), as these processes cannot
access any user’s vault. Even L2 programs, which have been cryptographically
veri￿ed prior to execution, are not able to use the fundamental tickets that underpin
the prime user’s privileges. In this way, there is extremely limited scope for use of
these tokens by malicious code.
However, the exposure of the prime user account is also limited by the relatively few
situations where it must be used. In contrast, superuser privilege is required for any
privileged operation, regardless of how trivial. Only a small number of these tasks
involve code being directly and interactively executed by the superuser with the ma-
jority being either non-interactive (such as with network servers) or interactive but
executed by non-privileged users (such as set UID programs). In both of these sce-
narios, highly privileged superuser code is interacting with non-privileged subjects
and is therefore highly exposed to numerous untrusted inputs. As a result, there are
many privilege boundaries and increased opportunity for attackers to discover and
exploit vulnerabilities. By comparison, prime user privileges are only required for a
very small number of administrative tasks that arise infrequently. All of these tasks
are interactive in nature and have very few, if any, privilege boundaries through
which prime user privileges are exposed to attack.
Object- and Subject-Based Higher Privilege Models
Indeed, the most obvious means of attacking the prime user account involves tar-
geting their encrypted vault stored on disk as this encapsulates all of these privi-
leges. However, if a su￿ciently secure encryption key has been used, this will be
an extremely di￿cult, and very likely impossible, task. This result highlights a
fundamental reason why the prime user account is more secure than the traditional
superuser approach. Superuser privileges are held by a wide variety of subjects on
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inputs. Furthermore, superuser privileges may be granted to a subject without
requiring any authentication, as in the example of set UID programs. In contrast,
the bulk of the time, prime user privileges exist as a static object and therefore
have very few privilege boundaries as avenues for attack. Furthermore, access to
prime user privileges always requires cryptographic authentication and the appli-
cation key and Trusted Fingerprinting mechanisms e￿ectively limit privileges to
speci￿cally designated, cryptographically authenticated code.
Interestingly, superuser privileges also are encapsulated as static objects, such as
the password ￿le. However, the superuser account is rarely directly compromised in
such a way, as this requires the attacker to have already successfully elevated their
privileges. This observation demonstrates how objects typically have fewer privilege
boundaries than subjects and it follows that it is easier to develop a secure model
for managing higher privileges if they depend upon possession of tokens rather
than identity-based labels. This observation further highlights the advantages that
cryptographically-based security models have over traditional approaches.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has described a number of mechanisms that exist to support the Vaults
security model. The most fundamental element of this supporting infrastructure are
the di￿erent types of vaults themselves; namely, user vaults, the Global Public vault
(GPUB), the Global Private vault (GPRIV), the Escrow Vault and the Fundamental
Vault. The basic Vaults PKI, which provides authentication to support secure
exchanges of privileges between users, is also critical to facilitate secure operation of
the model. Other underlying elements, such as process trust levels and application
keys, have also been described. Finally, the design for managing administrative
privileges within the Vaults model has been detailed. Privilege management is
particularly vital to ensure that past mistakes concerning management of higher
privileges are not repeated with Vaults.
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vided by the Vaults model; namely, cryptographic ￿le access controls and the
Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism for authenticating trusted code. While these
features play a prominent role in providing the enhanced security of the model,
they remain heavily dependent upon the infrastructure described in this chapter.
Consequently, this chapter has provided important background prior to elucidating
these other major security mechanisms.
93Chapter 4
Cryptographic Enhanced Access
Controls
4.1 Overview
This chapter describes the cryptographically enhanced access controls that form a
major component of the Vaults model. These access controls are designed to meet
the security goals of con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity for read and write pro-
tected objects (respectively), even when faced with a privileged attacker. Further-
more, the access controls allow the independent setting of read and write protection
on designated objects, controlled sharing of access between users, secure revocation,
and non-transferability of privileges between unauthorised users.
Vaults cryptographically enhanced access controls are not dependent on identity
like traditional models and are conceptually straightforward to use. The access
control model uses a dual locks and keys approach with a ￿le access ticket held
by the user in their vault that is cryptographically linked with a key stored in the
global private vault (GPRIV). This key, in turn, is used to secure the ￿le and the
security kernel will not grant access to the ￿le without a ticket that references this
key. In order to achieve of the stated security goals against a privileged attacker,
the scheme incorporates a mechanism for authenticating the metadata that stores
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all security goal of veri￿able integrity. Further details concerning the design and
operation of the Vaults cryptographic enhanced access controls will be described in
the remainder of this chapter.
4.1.1 File Protection Modes
Users may protect their ￿les on the system, both in terms of con￿dentiality (con-
trolling read access) and integrity (controlling write access). A read-protected ￿le
is encrypted with a symmetric cipher using a randomly generated key KfR and this
key is held in GPRIV. A read ticket T1
fR referencing this key is then stored in the
user’s vault. Once the ￿le’s contents are encrypted, accessing it requires a valid
ticket that references the correct decryption key held in GPRIV. If the user does
not have such a ticket, the kernel will deny access. Even if the user is su￿ciently
privileged as to be able to bypass the kernel and directly access the contents of the
disk, this will only give them access to the ciphertext.
A di￿erent process applies to write-protected ￿les. A message authentication code
(MAC) is generated for the data in that ￿le MAC(f) and this, together with the
randomly generated MAC key used KfW, is stored in GPRIV. A write ticket T1
fW
referencing this MAC is then stored in the user’s vault. If a user attempts to open
the ￿le for writing, the security kernel will recalculate the MAC based upon the
key referenced by the user’s ticket. Access is only granted if the MAC veri￿cation
is successful.
While ￿le protection modes may be enforced independently of one another, access
via one mode may interact with the other protection mode. This property may
impact on how objects are accessed. For example, writing to a read protected
￿le will result in the kernel transparently encrypting this data, even if the user
does not have read access. Alternatively, if a write-protected ￿le is opened for
reading, the kernel will transparently verify the MAC prior to granting access.
This behaviour ensures that the veri￿able integrity property, as de￿ned in Section
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possession of the ticket for one mode of access does not in any way permit access
for the other mode. This means, for example, a user with only write access to a
￿le that is both read and write-protected may make modi￿cations but not view the
results.
4.1.2 File Protection Key Binding
For a process to access a cryptographically protected ￿lesystem object, the program
must have been assigned a ￿ngerprint and have had this veri￿ed upon execution.
Therefore, applications without ￿ngerprints cannot access protected ￿les. Further
details of the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanisms are described in Chapter 5.
However, possessing a ￿ngerprint does not guarantee that an application will be
able to access any given protected ￿le. While programs assigned a trust level of
L2 and above can access all protected ￿les, those designated as L1 can only access
those protected ￿les whose keys have been speci￿cally bound to that application.
This feature can be used for con￿ning applications so that they can only access
those protected ￿les that are necessary and thereby reduces the amount of trust
that needs to be placed in that program. Owners of protected ￿les can bind their
protection keys to any application with a ￿ngerprint. This can be done either when
the ￿le is ￿rst protected or at any point while it remains protected. There is no
limit to the number of protection keys that can be bound to a given application;
protection keys can be bound to multiple applications as required. Further details
on ￿le protection key binding are given in Section 4.7.1.
4.2 General Filesystem Issues
4.2.1 Relationship to Identity-Based Access Controls
Vaults cryptographic enhanced access controls are designed as an additional layer
on top of existing identity-based access controls. Being independent from them,
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limits the power of the traditional superuser and mitigates the numerous security
problems that stem from this. Therefore, in order for a user to access a protected
￿le they must have both the necessary privileges according to its identity-based ￿le
permissions and also the required ticket. This allows the enhanced access controls
to be used to enhance security for important ￿les according to users’ requirements.
Finally, the enhanced access controls are designed to be semantically similar to
existing identity-based controls. In general, the same rules and principles apply to
the behaviour of these access controls compared with existing mechanisms, which
minimises the additional complexity users must deal with.
4.2.2 File Ownership
Only a ￿le’s owner can initiate cryptographic protection of it and, once the ￿le
has been protected, the kernel will not permit its ownership to be changed. This
applies even if the party attempting to change ownership is the current owner or the
superuser. Therefore, if a protected ￿le’s ownership must be transferred to another
user, the ￿le must be ￿rst unprotected. At this point, the traditional rules regarding
ownership changes apply again. Note that ownership credentials associated with
a given ￿le are not cryptographically protected and so a privileged attacker can
directly modify these values on the disk. However, such tampering has no impact
on the security of the ￿le as it remains protected and only accessible to authorised
parties who possess the required ticket.
4.2.3 Protecting Directories and Their Contents
Protecting a directory involves abstracting it to be a ￿le containing a list of direc-
tory entries and corresponding inode numbers [205, pp. 107￿111]. Therefore, read
protecting a directory means that it is not possible to view a list of the contents of
a directory without the required read-access ticket. Conversely, a write-protected
directory cannot be modi￿ed such that ￿les cannot be created, deleted or renamed
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write protected is particularly important to ensure that an attacker cannot remove
directory contents and replace selected ￿les. These semantics are consistent with
those used by existing Unix-based systems.
However, protecting a directory normally has additional implications in the context
of Vaults. As directories contain a collection of ￿les related to the same purpose,
protecting a directory implies that these objects should receive the same protec-
tion. These semantics are applied under the Vaults model such that the speci￿ed
protection mode is applied recursively to the protected directories contents. Fur-
thermore, newly created objects in protected directories automatically inherit the
protection mode of their parent directory. This means that the user does not need
to continually manually protect ￿les they create while working. Also, ￿les created
by applications without the user’s knowledge will be automatically protected if
this occurs within protected directories. Naturally, users can override these default
protections for speci￿c ￿les as required.
Aside from the security implications of protecting the directory itself, and the au-
tomatic application of a directory’s protection modes to newly created ￿les within
it, protecting a directory’s contents is largely a user interface issue. Even if an en-
tire directory’s contents are protected simultaneously as part of the directory itself
being protected, the outcome is identical to as if each ￿le had been individually
and manually protected by the user. Therefore, protecting directory contents in-
volves creation of separate protection keys and access tickets for each ￿le. This
design avoids the signi￿cant negative performance implications of sharing a MAC
key among a large number of ￿les that may be modi￿ed independently.
4.2.4 Moving and Deleting Files
The tasks of moving and deleting cryptographically protected ￿les are straightfor-
ward except for the determination of whether a given ￿le is currently protected or
not. Details of a mechanism and protocols used to verify the protection status of
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deleting ￿les given in Section 4.5.3. Beyond these steps, all that is required are
those system-speci￿c tasks that normally apply for the deletion of the ￿le, such as
unlinking the directory entry and removing inode metadata if no more links to the
data exist for Unix-like ￿lesystems [205, pp. 95, 96]. As discussed in the previous
section, deleting a ￿le requires write access to the directory in which it resides.
Other than the determination of protection status, the procedure for renaming
or moving ￿les is also not a￿ected at all by cryptographic ￿le protection except
for updating path metadata values associated with that object. Details of these
metadata are described in the following sections. Finally, the user interface should
warn the user if they attempt to move a ￿le to a ￿lesystem that does not support
cryptographic access controls as this will result in the loss of that ￿le’s protection.
4.3 File Access Tickets
Tickets are the tokens used in Vaults enhanced access controls to determine whether
a subject will be granted access to a speci￿c protected object. Although ￿les are
cryptographically protected by keys, the keys are stored in GPRIV and no subjects
(including the prime user) have direct access to them. Instead, it is their possession
of a ticket that references a speci￿c key which determines whether they may access
a particular protected ￿le. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The layer of
indirection provides greater ￿exibility and allows the security kernel to control the
way users access ￿les. This design allows Vaults to provide the properties of tradi-
tional, non-cryptographic access control schemes, namely: independent protection
modes, control data sharing, secure revocation, universality and non-transferability
of privilege, as detailed in Section 1.3.2.
Each ticket grants either read or write access to a speci￿c protected object. There-
fore, in order to have both read and write access to an object protected with both
modes, one ticket for each mode is required. There are also two di￿erent classes
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Figure 4.1: Simpli￿ed ticket/key/￿le relationships
of ticket. Primary tickets are those received by the owner of an object when it is
initially cryptographically protected. In addition to granting access, possession of
a primary ticket authorises the holder to issue additional tickets of the same mode
for that object to other users, to revoke access and to remove the object’s protec-
tion. Additional tickets issued to other users are secondary tickets. Unlike primary
tickets, these only confer the right to access the object in the speci￿ed mode and
cannot be used to construct additional tickets.
4.3.1 Ticket Security
Even though keys secure protected objects, it is the possession of a particular ticket
that determines whether a subject can access an object. Security of ￿le access
tickets is therefore critical and there are several signi￿cant security issues that need
to be addressed in designing tickets.
In particular, it is important that the owner of an object (the holder of the primary
ticket) is able to revoke secondary tickets from other users when desired. As recipi-
ents of these tickets will hold them in their vaults, there are few intrinsic restrictions
on what they can do with them. Consequently, another critical issue is ensuring
users do not duplicate secondary tickets they receive and pass these privileges on
to other parties. Preventing unauthorised transference of tickets therefore requires
linking a secondary ticket unequivocally and irrevocably with its speci￿c recipient.
One means of achieving these goals is to link the ticket with the recipient’s iden-
tity, which has the advantage that it re￿ects the way users grant privileges to
others based upon the intended recipient’s identity. However, this approach con-
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cryptographically-derived parameters rather than identity-based labels like those
that play a role in many of the security de￿ciencies of existing systems.
The Vaults PKI provides an ideal alternative. The PKI mechanism binds a user’s
authenticated identity to a speci￿c vault as identi￿ed by the Vault ID or VID
(Section 3.3.4). Therefore, linking a secondary ticket with a speci￿c VID allows
a user to both grant access based upon their notion of the recipient’s identity (as
described on their certi￿cate) and have the access token bound to a cryptographic
representation of the identity. Subsequent access control decisions are therefore
made based upon the contents of a user’s vault and not on the identity labels
assigned to a speci￿c process. Furthermore, access tickets are cryptographically
bound to a speci￿c vault and attempts to duplicate and transfer them to other
vaults will render them useless, regardless of any claimed non-cryptographically
derived identity labels of processes attempting to access that vault.
This approach also partially addresses the issue of revocation, as revocation of a
speci￿c secondary ticket can be performed on the basis of the VID to which the
ticket is bound. However, this is not a complete solution and further details of the
revocation mechanism will be described in Section 4.8.1.
4.3.2 Primary Tickets
Primary tickets are those issued to the owner of an object when they initiate cryp-
tographic protection of that object. Possession of a primary ticket grants the user
the following privileges:
￿ access to the speci￿c protected object to which the ticket relates according to
the ticket’s access mode;
￿ create secondary tickets of the same mode that can be issued to other users;
￿ revoke secondary tickets belonging to speci￿ed users so that they may no
longer access the protected object in that way; and
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Primary tickets have a number of important properties. Like all tickets, they are
associated with a speci￿c cryptographic key used to protect an object in a speci￿c
mode. Therefore, a ticket must uniquely reference this key and no other. Primary
tickets are also constructed in a manner that clearly demonstrates their status as a
primary ticket. Therefore, it is not possible for a secondary ticket to be mistaken
for a primary ticket and vice versa. Furthermore, it should not be possible for a
secondary ticket to be transformed into a primary ticket. Finally, unlike secondary
tickets, primary tickets do not have the same security issues as they are stored in
the vault of the object’s owner. However, they are still bound to this speci￿c VID
and therefore are useless if an enterprising attacker manages to steal them.
A primary ticket for a given ￿le is constructed as:
T1
f := Kf(Kf; H(VIDo; Kf; t1)); (4.1)
where T1
f is made up of the protection key Kf to which it links and a hash of the
VID of the user who protected the ￿le VIDo, the protection key Kf and the time the
original protection key was created t1. These values are encrypted with Kf using
an authenticated encryption method. Note that the small size of the ticket contents
means that the cipher used should be carefully selected for maximum key agility,
meaning that some ciphers will be more appropriate than others [12,100,206].
4.3.3 Secondary Tickets
Secondary tickets are those granted to another user by a user who possesses a
primary ticket for that object. Note that, although the user holding the primary
ticket will normally be the owner of the object in question, the ability to issue
secondary tickets for an object is predicated entirely on the possession of the primary
ticket. As with primary tickets, secondary tickets can be either for read or write
access.
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tickets because they represent limited access privileges granted to a user for a certain
amount of time. Therefore, secondary tickets must have certain security properties.
In particular, secondary tickets must:
￿ reference a speci￿c key uniquely and not be able to be modi￿ed to reference
any other key;
￿ be bound to a speci￿c vault and not be usable if transferred to a third party;
￿ not reveal any information about Kf;
￿ not be able to be converted into or mistaken for a primary ticket;
￿ be atomic in that the ticket holder cannot modify or manipulate individual
parts of the ticket;
￿ not be able to be constructed by any unauthorised party; and
￿ not facilitate or assist in any way in preventing the e￿ective revocation by the
holder of the primary ticket of the access granted by the secondary ticket.
In order to achieve these properties and withstand a number of attacks that were
identi￿ed during the design process, a separate key is used for encrypting the con-
tents of secondary tickets. This is known as the ‘ticket key’ and is given as:
KTr
f := H(VIDr; Kf; t1); (4.2)
where the ticket key is designated KTr
f and is constructed by hashing the VID of
the intended recipient VIDr, the protection key Kf and the protection timestamp
t1. This design ensures that the ticket key is unique within the context of these
three parameters.
The structure of secondary tickets is constructed as:
T2
f := KTr
f (t2; tE; H(VIDr; Kf; t1)); (4.3)
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stamp specifying an optional expiry time. The remainder of the secondary ticket
consists of a hash of the VID of the intended recipient VIDr, the protection key
Kf and the protection timestamp t1. These values are all encrypted with the ticket
key KTr
f using an authenticated encryption method. This design is intended to be
extremely robust and resist a variety of attacks by a highly privileged user. Further
details of a number of attacks on secondary tickets modelled as part of the analy-
sis of the Vaults scheme, and the subsequent results that were used to re￿ne this
design, are given in Section 7.3.
The ability for users to set an expiry date on secondary tickets reduces the man-
agement burden on the owner of the object to review the tickets they have granted
to other parties, and manually revoke those no longer required. This is a feature of
the Vault’s enhanced access controls that does not exist on most traditional access
control list schemes. Alternatively, the timestamp can be set to null, indicating
that the ticket never expires.
The ability of a recipient to use a secondary ticket may also be terminated if the
ticket is revoked by the user who issued it. The kernel is able to check if a ticket
is valid by searching a list of ‘Ticket IDs’ (TIDs) in GPRIV. A TID is constructed
by hashing the ‘Key ID’ (KID￿explained in Section 4.4.1) for the protected object
KIDf, the VID of the recipient VIDr and the timestamp of the secondary ticket t2.
The equation for the construction of the TID is therefore:
TIDr
f := H(KIDf; VIDr; t2): (4.4)
Further details on the revocation process are described in Section 4.8.1.
4.4 Ticket and Key Metadata
File access tickets and protection keys have a set of data associated with them
that supports the functioning of the access control scheme. Metadata relating to a
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may modify these values, the scheme is designed so that such modi￿cations do not
enable the user to elevate their privileges in any way. However, some data associated
with keys must be protected against modi￿cation so these parameters are held in
GPRIV. A diagrammatic overview of the metadata associated with tickets and keys
is shown in Figure 4.2. Details concerning the elements presented in the diagram
are explained in the following sections.
4.4.1 The Key ID
A critically important part of ticket metadata is the key ID (KID). This is used to
link a ticket, the speci￿c key that it refers to, and the ￿le protected with that key.
As separate ￿le protection keys are used for read and write access modes, separate
KID values apply for each mode. These are designated KIDfR and KIDfW, where
relevant. The KID for a given ￿le KIDf is constructed by hashing the protection
key for that ￿le Kf and the timestamp when the key was created t1:
KIDf := H(Kf; t1): (4.5)
Protected ￿les have a KID associated with them to identify which key or keys
protect a given ￿le. However, this association uses an authenticated mechanism
to prevent the metadata from being manipulated by a privileged attacker writing
directly to the disk. Details of the authentication mechanism used are discussed in
Section 4.5. As shown in Figure 4.2, KIDs are also used to label keys in GPRIV
and tickets in users’ vaults. The data stored in GPRIV cannot be modi￿ed by any
user and is therefore safe from manipulation. However, while users can modify the
contents of their vaults, altering the KID associated with a ticket does not make
the ticket e￿ective for accessing any other ￿le since any such action does not change
the key with which the ￿le and ticket are encrypted.
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1064.4.2 Primary and Secondary Ticket Metadata
For both primary and secondary tickets, the following metadata items are held in
the vault of the user who possesses that ticket:
Ticket Class A ￿ag to indicate whether this is a primary or secondary ticket.
Ticket Mode The access mode of the ticket, either read or write.
Key ID A unique identi￿er of the key that the ticket references.
Label An optional description identifying the path of the ￿le.
The purpose of the label is to remind the user to which ￿le a ticket relates. By
default, this is the path by which the user accesses the ￿le. However, users may set
this ￿eld to any value they like as it has no impact on system behaviour.
Again, note that changing the ticket class, KID and mode values in ticket metadata
does not assist a would-be attacker, as this does not alter the encrypted contents of
the ticket. Secondary and primary tickets are easily distinguishable by their di￿er-
ent lengths and structures and their contents cannot be changed without knowledge
of the ￿le protection key. Similarly, ticket mode metadata values do not change
which key the ticket references and￿as read and write keys are separate and not
interchangeable￿if a ticket were to be used for the wrong access mode, access would
simply fail.
4.4.3 GPRIV Protected Data
File protection keys and metadata related to them are held securely in GPRIV as
shown in Figure 4.2. Therefore, unlike the metadata stored in the user’s vault,
these values are securely maintained by the kernel. Also, unlike ticket metadata,
not all ￿elds are required to exist for every key. The following data are required for
all protection keys:
Key The value of the cryptographic key Kf protecting the ￿le.
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Timestamp The time t1 that the key was created and this particular instance of
protection for the ￿le initiated.
PSI The protection status index for this ￿le. This value allows unique identi￿cation
of the ￿le object within a given ￿lesystem and is used as part of the scheme
for authenticating the protection status of a ￿le. Further details are given in
Section 4.5.
The optional data that may be present for a given key are:
MAC Value The value of the MAC for a write-protected ￿le MAC(f). This value
will be present if the key pertains to write access.
Bound Applications A list of hash values of programs to which this particular
key is bound. Applications with an L1 trust level must have their ￿ngerprint
listed in this ￿eld in order to access a given protected ￿le in the speci￿ed
mode. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.7.1.
<VIDr; TIDr
f> A list of VIDs and corresponding TIDs representing secondary
tickets that have not been revoked. This metadata only applies to secondary
tickets.
4.5 Verifying File Protection Status
The question of which metadata is stored in the ￿lesystem to link ￿lesystem objects
with speci￿c keys and tickets was not addressed in the previous section but is
critically important to ensure the security goals of Vaults are achieved. The naive
approach of storing KIDs in ￿lesystem metadata is vulnerable to illicit modi￿cation
by a privileged attacker. If this metadata cannot be trusted, it becomes impossible
to ascertain a ￿le’s protection status with certainty and this, in turn, enables attacks
on both the con￿dentiality and integrity of protected data.
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re-writing ￿le contents. As the protection status of the ￿le cannot be determined,
the ￿le appears unprotected and the modi￿cations cannot be cryptographically
detected. Consequently, the veri￿able integrity requirement cannot be met. A
similar attack on read protection also exists. By removing the indication of read
protection and re-writing ￿le contents, future legitimate modi￿cations or additions
to the ￿le will not be encrypted. If the user does not identify this, the attacker can
gain access to these later, unprotected modi￿cations. Furthermore, a race condition
is likely to exist where an attacker removes the read protection designation of an
encrypted ￿le after it has been read into memory in plaintext but prior to the
data being rewritten to disk after modi￿cation. If the kernel cannot, at this point,
identify that the ￿le is read protected, the data may be inadvertently written in
plaintext.
Further analysis identi￿ed the existence of other more sophisticated substitution
and rollback attacks, and a robust, cryptographic approach to ascertain protection
status is therefore required. The security goal of this mechanism is to allow the
protection status of a given ￿le to be veri￿ed in such a way that an attacker cannot
undetectably tamper with this information. The mechanism must be able to de-
tect attacks such as creation of false protection status information, substitution of
protection status information with that belonging to another ￿le, and rolling back
a ￿le’s protection status to a previous, legitimate state. This goal is a challenging
one as ￿lesystem metadata is e￿ectively untrusted in the presence of a privileged
attacker, as is assumed. Protection of this data must therefore be passive in nature,
according to Gi￿ord’s [127] notions of active and passive enforcement mechanisms,
as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
4.5.1 Filesystem Metadata
The ￿lesystem metadata for each object must store information allowing the ￿le’s
protection status to be veri￿ed. This is in addition to existing metadata required
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PSAf1 pf1 The PSA and path pair for the ￿rst link to this ￿le.
... ...
PSAfn pfn The PSA and path pair for the nth link to this ￿le.
tPSf The timestamp of the last protection status change.
nf The number of links relating to this inode.
Table 4.1: Protection status-related ￿lesystem metadata
by the system. While the principles are general, the construction of the protection
status veri￿cation mechanism requires consideration of some low-level details of
some properties of the target ￿lesystem. The description given here assumes a Unix-
like ￿lesystem involving an inode structure for each individual object but with the
possibility of multiple directory entries or ‘links’ referencing that inode [205, pp. 92￿
95]. However, the design of the mechanism is not dependent upon such a structure;
in fact the design would be slightly simpler when implemented on top of a ￿lesystem
where there is a one-to-one relationship between ￿le objects and directory entries.
Table 4.1 summarises the additional ￿lesystem metadata relating to Vaults en-
hanced access controls and protection status veri￿cation that is stored in each inode.
The majority of these are value pairs containing the protection status authenticator
(PSA) PSAfx and the ￿lesystem path pfx. Each pair relates to a di￿erent directory
entry or link corresponding to a speci￿c inode on a given ￿lesystem with the number
of pairs matching the link count. The PSA value is cryptographically generated and
its construction is described in the next section. Path details relating to di￿erent
directory entries are not normally stored in Unix inode metadata; however, this is
necessary in order to e￿ciently determine all of the paths corresponding to a speci￿c
inode without requiring an intensive search of the ￿lesystem. As the vast majority
of ￿les only have a single directory entry1, ￿les with more than one PSA-path pair
will be relatively uncommon in practice. The inode metadata also stores the time
tPSf when the protection status of the ￿le last changed. If the ￿le is unprotected
and has never been protected, this will be the time when the Vaults architecture was
1An informal experiment conducted on Linux workstation using the ￿nd(1) program found that
out of 248,639 ￿les, a total of 248,203 or 99.8% had only a single link.
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installed and the PSA values initially generated. Finally, the number of directory
entries (links) nf corresponding to this inode is also stored.
4.5.2 The Process Status Authenticator
The PSA is used to derive a Protection Status Index (PSI) that references an entry
in the Protection Status Table (PST) held in GPRIV, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
The mechanism is secured using the protection status key KPS, which is also stored
in GPRIV.
The PSA is constructed as given in Equation 4.6. A hash is calculated of the
protection status key KPS, the access path pf, the inode number for the ￿le in
question if, the number of links (directory entries) for this ￿le nf and the time its
protection status last changed tPSf. This is XOR’d against the PSI for this ￿le
(padded with leading zeros as required) and the result encrypted with KPS:
PSAf := KPS(PSIf  H(KPS; pf; if; nf; tPSf)): (4.6)
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PSIf The protection status index (PSI) for that ￿le.
KIDfR The Key ID for the ￿le’s read protection key.
KIDfW The Key ID for the ￿le’s write protection key.
tPSf The timestamp of the last protection status change.
Table 4.2: List and summary of Protection Status Table ￿elds
Note that as each link for a given ￿le results in an additional path, a di￿erent PSA
must be generated for each. However, the PSI value remains identical so the same
entry in the PST is referenced regardless of the path by which a ￿le is accessed.
The construction of the PSA is designed to resist a variety of attacks by a privileged
user who can write directly to the disk, bypassing the kernel. Without knowing
KPS, an attacker cannot either decrypt the PSA or recalculate its hash component
in order to modify parameters such as path values or timestamps. However, both
of these tasks must be accomplished in order to change the PSI value relating
to a given ￿le or modify the parameters associated with that ￿le. This design
cryptographically protects these parameters, which are also stored in plaintext in
the inode metadata. Finally, XORing the hash component with the PSI value
combines them together to ensure the atomicity of the PSA value. This prevents the
substitution of selected parts of the PSA ciphertext for one ￿le with that belonging
to another in order to mis-apply the latter’s protection status to the former.
Upon access to a ￿le, the PSA and ￿le parameters (if; nf; tPSf) are obtained
from the inode metadata. Note that the path name pf used in this calculation is
that received by the kernel in the user’s access request. Using this value means
that the PSA calculated will correspond with the ￿le the user seeks to access. In
conjunction with the protection status key KPS held in GPRIV, the hash component
H(KPS; pf; if; nf; tPSf) is calculated. The PSA value is then decrypted using KPS
and this is XOR’d against the previous result, giving the PSI value for that ￿le
according to the equation:
112PSIf := (PSIf  H(KPS; pf; if; nf; tPSf))  H(KPS; pf; if; nf; tPSf): (4.7)
Once the PSI for a given ￿le has been obtained, this references a speci￿c entry
within the PST as shown in Table 4.2. Each entry speci￿es the KIDs, both read
and write (KIDfR and KIDfW), belonging to that ￿le, allowing its protection status
to be reliably determined. The timestamp of the last protection status change is
also stored here and this is cross-checked against the value from the inode metadata
that was used to generate the PSA to ensure that a rollback attack has not occurred.
Assuming a secure hash function and su￿ciently large output length, the probability
is vanishingly small that any manipulation of ￿lesystem metadata parameters will
lead to the calculation of a valid PSI. Consequently, if no entry is found in the
protection status table for a calculated PSI, this reveals tampering with ￿lesystem
parameters and access to the specied ￿le is halted.
4.5.3 Protection Status Protocols
The following are speci￿c scenarios where the protection status of a ￿le is relevant
and must be veri￿ed before proceeding. Descriptions are given of the steps required
for each scenario in terms of a set of preliminary protection status veri￿cation
routines, which are outlined in Appendix D. Names of routines are distinguished
by the use of a monospaced font, for example AddPSA. Low-level ￿lesystem issues
are not considered; however, the use of journaling to ensure reliability, as found
in many contemporary ￿lesystems, is anticipated. Note that the design of these
protocols is such that race conditions and other attacks on security by interfering
with the completion of these protocols will leave the system in an inconsistent state.
As a result, the attack will be detected upon next access to the ￿le concerned and
the goal of veri￿able integrity is thereby achieved.
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The ￿lesystem is recursively scanned to identify all directory entries and inodes.
New entries in the PST are created for each inode with PSI values being obtained
incrementally, taking care to ensure they do not repeat, and the timestamp being
initialised as the current time. As no ￿les will be protected at installation time,
all KID values held in the PST are initially 0. PSA values are then calculated for
all directory entries and inode metadata extended to include all PSA-path pairs
for that inode and the corresponding timestamp for the object held in the PST
using the AddPSA routine. This process is then repeated for all local, compatible
￿lesystems with separate PSTs used for each.
File Creation and Access
Creating a new ￿le also requires creating the appropriate protection status meta-
data. This involves obtaining the next available PSI value incrementally 2 and creat-
ing a new PST entry. After this is done, the PSA for the new ￿le can be generated
using the available PSI, path, inode, link count and timestamp parameters and
these are written to the inode metadata (AddPSA). The protection status must also
be checked when accessing a ￿le, however, this simply involves calling the GetPS
routine.
Link Creation and Deletion
Creating a hard link to an already existing ￿le requires checking the protection
status of all existing paths, accomplished by calling the PSVerifyAll routine. Once
this is completed, a new PSA-path pair is created using AddPSA. At this point the
new directory entry can be created.
Link deletion requires ￿rstly verifying all paths (PSVerifyAll). Assuming this
check succeeds, if the veri￿ed link count is greater than 1 then the PSA-path pair
2Note that PSI values must never be reused to avoid collisions.
114for the speci￿ed link is deleted (DeletePSA) and the process status updated. The
corresponding directory entry can then be removed. If this is the only remaining
link, the PST entry, inode metadata and ￿le contents are deleted (DeletePSI). If
the ￿le is protected then the key entry in GPRIV is also deleted.
Moving/Renaming a File
Moving or renaming a ￿le simply involves changing a path value relating to this
inode. However, this requires a number of changes to protection status meta-
data. Once existing protection status data is veri￿ed (PSVerifyAll), a PSA-path
pair corresponding to the new name is created (AddPSA) and the old value deleted
(DeletePSA). The directory entry corresponding to the old name is then unlinked
and the new one created.
Adding or Removing Cryptographic Protection from a File
When initiating the protection of a ￿le, it is important to con￿rm that it is not
already protected. This is achieved using PSVerifyAll and con￿rming the value of
the relevant KID ￿eld in the PST. For unprotected ￿les, this ￿eld will be 0. Once
the ￿le has been protected, the KID ￿eld in the PST is updated to re￿ect this and
UpdatePS is used to ensure protection status metadata is consistent. Removing
cryptographic protection similarly requires using PSVerifyAll ￿rst to con￿rm the
￿le’s status. The relevant KID ￿eld in the PST is set to 0, the protection status
metadata updated (UpdatePS), and protection can then be removed.
4.6 Ticket Creation Protocols
4.6.1 Read Protecting an Object
The procedure for read protecting an object involves the following steps.
1151. User sends a request to protect a named ￿le and speci￿es the protection mode
as read. Initiating protection can only be performed using an L3 program.
2. The kernel checks the VID of the requesting process against the CRL and
veri￿es that the owner of the ￿le is the same as the user making the request.
The instantiation of read protection is terminated if either of these checks
fails.
3. The kernel checks the ￿le’s current protection status using the ￿le protection
status veri￿cation mechanism described in Section 4.5. If the ￿le is already
read-protected, the attempt to re-protect it will fail, otherwise the kernel
temporarily locks out any changes to the ￿le’s protection status.
4. The kernel generates a key Kfr and encrypts the ￿le with it.
5. A new primary ticket T1
fr is constructed from this key as described in Equation
4.1 (p. 102) and is bound to the VID associated with the process making the
request VIDo.
6. The ￿le protection key is stored in GPRIV with the associated metadata;
namely, the Key ID KIDfR (Equation 4.5, p. 105), timestamp t1, protection
mode (read) and the ￿le’s protection status index PSIf.
7. The kernel updates the read KID KIDfR and timestamp tPSf in the PST.
After this is complete, the kernel can remove the lock previously held on
changes to the ￿le’s protection status.
8. A copy of the new primary ticket and its KID is placed in the Escrow Vault.
9. The kernel returns the newly generated primary ticket and its associated user
vault metadata which the L3 process adds to the user’s vault.
At this point the user may now gain read access to the protected ￿le.
1164.6.2 Write Protecting an Object
The process involved in write protecting an object is similar to that for reading,
with the principal di￿erence being the existence of the MAC key used to crypto-
graphically determine whether to allow or deny write access.
The procedure for write protecting an object involves the following major steps.
1. The owner sends a request to protect a named ￿le and speci￿es the protection
type, in this case write. Again this request is made using an L3 program.
2. The kernel checks the VID of the requesting process against the CRL and
veri￿es that the owner of the ￿le is the same user making the request.
3. The kernel checks to see that the ￿le is not already write protected using the
protocols from Section 4.5. If the ￿le is already write protected, the attempt
to re-protect it will fail. Otherwise, the kernel temporarily locks out any
changes to the ￿le’s protection status.
4. The kernel generates a MAC key Kfw and a MAC value for the ￿le is cal-
culated MAC(f). Note that the MAC is calculated based upon the plaintext
contents of the ￿le. If the ￿le is currently read protected, this must ￿rst be
decrypted in order to calculate the MAC.
5. A primary ticket T1
fw is constructed from this key, as described previously in
Equation 4.1 (p. 102), and is bound to the VID associated with the process
making the request, VIDo.
6. The key Kfw and associated metadata, including the KID KIDfW (Equation
4.5, p. 105), timestamp t1, protection mode (write), the ￿le’s PSI PSIf, and
MAC value MAC(f), are stored in GPRIV.
7. The kernel updates the write KID KIDfW and timestamp tPSf in the PST.
After this is complete, the kernel can remove the lock previously held on
changes to the ￿le’s protection status.
1178. A copy of the new primary ticket and KIDfW are placed in the Escrow Vault.
9. The kernel returns the newly generated primary ticket and its associated user
vault metadata which the L3 process adds to the user’s vault.
At this point the user may now gain write access to the protected ￿le.
4.6.3 Creating and Distributing Secondary Tickets
The process for creating and distributing secondary tickets is straightforward.
1. The primary ticket holder for the object submits the following items to the
kernel:
￿ Primary ticket Kf(Kf; H(VIDo; Kf; t1)).
￿ Claimed KID, KIDf.
￿ Path name for ￿le in question pf .
￿ VID of user whom they are granting access VIDr. This can be securely
obtained based on the user information found on their VPKI certi￿cate
stored in GPUB.
￿ Expiry time/date tE or null if it should never expire.
This process is performed via an L3 vault administration program as only
these programs have direct access to the user’s vault.
2. The kernel veri￿es that the ticket is a primary ticket and is valid for the ￿le
in question:
(a) Kernel looks up the KIDs for the ￿le in the PST using the GetPS routine
as described in Appendix D. By identifying which KID matches with the
KID claimed in Step 1, the kernel can determine whether the protection
mode is intended to be read or write. If neither KID matches, the ticket
issuing process aborts.
118(b) The appropriate key entry in GPRIV is retrieved based on this KID. Note
that the KID used to identify the key is that from the user’s vault and
is therefore untrusted data. However, if this KID is incorrect then the
wrong key will be obtained from GPRIV and veri￿cation of the primary
ticket will fail.
(c) Veri￿cation of the primary ticket is performed as described in Section
4.7.4.
3. The kernel constructs the ticket key KTr
f as H(VIDr; Kf; t1) using the pa-
rameters obtained in the previous steps.
4. Using the hash calculated in the previous step, the expiry timestamp speci￿ed
in Step 1 and the current time, the kernel constructs the secondary ticket T2
f
and encrypts it with the ticket key, giving KTr
f (t2; tE; H(VIDr; Kf; t1)).
5. In order for the secondary ticket to be usable by the recipient, it must have
a ticket ID (TID). As per Equation 4.4 (p. 104), the kernel constructs the
TID TIDr
f by hashing the KID of the ￿le, the VID of the intended recipient,
and the secondary ticket timestamp. The resulting value H(KIDf; VIDr; t2)
is paired with the recipient’s VID, giving <VIDr; TIDr
f> and this is added
to the list of the VID-TID pairs associated with the key in GPRIV as shown
in Figure 4.2.
6. The new secondary ticket is now distributed to the recipient:
(a) The kernel locates the public key for the recipient user in GPUB using
VIDr and retrieves it.
(b) The kernel encrypts the new secondary ticket with this public key.
(c) The recipient’s VID is attached to the encrypted ticket as a plaintext
header and the kernel lodges the result in GPUB for collection.
7. The recipient can then request collection of tickets from GPUB by searching
for their VID, decrypting the ticket and storing it in their vault.
119In practice, users will often want to distribute secondary tickets to groups of other
users at a time rather than creating each ticket individually. However, the above
steps will still need to be completed, albeit in an automated and transparent way,
making this primarily a user interface issue. In practice, this could be implemented
by the user creating lists of users via an L3 program that could either be stored
in a separate write protected ￿le or directly in the vault. The construction of this
list requires the user to verify the identity of the intended recipients, as speci￿ed
on their certi￿cate, with the list then being made up of these recipient’s VIDs.
However, the revocation status of these certi￿cates must still be veri￿ed upon the
creation of each ticket.
4.7 File Access Protocols and Related Issues
4.7.1 Binding File Keys to Applications
Access control models involve limiting the objects that a user may access. However,
actual access is performed by programs executing on behalf of the user. Therefore
the security of a ￿le also depends on the security of the programs that can access it.
The Vaults Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism (Chapter 5) partially addresses this
issue by preventing the applications that a user trusts from being illicitly modi￿ed
without the user’s knowledge. However, Vaults also uses information from Trusted
Fingerprinting to assign a trust level to applications when they execute and this
determines the degree of access these processes will have to the user’s vault. Pro-
grams with a trust level set to L1 are restricted to a speci￿ed set of keys, regardless
of the tickets contained in the user’s vault. Setting an L1 trust level can be used
to con￿ne an application to the minimum number of protected ￿les that it needs
to access to complete the work required of it by the user. Such an approach is
particularly appropriate for applications that must deal with a large quantity of
data from untrusted sources, and allows them to execute with minimal privileges.
This con￿nement is accomplished by binding the protection keys of the speci￿c
120objects to the L1 application concerned, in a manner notionally similar to how ap-
plication keys can be bound to speci￿c applications. Although keys are bound to
an application, and not vice versa, a key may be bound to many applications and a
particular application may have many keys bound to it. Also, it is keys rather than
tickets that are bound to an application. Therefore only the owner of a protected
￿le who possesses the appropriate primary ticket can bind its key to a particular ap-
plication. File protection keys may only be bound to natively executable programs
and not to interpreted scripts etc. as otherwise determining which application is
actually accessing the ￿le becomes problematic. Finally, note that binding a ￿le
protection key to an application does not mean that only that application can ac-
cess the ￿le protected with that key; the set of programs that can access this ￿le
includes bound L1 applications as well as all L3 and L2 programs. The purpose of
binding ￿le protection keys therefore is to con￿ne speci￿c applications, rather than
as a mechanism for further protecting speci￿c ￿les.
The File Key Binding Process
Binding a ￿le protection key to an L1 trusted application involves using a speci￿c
L3 program to identify both the protected ￿le (or ￿les) and the application to which
these are to be bound. A request is then made to the security kernel to instantiate
this binding, submitting the primary ticket (or tickets) for the relevant ￿les and
the ￿ngerprint for the application. After verifying the primary ticket (discussed in
Section 4.7.4), the kernel then adds the ￿ngerprint value for the application to the
list of bound applications for that key stored in GPRIV. Note that ￿le protection
keys can only be bound to L1 applications that are part of the user’s LTCB, so
any programs that only have ￿ngerprint records in GPUB must ￿rst be duplicated
inside the user’s vault before having keys bound to them.
121Protection Access Behaviour
r r Use key associated with ticket.
w w Verify MAC using key associated with ticket. Recalculate when complete.
r w No ticket required. Data is encrypted as written using KfR.
w r No ticket required. MAC veri￿ed prior to granting access.
rw r Use respective keys to decrypt contents and verify MAC.
rw w Use respective keys to decrypt contents and verify MAC. Recalculate when complete.
Table 4.3: Protection mode and access request permutations and behaviour
4.7.2 Accessing Protected Files with Tickets
When attempting to open a ￿le for either read or write, the protection status must
￿rst be determined using the GetPS routine (Appendix D). If the ￿le is completely
unprotected, the ￿le is opened in the same way as in a non-Vaults environment with
no ticket required. However, protected ￿les can also be accessed without needing
a ticket if the ￿le’s protection mode does not intersect with the access mode being
attempted. The applicability of this scenario can be determined based upon the
KID ￿elds in the PST as reported by the GetPS routine. Six scenarios exist, as
summarised in Table 4.3, and are explained below. For those where a ticket is
required, the correct ticket can be identi￿ed by matching the KID ￿eld for the
designated access mode against the corresponding ￿eld in the ticket metadata in
the user’s vault. Similarly, where the kernel must perform transparent encryption
or decryption, the authenticated KID values from the PST allows selection of the
correct key data in GPRIV.
When read access to a read-protected ￿le is requested, the KID obtained from the
PST is used to identify the relevant ticket in the user’s vault and the corresponding
key in GPRIV is retrieved and the ticket veri￿ed as described in Section 4.7.4. If
this succeeds, the kernel grants read access to the ￿le. Writing to a ￿le that is
only write protected also requires the user to possess a suitable ticket. The KIDfW
is retrieved from the PST and the corresponding key in GPRIV is obtained for
veri￿cation of that ticket. After the ticket has been veri￿ed, the MAC is veri￿ed
against the ￿le’s contents and, if successful, write access to the ￿le is granted and
the new MAC value is recalculated when the ￿le is closed.
122While write access to a ￿le that is only read protected does not require a ticket, as
the ￿le’s contents are encrypted, the data written to the ￿le must also be encrypted
with the read protection key. The kernel therefore uses the KIDfR from the PST
to identify the correct encryption key. On the other hand, when reading from a
￿le that is only write protected, the contents of the ￿le must be read into memory
and the MAC veri￿ed, again using the write protection key referenced by the PST
entry. Note that read access must then be granted to the veri￿ed copy of the ￿le
held in memory in order to eliminate race condition attacks.
When accessing a ￿le that is both read and write protected, the requirements of
both protection modes must be considered. When reading from such a ￿le, ￿le
contents must be both decrypted and the MAC veri￿ed prior to access. The same
applies when writing to a ￿le with both protection modes; however, when writing
is complete, the MAC must then be recalculated.
4.7.3 Issues Relating to Trust Levels and Bound Files
The above assumes that the application attempting to access the ￿le is operating
at a trust level of L2 (or above). If the application is an L0 process, its access
attempt will fail as such processes cannot access the user’s vault. However, if the
application is an L1 process, its ability to access the ￿le is dependent upon whether
the key that protects the ￿le is bound to this application.
When an L1 process requests access to a protected ￿le and the user concerned
possesses the corresponding primary ticket, the security kernel ascertains whether
the Fingerprint value stored in the process’s metadata is present in the list of
￿ngerprints of Bound Applications ￿eld in the GPRIV metadata for that key. If
this value is found, the L1 process has permission to access the speci￿ed protected
￿le in the relevant mode and access proceeds. However, if the ￿ngerprint is not
found in the list, the key has not been bound to this application and access is
denied.
Although ￿le protection keys can be bound to L1 applications in order to con￿ne
123them to the speci￿ed objects, this does not restrict which applications secondary
ticket holders may use to access these objects. As all L2 and L3 applications
can access all protected ￿les and trust levels are determined on a per user basis,
the binding of ￿le protection keys to speci￿c applications has no impact on the
recipients of secondary tickets. As it is not a goal of Vaults to establish a digital
rights management (DRM) scheme, it is di￿cult to justify the additional complexity
involved in enforcing such restrictions on secondary ticket holders. Nonetheless,
there may be opportunities here for further research.
4.7.4 Primary Ticket Veri￿cation
Ticket veri￿cation is performed whenever a ticket is used; for example, when access-
ing a protected ￿le with either a primary or secondary ticket. However, for primary
tickets, veri￿cation is also required when creating or revoking secondary tickets and
when removing protection from an object.
Prior to veri￿cation, the KID for the ticket concerned is obtained from an authen-
ticated source, speci￿cally an entry in the PST. Using the KID, the protection key
Kf for the object is retrieved from GPRIV. The veri￿cation protocols described
below assume that a key length of k bits, a hash output of h bits and timestamp
length of n bits.
Primary ticket veri￿cation involves the following steps and all of these must be
successful for the ticket to be considered valid and usable.
1. Verify that the VID associated with the requesting process is not on the
CRL. If this process has no VID as it is executing at a trust level L0, access
is automatically denied. Alternatively, if the trust level is L1, the kernel must
additionally con￿rm that the process’s ￿ngerprint value is present on the list
of bound applications associated with the key in GPRIV.
2. Decrypt the ticket T1
f received using the protection key Kf obtained from
GPRIV giving [Kf; H(VIDo; Kf; t1)].
1243. Verify that the ￿rst k bits of plaintext from the previous step are equal to the
value of Kf used.
4. Using the VID of the requesting process and the key and protection timestamp
values obtained from GPRIV, calculate H(VIDo; Kf; t1).
5. Verify that the next h bits from the decrypted ticket are equal to the value
calculated on the previous step.
4.7.5 Secondary Ticket Veri￿cation
Similarly for secondary ticket veri￿cation, the following steps apply and again all
of these must be successful for the ticket to be accepted.
1. Verify that the VID associated with the requesting process is not on the CRL.
As with primary tickets, if the process has no VID as it is executing at trust
level L0, access is automatically denied. Alternatively, if the trust level is
L1, the kernel must additionally con￿rm that the process ￿ngerprint value is
present on the list of bound applications associated with the key in GPRIV.
2. Construct the ticket key KTr
f by hashing the VID of the requesting process,
the protection key and protection timestamp H(VIDr; Kf; t1).
3. Decrypt the ticket T2
f with the the ticket key calculated in the previous step
giving [t2; tE; H(VIDr; Kf; t1)]
4. Verify that the ￿rst n bits (t2) are prior to the current system time.
5. Verify that the next n bits (tE) are after the current system time.
6. Using the VID of the requesting process and the key and protection timestamp
values obtained from GPRIV, calculate3 H(VIDr; Kf; t1).
3Note that the hash construction here is the same as for the ticket key; however, the ticket key
value will likely need to be truncated from the full length of the hash. This step therefore can be
optimised by not discarding the full hash value calculated in Step 2 prior to truncation.
1257. Calculate the TID by hashing the KID, VID of the process and secondary
ticket timestamp from Step 4, H(KIDf; VIDr; t2).
8. Finally, the kernel searches the list of TIDs associated with the key in GPRIV
using the requesting process’s VID and con￿rms that the TID calculated in
the previous step is present. If the TID is not present, this indicates that the
ticket has been revoked and access is denied.
4.7.6 Fundamental Ticket Veri￿cation
Fundamental tickets are those associated with a key held in the Fundamental Vault
that encrypts one of the system vaults. Fundamental tickets are used by the prime
user when either modifying an entry in GPUB or obtaining a secondary ticket to
bypass cryptographic access controls (Section 3.6.3). Verifying a fundamental ticket
involves the following steps.
1. Con￿rm the trust level of the requesting process is L3. Only L3 programs are
able to use fundamental tickets.
2. Decrypt supplied fundamental ticket TF
V with the key KF
V from the Funda-
mental Vault for the system vault to which access is being requested, giving
H(KF
V ; VIDP).
3. Hash KF
V and the VID of the requesting process, and compare it with the
result of Step 2.
4. Verify that the VID of the process making the request is not present in the
CRL and has the Certifying ￿ag set on the corresponding certi￿cate in
GPUB.
If all of the above is completed satisfactorily, the ticket has been successfully veri￿ed
and access is granted.
1264.8 Other File Protection Protocols and Issues
4.8.1 Revocation
Revocation is critical because users who have granted others access to their objects
must be able to terminate this access if and when desired. Note that the design of
Vaults, which does not grant users direct access to ￿le protection keys, ensures that
revocation is both e￿cient and ￿nal.
The possession of a primary ticket allows the owner of an object to both grant
and revoke access to that object for the speci￿ed mode. As previously described
in Section 4.4.3 and Figure 4.2, each key in GPRIV has associated with it a list of
zero or more TIDs, each with a corresponding VID label. During the veri￿cation
of a secondary ticket, the TID for that ticket and user is calculated and checked
against this list. If the TID is not found, access is denied, e￿ectively rendering the
secondary ticket unusable. The primary ticket holder can therefore revoke use of a
secondary ticket by requesting the removal of a corresponding TID from the list in
GPRIV. The protocol for this is:
1. The primary ticket holder uses an L3 program and submits a request to revoke
access, specifying:
￿ Primary ticket T1
f
￿ File path pf
￿ User whose access is to be revoked VIDr
￿ Access mode (read/write).
2. From the ￿le path pf , the kernel looks up KIDf for the object in the PST and
locates the relevant key Kf in GPRIV.
3. The kernel then veri￿es the primary ticket as described in Section 4.7.4.
4. Using the VID of the revoked user, the kernel locates the TID in the list and
deletes the <VIDr; TIDr
f> pair.
127Note that in the case of a user’s certi￿cate being revoked, it is not necessary for
those other users who have granted them secondary tickets to manually revoke them
in order to maintain security. Not only is the revocation status of the user’s cer-
ti￿cate checked when verifying both primary and secondary tickets, but revoking a
user’s certi￿cate involves the automatic revocation of all secondary tickets belong-
ing to that user by deleting their VID from all protection key entries in GPRIV as
described in Section 3.3.8.
4.8.2 Removing Cryptographic Protection from a File
The process of removing cryptographic protection from ￿les di￿ers depending upon
the mode being removed and the ￿le’s current protection status. In all cases an L3
application is used and the subject presents the relevant primary ticket and speci￿es
the ￿le path and protection mode. Using the path, the kernel obtains the relevant
KID from the PST and veri￿es the primary ticket as described in Section 4.7.4. If
the ￿le is only read protected and this protection is being removed, the kernel will
decrypt the ￿le and write the plaintext to disk. Alternatively, if removing write
protection, this requires verifying the MAC and warning the user if the veri￿cation
fails. Note that if the ￿le having write protection removed from it is both read and
write protected, the ￿le must ￿rst be decrypted in order to perform veri￿cation.
However, this plaintext is not written to disk. For ￿les that have both protection
modes currently enabled but read protection is being removed, the data must be
decrypted, veri￿ed against the MAC and then the plaintext written to disk. Finally,
in all four of the scenarios described, the key record and associated data in GPRIV
must be deleted and the relevant KID in the PST be reset to null.
4.8.3 Ticket Escrow
When a new primary ticket is generated, a copy is placed in the Escrow Vault and
labelled with its KID. This allows the prime user to exercise one of their fundamental
privileges, namely to bypass the cryptographic enhanced access controls provided by
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Vaults. Bypassing these controls in this way requires possession of the fundamental
ticket for the Escrow Vault TF
E . Figure 4.4 provides an overview of the operation
of the ticket escrow mechanism.
However, consistent with the goal of limiting the prime user’s privileges, access to
the Escrow Vault is controlled in a number of ways. Most importantly, the prime
user does not gain access to ￿le protection keys themselves, which remain secure in
GPRIV and are not stored by the Escrow Vault. Also, as the primary tickets held
in the Escrow Vault are bound to the VID of the ￿le’s owner, they are not usable by
the prime user. Instead, upon being provided with the correct fundamental ticket,
the security kernel retrieves the relevant primary ticket and generates from this
a secondary ticket bound to the prime user’s VID using the procedure described
in Section 4.6.3. The expiry time set on these recovered secondary tickets is set
to be relatively limited with selection of a default value being dependent upon
the organisation’s security requirements. In this way, access to cryptographically
protected objects is only for a limited amount of time, although the prime user can
request additional secondary tickets at a later point if required.
The process of requesting a secondary ticket for a protected object requires the use
of a speci￿cally designed L3 program, which must be both interactive and require
explicit selection of the ￿les for which tickets are to be obtained. These requirements
129ensure that the process cannot be subverted in an automated way by malicious code.
The following steps apply to this process.
1. The prime user executes the appropriate L3 program and selects the path of
the ￿le pf for which they wish to retrieve a secondary ticket and the access
mode required.
2. The L3 program submits these details to the kernel, along with the funda-
mental ticket TF
E for the Escrow Vault.
3. The kernel veri￿es the fundamental ticket as described in Section 4.7.6.
4. The kernel retrieves the KID for the mode and ￿le requested from the PST.
5. The kernel then searches the Escrow Vault for the KID of the selected ￿le and
retrieves the corresponding primary ticket.
6. The kernel constructs a secondary ticket from this primary ticket, bound to
the prime user’s VID VIDp, and with an expiry timestamp tE set as described
above.
7. The new ticket is returned to the L3 program, which places it in the prime
user’s vault for subsequent use.
4.9 Summary
This chapter has described the mechanism within Vaults for providing cryptographic
enhanced access controls. Users can cryptographically protect a ￿le in either read
or write mode and this provides them with a primary ticket for accessing the ￿le,
issuing secondary tickets to other users and subsequently revoking this access if and
when desired. All tickets are bound to a speci￿c vault and are unusable if accessed
via any other vault. This restriction prevents recipients of secondary tickets from
duplicating them and transferring them to other, unauthorised users. Primary
ticket holders can also bind the ￿le protection key to speci￿c L1 applications, which
130serves as a mechanism for limiting the trust that must be placed in a speci￿c
program. Finally, Vaults provides a way for cryptographically verifying ￿lesystem
metadata and this, combined with the cryptographic nature of the access control
model, ensures that the speci￿ed security goals are achieved even in the face of
an attacker who is able to bypass the security kernel and write directly to the
secondary storage device. The next chapter will examine the Trusted Fingerprinting
mechanism, which protects speci￿c programs and various objects that they depend
upon for secure operation against illicit modi￿cation. This mechanism is also used
to assign trust levels to programs and these are used to manage the program’s
privileges on the system.
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Trusted Fingerprinting
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes in detail Trusted Fingerprinting, an important security fea-
ture of the Vaults model that is facilitated by its cryptographic infrastructure.
Trusted Fingerprinting enables users, both privileged and otherwise, to select pro-
grams that are important for their security requirements and have these crypto-
graphically checked for unauthorised modi￿cations prior to execution. If the pro-
gram has been modi￿ed, execution will be denied and users thereby shielded from
potentially malicious code. As a means for users to obtain authenticated access to
trusted code, Trusted Fingerprinting is therefore a virtual implementation of the
traditional notion of a physical trusted path to the trusted computing base (TCB).
However the mechanism also allows for programs to be assigned di￿erent trust levels
and this determines their privileges in relation to the cryptographic access control
model described in the previous chapter.
5.1.1 Goals of Trusted Fingerprinting
The goals of Trusted Fingerprinting are as follows:
Actively protect against modi￿cation to trusted software The primary goal
132is to detect modi￿cations to trusted code executed via a speci￿c path. These
may be programs that are trusted by an individual user or relevant to the se-
curity of all users on the system. However, Trusted Fingerprinting recognizes
that, in many cases, code behaviour can be manipulated by modi￿cation of
external dependencies, such as libraries or con￿guration ￿les. Consequently,
these objects are also checked for unauthorised modi￿cations. Finally, if modi-
￿cations are detected, execution is denied. Therefore, Trusted Fingerprinting
is not simply a passive detection mechanism but actively prevents further
compromise due to execution of malicious code.
Authentication of code for privilege determination By verifying the integrity
of code, Trusted Fingerprinting allows for code that is authorised to access
cryptographically protected ￿les to be distinguished from that which is not.
It also facilitates the con￿nement of a program to a speci￿c set of protected
objects. In this way, Trusted Fingerprinting is tightly integrated with the ac-
cess control model described in the previous chapter and plays an important
role in determining a process’s privileges.
Authentication of code for application key release This code authentication
mechanism also serves as a means for ensuring that application keys (Section
3.5) are only released to the applications speci￿cally authorised to access
them. As discussed in Section 2.6, this resolves a signi￿cant limitation of
previous secure storage mechanisms.
Preventing mis-use of trusted code In addition to limiting the privilege of un-
trusted code by keeping track of the trust relationships between parent and
child processes, Trusted Fingerprinting also includes measures to prevent
trusted programs from being used in undesirable ways by malicious code be-
yond simply direct modi￿cation.
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5.1.2 Overview of Process Execution and Fingerprinting
The checking of a program’s ￿ngerprint occurs prior to a new process executing and
an overview is given in Figure 5.1. The ￿rst phase involves searching to identify
whether a ￿ngerprint exists for the program being executed. This process is known
as ‘matching’ and involves considering ￿ngerprints in both GPUB and the user’s
vault, if available.
If the matching process fails to identify a corresponding ￿ngerprint, execution of
the program proceeds. However, the process will have a trust level of L0 and is
unable to utilise items held in the user’s vault. If matching succeeds, the program’s
134￿ngerprint, and those of any shared libraries upon which it depends, are veri￿ed.
If veri￿cation is successful, the program is executed with its trust level as speci￿ed
by the ￿ngerprint dependency record. However, if veri￿cation fails, execution is
denied.
5.2 Trusted Fingerprint Dependencies
In order to specify that a particular program should be veri￿ed upon execution,
a new ￿ngerprint record must be created. This record speci￿es both the actual
￿ngerprint (hash) value, along with some other parameters, and also identi￿es the
objects upon which the program depends for secure execution. Similar records for
these objects are also subsequently created. Due to their interconnected nature, all
￿ngerprinted objects are referred to as ‘dependencies’.
New dependencies can be created by both the prime user and other users on the
system. In the former case, these dependency records may be placed in GPUB by
the prime user1 and therefore constitute part of the system’s global TCB (GTCB).
However, for non-privileged users, these records are placed in their own vault and
only veri￿ed when that speci￿c user executes the program. While the prime user
may create ￿ngerprints for any program on the system, users can only create ￿n-
gerprints for programs they are able to read and execute. Dependencies may be
created for any object to which the user will have access when the main ￿nger-
printed program itself is run. For example, set user ID programs will generally run
with privileges di￿erent to those of the user who executed them [5, pp. 145￿151].
5.2.1 Dependency Data Structures
Each dependency created stores several parameters associated with that object and
its ￿ngerprint. These are described below:
1The prime user also has their own user vault that belongs just to them in addition to GPUB.
135Value The ￿ngerprint value representing the output of the one-way hash function
for the contents of the speci￿ed target.
Targets The list of one or more fully quali￿ed paths for the directory entries
corresponding to this dependency.
PSI The protection status index of the ￿le.
Dependencies The list of zero or more ￿ngerprint values representing dependen-
cies for the object. This information e￿ectively links the dependency record
with the records for the objects on which it, in turn, depends.
Type The type of dependency speci￿ed as Program, Library or Data File.
Trust Level The trust level assigned to this dependency that determines its access
to the user’s vault and, consequently, the program’s privileges. This ￿eld must
be set for Program dependencies and is optional for those of type Data
File. However, it cannot be set for Library dependencies.
Flags A list of zero or more ￿ags that can be used to ￿ne-tune the operation of
the ￿ngerprint veri￿cation process.
As described above, each ￿ngerprint record has a list of dependencies that result in
a graph data structure [207]. Speci￿cally this is a directed graph (digraph) but with
vertices (nodes) that are irre￿exive (do not link with themselves). Each dependency
relationship is only one-way since one ￿ngerprint being a dependency for another
does not automatically imply any reciprocal relationship. Indeed, two dependency
records will not normally be mutually dependent, although this is not impossible.
Thus the resulting digraph will normally be acyclic in nature.
5.2.2 Dependency Types and Flags
The type of each dependency must be speci￿ed as a Program, Library or Data
File and this value determines how the entry is processed. Program dependencies
136Flag Description Page(s)
Required Program terminated if speci￿ed dependency is inaccessible. 149, 150, 155
Require Trusted Child Child processes require parent’s trust level to be executed. 150
Ignore Data Fail Program continues if veri￿cation of Data File fails. 155
No Cache Always reload and re-verify dependency. 157
Require Trusted Data ETL set to L0 if non-dependency object opened for reading. 157
No Auto Update Do not auto update ￿ngerprint if dependency modi￿ed. 162
Installer Allow updates to ￿ngerprints of non-Data File children. 163
Require STL Active node may only execute at its STL. 168
Table 5.1: Summary of dependency ￿ags
are those relating to natively executable code. For example, on a Unix system, this
would typically apply to processes executed via one of the exec() system calls [205,
pp. 207￿212]. Programs in the dependency digraph will often be ‘sources’ in that
there will be no edges that reach them from other nodes. However, this property is
not required, as some programs exist primarily as ‘helper applications’ that can be
launched by another program to complete some specialised task. For shared libraries
that are linked with an executable program, the Library type is set. Finally,
Data File dependencies are those that are not natively executable and are read
by running processes via a POSIX open() system call [205, pp. 48￿50] or equivalent.
Examples of such objects include non-executable objects such as con￿guration ￿les
that have the potential to signi￿cantly determine a program’s behaviour at runtime
and non-natively executable code such as scripts. Full details on the e￿ect that the
type of dependency has on the veri￿cation process are described in Section 5.4.
The way a dependency is processed can be ￿ne tuned by the setting of speci￿c
con￿guration ￿ags in the Flags ￿eld of the dependency record. These are discussed
in more detail at the relevant points in the following sections. However, an overview
is given in Table 5.1 along with a reference to where these details can be found.
Default values for these ￿ags are given in Table 5.2.
5.2.3 Dependency Trust Levels
The trust level of a dependency determines how that program may access the user’s
vault and therefore its ability to access protected objects. The trust levels are
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Required On Child Any Program parent On
Require Trusted Child On Parent With STL Children with STL On
Ignore Data Fail O￿ Child Data File Program parent O￿
No Cache O￿ Child Data File Self On
Require Trusted Data O￿ Parent With STL Self On
No Auto Update O￿ Child Any Self On
Installer O￿ Parent With STL All children O￿
Require STL On Any With STL Self On
Table 5.2: Dependency ￿ag details and defaults
labelled L0 to L3 as described in Section 3.4.2. Of the di￿erent types of depen-
dencies, trust levels must be set for Program dependencies as this information is
maintained in each process’s credentials. However, as Library dependencies are
typically shared between a large number of programs, trust levels cannot be set for
this type of dependency and the ￿eld will remain blank. Instead, when a library
that is a dependency of a program is linked at runtime, the process is assigned the
trust level of that program. However, a trusted program executing at L1 or above
cannot be linked with a library that is not speci￿ed as one of its dependencies. If
such linking is attempted, execution is aborted.
A trust level may be set for a Data File dependency, depending upon the type of
￿le involved. If the ￿le represents non-executable data, such as a con￿guration ￿le,
the ￿eld should be left blank as non-executable data is not considered to have a level
of trust2. However, if the ￿le represents a non-natively executable program such as
a script, the user should set its speci￿ed trust level (STL) in the same manner as for
a native executable. The only restriction that applies here is that the trust level of
the non-native executable should not exceed that of the program that is its parent
dependency (i.e., its interpreter or virtual machine). Otherwise, upon opening a
Data File dependency, the e￿ective trust level (ETL) of the process is set to the
lower of its current ETL and the STL given in the Data File dependency record.
2While any data input can a￿ect the behaviour of a program, attempting to label the trust level
of all possible inputs is infeasible for any non-trivial program and the lack of precision involved in
such an assignment would make it of limited security value at the cost of signi￿cant complexity.
While Trusted Fingerprinting therefore allows for non-executable data ￿les to be speci￿ed as
dependencies for programs and veri￿ed upon access, the model does not intend for trust levels to
be set for them.
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The process of creating a ￿ngerprint begins by the user specifying the path of the
program they wish to ￿ngerprint using a designated L3 application. This path
is known as a ‘target’. The kernel then identi￿es any other paths by which the
dependency may be accessed. This information can be conveniently obtained from
the ￿le’s authenticated metadata, as described in Section 4.5. These paths then
become additional targets for that particular record and will also cause the program
to be veri￿ed if accessed from that path. If required, users may also manually add
additional targets that cannot be detected, such as symbolic links.
The dependencies of the speci￿ed program are then identi￿ed. These dependencies
may include dynamically linked shared libraries, interpreters, helper applications,
con￿guration ￿les and any other relevant data ￿les that may a￿ect the program’s
execution in a security-relevant way. Many of these dependencies potentially can
be detected automatically by the system by analysing the selected program’s code.
For example, all relevant shared library dependencies can be identi￿ed through a
recursive consideration of the program and its libraries, and this task can be eas-
ily automated. However, the user should review the generated list to remove any
that are unnecessary and add any that have been missed; for example, any helper
applications. Ensuring the completeness of this list is particularly important in
the case of GTCB dependencies, which must be comprehensively identi￿ed by the
security administrator to ensure su￿cient veri￿cation occurs. However, some anal-
ysis may also be necessary when making the decision to exclude certain potential
dependencies; for example, if these frequently change independently of trusted pro-
grams. Again, in the case of the GTCB, the security administrator is well-placed
to perform such an analysis.
5.2.5 Data File Dependencies
Many programs do not exist as native code and are instead converted into an
executable format immediately or shortly before execution. Examples include Java
139programs and those written in various scripting languages such as Perl and Python
[208￿210]. In these cases, the non-native code ￿le will be speci￿ed as a data ￿le
dependency of the natively executable interpreter. Typically it is likely that the
interpreter can be identi￿ed automatically by examining the ￿rst line or header of
the source code and so the burden on the user to perform this manually is minimal
(cf. [211, p. 11]).
A program’s con￿guration ￿les often have a signi￿cant e￿ect on its behaviour and
therefore could be manipulated for malicious purposes; for example, by downgrading
security settings. It is therefore important to identify data ￿les that may contain
important con￿guration parameters for the given program and include these ￿les
as dependencies. However, as the impact of the con￿guration ￿le on a program’s
behaviour is highly speci￿c to the programs and ￿les in question, they require more
consideration and analysis by the user than other data ￿le dependencies. The user
should identify the con￿guration ￿les involved and possibly evaluate the potential
impact they may have on security, relative to how frequently the ￿les will be changed
by programs for which they are not dependencies. For programs with a relatively
static con￿guration that, once established, rarely needs to be changed, these should
be included even if their impact on security appears limited. Similarly, if a program’s
con￿guration is only ever changed from within that program or another for which it
is also a dependency, these updates can be automatically captured by the Trusted
Fingerprinting mechanism, meaning there is no disadvantage to including these as
a dependency. Therefore, in the majority of cases, the burden on the user is limited
to the identi￿cation of the appropriate ￿les. In practice, this burden could be
signi￿cantly mitigated, or eliminated entirely, by the use of vendor-supplied pro￿les
describing the dependencies for a speci￿c trusted application.
5.2.6 Creating Dependency Records
Once the targets for the new dependencies are identi￿ed and collated, the user sets
trust levels and dependency ￿ags for each new dependency as desired. The kernel
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dency records for each, creating a digraph structure by specifying the Dependency
￿eld for each record as previously described. This new record is then integrated into
the larger digraph stored in the relevant vault (either the user’s or GPUB), with
each new dependency record representing a new node in the structure. If there are
no shared dependencies between the newly created digraph and the existing one,
separate digraphs may be stored. However, this scenario is likely to be rare due to
extensive overlap of dependencies such as shared libraries.
Modelling the dependency relationships between programs in this way has the ad-
vantage that, where two or more programs share a dependency, an update to this
dependency is automatically inherited by all programs a￿ected. However, the na-
ture of runtime dependency veri￿cation means that newly added or modi￿ed de-
pendencies require a program to ￿rst be restarted before these apply. This and
related issues are discussed further in Section 5.4.
5.3 Fingerprint Matching
Matching is the process by which the security kernel attempts to identify whether a
dependency record exists for an object that is about to be executed or accessed. If
the matching process identi￿es a target, the object’s ￿ngerprint is veri￿ed against
the value stored in the ￿ngerprint record and other parameters, such as trust levels
and dependency ￿ags, will be applied. Dependencies of the target are also identi￿ed
through the digraph and these are also veri￿ed as required. However, if a matching
target cannot be found for a program that is about to be executed, the program
will instead execute as untrusted (L0). Such programs have no access to the user’s
vault or cryptographically protected ￿les. Restricting the program’s privileges in
this way signi￿cantly mitigates the potential negative impact of a substitution or
redirection attack involving malicious code.
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Restricting a program to the lowest privilege level possible when matching fails
to identify an appropriate target limits the scope for negative security outcomes.
However, one remaining issue is that of the user’s expectations. If the user executes
a program that they believe to be ￿ngerprinted and yet are redirected to malicious
code, they may still expect that the program has been veri￿ed and can be trusted.
This expectation could in￿uence their interactions with the program. For exam-
ple, if the user executes their usual, ￿ngerprinted, web browser to perform Internet
banking, but is instead redirected to a compromised version that is not veri￿ed,
they may unwittingly reveal sensitive information to an attacker 3. Therefore the
matching process must be performed in order to both maximise the likelihood of
identifying the appropriate target and to be consistent with the user’s understand-
ing and expectations of the system. This relates to the secure design principle of
psychological acceptability as identi￿ed by Saltzer & Schroeder [15].
This second requirement excludes several otherwise ideal matching techniques. For
example, matching by inode number is vulnerable to a trivial attack where legiti-
mate, ￿ngerprinted code is renamed or deleted and malicious code substituted with
the original’s name. As this is the name by which the user executes the program,
the malicious code will be executed and the substitution not detected. This is
the same vulnerability that applies to the I3FS scheme discussed in Section 2.7.4.
Although under Trusted Fingerprinting the malicious program will execute with
limited privilege, from the user’s perspective they have executed the same program
they always do and will expect it to have its usual security properties. Matching
based on a ￿le’s protection status identi￿er (PSI) su￿ers from essentially the same
problem. Although the PSI value can be relied upon to be unique and authorita-
tive, it will not detect a substitution attack where the malicious code has the same
name as the intended program, and nor is this its intended purpose.
3Normally banking passwords and the like would be stored as application keys and bound to
the legitimate, ￿ngerprinted version of the web browser so the inability of the malicious version
to access these keys transparently could alert the user to the attack.
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Consequently, matching based upon the target’s path is most consistent with the
user’s expectations. Therefore all paths by which a program may be executed are
speci￿ed as targets when creating a new dependency. As noted, these can be se-
curely identi￿ed by the kernel using the cryptographically veri￿able list stored in
the ￿lesystem metadata. This list does not include symbolic links; however, these
will be resolved to the actual path by the kernel prior to execution. Although new
links to ￿ngerprinted ￿les may be created after its dependency record has been
instantiated, this has limited impact on security for a number of reasons. First,
the user is unlikely to execute a program via a new pathname of which they were
unaware and, if aware, they can update the dependency record. Second, the secu-
rity kernel can also periodically search and update the target ￿elds of dependency
records as required by crosschecking them against secure ￿lesystem metadata. Fi-
nally, any ￿ngerprinted program inadvertently executed through a link that is not
speci￿ed as a target will default to an L0 trust level and thus mitigate the impact
of any attacks based upon it.
A detailed algorithm for path matching is given in Appendix E. In summary, the
algorithm works by iterating through the list of dependency records, searching for
a target path amongst those matching that of the program being executed. If
such a path is found, matching has been successful and the search is halted. The
routine then returns the matched dependency record for veri￿cation. However, if
all dependencies are searched without a match being found, the routine returns 0
to indicate this and the program will execute as untrusted.
5.3.3 Multi-digraph Matching
The matching algorithm from Appendix E applies to a single dependency digraph.
However, matching may often need to be performed against a number of di￿erent
digraphs. When one program executes another, initially the matching algorithm is
applied to a digraph specifying the dependencies for the program that is currently
143executing. This digraph is known as a ‘runtime digraph’ and is discussed in the
next section. If a match is not found, matching is performed against the digraph
structures in both the user’s vault and then GPUB. This process has three possible
outcomes. If a match is found either locally or globally, but not in both, the
veri￿cation process proceeds for the single matching target. If no match is found
in either vault, matching fails and the program executes as untrusted as previously
described. However, if matching targets are found in both the user and GPUB
vaults, a ‘double match’ has occurred and this a￿ects the construction of the runtime
digraph as described in Section 5.4.
Matching may also need to be performed against multiple digraphs within a single
vault. While generally there will be signi￿cant inter-relationships between depen-
dencies due to shared libraries, any ￿ngerprinted programs that are statically linked
are likely to exist in separate digraphs, which must also be searched during match-
ing. However, this requirement does not complicate the matching process with
the algorithm described applied to all local and global digraphs (in that order).
Also, unlike local and global matching, there is no possibility of a double match
when scanning multiple digraphs within a single vault if the digraphs themselves
are consistent, as otherwise this would suggest that they should be merged.
5.4 The Runtime Dependency Veri￿cation Model
5.4.1 Runtime Digraphs
As just described, applying the matching process to both local and global digraphs
can result in a double match where the target is found in both vaults. A program
being ￿ngerprinted both locally and globally indicates a signi￿cant degree of security
importance. As a result, dependency information from both sources is used for
veri￿cation. In particular, any di￿erences in the dependencies speci￿ed locally and
globally must be identi￿ed. For example, an application may have a global ￿le
specifying settings applying to all users but also allow individual users to customise
144their settings in a separate per-user con￿guration ￿le. As both of these may a￿ect
the program at runtime, both are considered to be dependencies and may require
veri￿cation.
To facilitate comprehensive veri￿cation, a runtime digraph (RTD) for the program
is constructed. The RTD speci￿es the dependencies for the matched target to ensure
that they are all veri￿ed at runtime and remains in e￿ect for the execution lifetime
of the program4. It also facilitates tracking of the cache and veri￿cation status of
each dependency as detailed later in this section. For this purpose, each dependency
record in the RTD contains two additional ￿elds not listed in Section 5.2.1. The
￿rst is the veri￿cation status of the dependency and the second is a reference to its
cached image in secure memory. The dependency can only be used if it has been
loaded and its image previously veri￿ed against the speci￿ed ￿ngerprint. Where
there has only been a single match found, either locally or globally, then the RTD
is a subset of the larger digraph where the match was found and consists only of the
dependencies relevant to the matched target. The nodes of the RTD are identi￿ed
by traversing the larger digraph beginning from the matched target.
5.4.2 Merged Runtime Digraphs
In the case of a double match, local and global digraphs must be merged to form
an RTD for the program. This is an additive process, while also eliminating du-
plication. It involves simultaneously traversing both local and global digraphs,
beginning with the matched target. After crosschecking to con￿rm that ￿ngerprint
values are the same in both, this dependency becomes the source node in a new
RTD. Traversal then proceeds to the child dependencies for each node in the local
and global digraphs. Fingerprints are cross-checked and, where dependencies from
di￿erent digraphs have intersecting target names, they are considered to be the
same dependency and a single instance is added to the RTD. This process ensures
that all relevant dependencies that are in both the local and global digraphs are
4This is the reason why dependencies added for a given program will not apply to the program
until it is restarted.
145identi￿ed and included in the RTD for veri￿cation.
An abstracted but nonetheless representative example is given in Figures 5.2 and
5.3. The ￿rst diagram shows the two separate global and local diagrams prior to
merging and the second shows the merged result. Such an RTD is created for each
successfully matched application prior to veri￿cation and execution. It is then used
to direct the veri￿cation of dependencies at runtime.
5.4.3 Runtime Digraph Construction Con￿icts
If, during the RTD construction process, a dependency is found that has di￿erent
local and global ￿ngerprints for the same target, then this strongly indicates that
a security failure has occurred and the veri￿cation process is considered to have
failed. While this event may be the result of data in either the local or global vault
being out of date, it may also indicate that the contents of one of those vaults has
been subverted. Aborting the veri￿cation process at this stage is therefore critical
in order to maintain the defence-in-depth a￿orded by the two-tier trust system.
Another potential con￿ict is that the ￿ags set for related dependency records in
the two vaults may di￿er. Table 5.2 speci￿es the default values for each ￿ag and
also the result if there is a con￿ict when merging to create the RTD. Note that the
merged con￿ict result is always the safest possible outcome.
The two other possible di￿erences between local and global dependency records are
actually not con￿icts at all. First, trust levels for dependencies may di￿er. However,
this re￿ects the nature of trust level speci￿cations as an indication of a user’s
security policy with respect to that application. Therefore the globally-assigned
trust levels are only defaults and user-speci￿ed values always override this setting.
Second, the list of targets in related dependency records will not necessarily be
identical. Again, this does not indicate a con￿ict and is consistent with the additive
nature of the RTD construction process which identi￿es intersections between target
names in both local and global digraphs.
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Figure 5.3: Merged runtime digraph
147As dependency data in both GPUB and the user’s vault is regarded as trusted,
constructing the RTD aims to include as large a list of potential dependencies as
possible. Therefore, the list of targets included in a dependency record in the ￿nal
RTD represents the union of those targets speci￿ed for that matching dependency
in both GPUB and the user’s vault.
5.4.4 Practical Fingerprint Veri￿cation Issues
Certain practical issues in￿uence the way ￿ngerprint veri￿cation is performed at
runtime. One signi￿cant issue is preventing race condition-based attacks surround-
ing the veri￿cation process. For example, it is critical that the program image that
is veri￿ed be the same as that which is actually executed so an attacker cannot
substitute unveri￿ed code between veri￿cation and execution time. Similar issues
apply to non-Program dependencies; for example, the shared library image actu-
ally linked with the application on execution must consist of the same data that
was veri￿ed against its ￿ngerprint in the dependency record. This issues is even
more signi￿cant for Data File dependencies that may be accessed some time after
the program has begun executing, making the window for potential attacks much
wider. Therefore, secure veri￿cation requires that the dependency image hashed
for veri￿cation against the stored ￿ngerprint be the same as that which is actually
used. To this end, all veri￿ed objects held in memory, regardless of their type,
must be protected against modi￿cation by the security kernel. This requirement
includes ensuring that these objects cannot be modi￿ed if written out to swap, ei-
ther through the use of a virtual memory encryption scheme such as that described
by Provos [136], or through a mechanism equivalent to the mlock() POSIX system
call to disable paging for the memory concerned [212].
A similar issue relates to the availability of dependencies at runtime. For example,
a dependency may not be available when execution begins if it is located on an
external storage device or network ￿lesystem. As long as the dependency is available
for veri￿cation and use at the required time, this does not impact on ￿ngerprint
148veri￿cation. In particular, it is an important requirement that an attacker cannot
avoid veri￿cation of any dependency by making it temporarily inaccessible at a
certain time and, again, this highlights the need for veri￿cation to be performed on
the same image that is subsequently used.
Alternatively, sometimes a speci￿ed dependency may not be available for veri￿ca-
tion and use. For many programs this unavailability will not impact on security and
will simply be handled internally. However, in some cases, it may be important for
a program that a speci￿c dependency be available, as its unavailability may impact
negatively on security. For example, a program may default to an insecure state if
its con￿guration ￿le is not available. In this case the Required ￿ag should be set.
The ￿ag may be set on any type of dependency and if, for any reason, the object
￿agged in the program’s RTD is inaccessible, the kernel will deny or terminate the
program’s execution. As indicated in Table 5.2, this ￿ag is switched on by default.
5.4.5 Runtime Veri￿cation of Programs
Execution of a native program by the creation of a child process through the POSIX
fork() system call [205, pp. 188￿193], followed by a call to one of the exec()
family of system calls [205, pp. 207￿212], involves one of two possible relationships
between the parent and new child process. In one case, the parent is a user interface
shell process responsible for executing other programs and there is no dependency
relationship between parent and child. Alternatively, the new child process may be
a program that performs a speci￿c task on behalf of the parent. In this case, the
newly executed program is the dependency of the parent and is considered to be
a ‘helper application’. Both of these outcomes, and their impact on matching and
veri￿cation, are outlined in Figure 5.4 and described in detail below.
Upon execution of any new program through an exec() call, an attempt is made to
￿nd a matching Program target in the parent’s RTD. If it is found, this indicates
the new program is a helper application and there is no need to attempt matching
on local and global digraphs. If no match is found in the RTD, the new program has
149no dependency relationship with its parent but may still exist in one of the other
larger digraphs, most likely as a graph source. Matching is therefore performed on
local and global digraphs and, if this succeeds, a new RTD is constructed for the
new program based on the results. This new RTD is retained in memory throughout
the lifetime of the program’s execution and used to direct the runtime veri￿cation
process. Alternatively, if no match is found, the program will execute as untrusted.
If either match is found, veri￿cation proceeds. The program’s image is loaded o￿
the disk, hashed and the result is compared against the ￿ngerprint stored in the
RTD. If veri￿cation fails, execution is aborted. Otherwise, the program’s record
in the RTD is ￿agged as having been veri￿ed. After successful veri￿cation of and
linking with dependent shared libraries, the new process’s credentials are initialised,
as described in Section 3.4.4, and the veri￿ed image referenced by the RTD is
executed. By caching the program’s image in memory, the race condition attacks
described in the previous section are excluded.
5.4.6 Impact of Dependency Flags on Execution
With the general exception of user interface shell programs used to launch other
applications, when one program executes another there is the potential for the child
process to impact on the parent’s security. This issue can be addressed by setting
the Require Trusted Child ￿ag in a program’s dependency record, meaning
that any processes it spawns cannot execute at a lower trust level 5. Execution of
any child processes, whether matched as a dependency in the RTD or not, will be
denied if its trust level is lower and the ￿ag is set. Similarly, if the trust level of
the child process is lowered at a later point after its execution is initiated, the ￿ag
also comes into e￿ect. The ￿ag is set by default but must be switched o￿ when
creating dependencies for user interface shell programs. However, the ￿ag should
not be switched o￿ for L3 programs.
The Required ￿ag can also impact on spawning of child processes. If this ￿ag is
5In practice this means parent and child must have the same trust level as it is not generally
permitted for a child process to execute at a higher trust level than its parent (Section 5.6).
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151set for a program’s dependency as speci￿ed in the RTD, and this dependency is
not accessible when accessed, then the parent program will be terminated. The ￿ag
applies to Data File dependencies but can also a￿ect helper applications that are
speci￿ed as dependencies of another program; if the application cannot execute for
some reason, the execution of the parent program is terminated. Also note that
the Require Trusted Child and Required ￿ags can potentially interact. If
the former is set on a parent program and the latter set on a helper dependency,
and if the helper application would not execute at the required trust level and is
therefore prevented from launching, this will lead to the parent being terminated
also. However, this scenario strongly indicates a miscon￿guration, suggesting the
trust level of the helper application should be raised or at least one of the ￿ags
altered. This condition is easily checked for and detected during con￿guration so
that the user may select the appropriate solution. However, even if this checking is
not done, the fail safe defaults are designed to limit any possible security failure.
5.4.7 Runtime Veri￿cation of Libraries
A related process occurs when linking a program with its shared libraries and is
summarised in Figure 5.5. The RTD is traversed and all dependencies with the
type Library are loaded and, if veri￿ed successfully, linked with the program.
However, libraries are typically shared between many programs. Therefore, if a
particular library has already been loaded and veri￿ed for linking with another
trusted program for which it is also a dependency, this instance may be reused
for the new program so re-veri￿cation is not required. This approach creates links
between RTDs of di￿erent executing programs, allowing the veri￿cation status of
library dependencies to be tracked. However, it also requires that the kernel con￿rm
that the apparently mutually shared libraries are in fact the same by con￿rming
both the intersection of targets and identical Value ￿elds.
If a veri￿ed library is later unloaded from memory (i.e., no longer part of any RTD)
and subsequently reloaded for linking with another program, the library must be
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153reveri￿ed before execution can proceed. Any loaded and unveri￿ed libraries linked
with untrusted (L0) programs must be reloaded and veri￿ed before linking with any
trusted program executing at L1 or above. Finally, trusted programs can only be
linked to shared libraries speci￿ed in their RTD and attempts to link with other,
possibly unveri￿ed, libraries causes execution to be aborted. In practice, though,
this scenario would be unlikely to occur due to the automated detection of library
dependencies for a given program.
5.4.8 Runtime Veri￿cation of Data Files
Dependencies of type Data File are those accessed with a read or write request via
the open() system call. However, the logic applied di￿ers depending on the mode
of access requested. An overview of how read requests are processed is given in
Figure 5.6; write requests are considered in Section 159. Note that, for the sake of
simplicity, the overview presented in the diagram deliberately does not describe the
impact of the Require Trusted Child and Require STL ￿ags. Upon receiving
a read request, the security kernel searches the RTD for a target matching that
speci￿ed. Note that matching is performed recursively and all nodes in the RTD
are searched. If no match is found, the ￿le being accessed is not a dependency of the
program. Access then proceeds with no veri￿cation required, although the ETL of
the process may be lowered to L0 if the Require Trusted Data ￿ag is set on the
program’s ￿ngerprint record. Alternatively, if a matching dependency is located,
the ￿le’s contents must be veri￿ed prior to granting access to the process. If a cached
and veri￿ed copy is available, this may be used. Further details concerning caching
are discussed in the next section. Otherwise, the system attempts to load the ￿le’s
contents into memory and the image is veri￿ed against the target’s ￿ngerprint. If
loading and veri￿cation are successful, data read from the ￿le is taken directly from
the veri￿ed image cached in memory, thereby preventing race condition attacks.
However, if the Data File dependency has a trust level speci￿ed and it is lower
than the ETL of the program, the program’s ETL will be lowered to match it prior
154to being allowed to read the ￿le’s contents. The reasons for this behaviour are
discussed in Section 5.4.10.
Veri￿cation of a Data File dependency may fail in two primary ways. The ￿rst
is when the ￿le is not available for veri￿cation. In this case, the reading of the ￿le
clearly cannot proceed. However, if the Required ￿ag is set, this will also cause the
requesting process to be terminated since the unavailability of a dependency may
have a detrimental security-related impact on the program’s behaviour. Alterna-
tively, veri￿cation may fail due to a modi￿cation being detected. As a potentially
malicious modi￿cation to the dependency has occurred, the program will not be
granted read access to the ￿le. Since the program’s response to the unavailability
of this dependency is unknown, by default the program’s execution will be termi-
nated. However, if the Ignore Data Fail ￿ag is set for the dependency being
accessed, the program may be allowed to continue to execute, although under no
circumstances is read access to the modi￿ed dependency granted. Note that, if set,
the Required ￿ag takes precedence over this other ￿ag and the program will still
be terminated due to the unavailability of the dependency.
5.4.9 Impact of Flags on the Runtime Data File Veri￿cation
Caching of Data File images
When a ￿le’s contents are ￿rst read into memory and veri￿ed, they are held there
while the ￿le is opened and data is read directly from the veri￿ed image, rather
than the disk. If the ￿le is then closed, a cached copy of the veri￿ed ￿le may be
maintained in memory, space permitting, for the duration of the program’s execu-
tion, allowing subsequent accesses without re-veri￿cation. This approach is feasible
because con￿guration information and other data ￿les that impact on a program’s
security-related behaviour are likely to be relatively small, whereas larger ￿les con-
taining images, audio and video typically would not represent security dependencies
for most programs.
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156When re-opening a cached ￿le, the security kernel checks its modi￿cation timestamp
to determine whether the cached image must be refreshed. If the timestamp is more
recent than the cached copy, the image is reloaded and re-veri￿ed; otherwise, the
existing cached image is used. Note that illicit modi￿cations that do not update the
modi￿cation timestamp may be safely ignored as the previously cached and veri￿ed
copy is not a￿ected by them. However, this means such illicit modi￿cations will
not be detected as promptly and, if it is considered to be important for a particular
dependency or if memory capacity or image size makes caching problematic, the
No Cache ￿ag can be set for that speci￿c dependency.
The Require Trusted Data ￿ag
There is a need for some programs to behave in a speci￿c way so as to maintain their
expected secure behaviour. For example, programs such as command interpreters
will generally run with an L2 trust level to allow them to execute non-native code
with trust levels up to this value. However, if such programs execute a non-trusted
script, it is important that they do not run with their normal trust level. The
Require Trusted Data ￿ag addresses this and equivalent problems with other
types of programs.
The ￿ag operates by automatically and transparently lowering the trust level of
the ￿agged program to L0 in the event that the program reads from a ￿le that
is not speci￿ed as a dependency. This design ensures that untrusted scripts may
be safely executed by command interpreters where the ￿ag is set on these pro-
grams. It also limits the need for a program to manually and voluntarily request
that its trust level be lowered, thereby increasing the backward compatibility of
the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism and avoiding the need for modi￿cations to
existing programs.
There is scope for the Require Trusted Data ￿ag to interact with other ￿ags.
In particular, if the Require Trusted Child ￿ag is set on the parent of a process
that has the Require Trusted Data ￿ag set, it will cause the child process to be
157terminated if it accesses untrusted data and has its trust level lowered. Similarly,
the Require Trusted Data and Require STL ￿ags may also interact as the
e￿ect of the former will cause the requirements of the latter to be violated, with
the result that the process will again be terminated. These interactions are not
described in Figure 5.6 in order to maintain the diagram’s simplicity.
5.4.10 Runtime Veri￿cation of Non-Native Code
Execution of non-native programs, such as scripts, represents a special case of Data
File dependency veri￿cation. The natively executable runtime environment or
command interpreter program that executes scripts is speci￿ed as a Program
dependency, with all scripts that require veri￿cation speci￿ed as separate Data
File dependencies. These dependencies in turn may have their own Data File
and Program dependencies representing, for example, con￿guration and helper
applications, respectively. This is why the matching process applied to the RTD for
Data File dependencies is performed recursively when opening a ￿le for reading,
thus ensuring dependencies of other dependencies are checked. Execution of such
scripts typically involves executing the interpreter and supplying the name of the
script to be executed as a parameter. Veri￿cation is therefore performed ￿rst on the
natively executable interpreter and then on the ￿le containing the script when it is
loaded. In this way, complete and secure veri￿cation of non-native code is achieved.
Non-natively executable objects can be di￿erentiated from non-executable data as
they will have a trust level speci￿ed in their ￿ngerprint record. Consequently, the
trust level of the natively executing process is lowered to meet this value where
necessary. Since a natively executable interpreter running a non-native script is
e￿ectively under the control of the script, adjusting the trust level in this way is
necessary in order to maintain sensible and secure semantics.
The kernel also di￿erentiates between the roles played by the di￿erent nodes in the
RTD. In particular, it distinguishes between the ‘executing process’ (EP), which
represents the native code, and the ‘active node’ (AN), which refers to the actual
158program notionally being executed. While for natively executable code, the EP and
AN will be the same, for non-native code the EP is considered to be the interpreter
and the AN refers to the non-native script currently being run. These distinctions
do not a￿ect the scheme’s behaviour when reading from Data File dependencies.
However, they become important when considering modi￿cations to these objects.
This issue is further developed in Section 5.5.2.
5.5 Fingerprint Updating
5.5.1 Manual Updating
If a ￿ngerprinted object changes, the ￿ngerprint information in the Value ￿eld for
this dependency record will need to be updated. If this change occurs independently
of any program for which the object is a dependency (for example, when manually
editing a con￿guration ￿le using a text editor), the ￿ngerprint value must be man-
ually updated in the vault where it is stored. In the case of globally ￿ngerprinted
objects, only the prime user can update the values stored in GPUB. However, in-
dividual users may update the ￿ngerprint values stored in their own vaults at any
time. Manual updating involves using an L3 application and specifying the target
name of the object to be updated. The new ￿ngerprint value is then calculated and
the user con￿rms whether to replace it in the dependency digraph. All dependency
digraphs in the vault are then fully traversed searching for other occurrences of the
old ￿ngerprint value in the Dependencies ￿eld of other records, as these too will
need to be updated.
Race conditions represent a serious potential security threat and manual ￿ngerprint
updating has been identi￿ed as the only signi￿cant means for potentially violating
the security properties of the Vaults model. This issue is discussed extensively in
Chapter 8 and a number of mechanisms for reducing, and potentially eliminating,
the need to perform manual updates are discussed in the next section. Nonetheless,
if performing a manual update becomes necessary, it is important that great care is
159taken with this procedure. Wherever possible, users should calculate the ￿ngerprint
for an object’s new state from a trusted source, such as a digitally signed copy or
data held on securely distributed read-only media. These precautions are particu-
larly important when the prime user makes manual updates to global ￿ngerprints.
5.5.2 Automatic Updating
Maintaining the correctness of ￿ngerprint hash values is important to avoid false-
negative veri￿cation errors that may inconvenience users. Therefore ￿ngerprint
values must be kept up to date. Similarly, as discussed in the previous section,
manual updates should be avoided wherever possible as they represent a potential
opportunity for subverting security. Automatic updating serves to achieve both of
these goals.
In general, programs and libraries are likely to change relatively rarely, for example
when software is periodically upgraded, and manual updating can be a suitable
mechanism for managing these changes to ￿ngerprint values. Manual updating
may also be suitable for con￿guration ￿les that, after being set initially, require
only very infrequent modi￿cations. However, some Data File dependencies may
change more frequently. Typically, however, many con￿guration ￿les will be regu-
larly modi￿ed by the application itself; manually updating these ￿ngerprints is both
inconvenient for users and increases the risk of race condition attacks. Another prac-
tical issue is that it may be di￿cult for the user to identify which con￿guration ￿les
contain security-relevant settings, and which contain general preferences, making
the safest option to include all such ￿les as dependencies. However, this approach
makes manual updating even more impractical and risky as ￿ngerprint values would
need to be updated more frequently and for a greater number of objects.
Trusted Fingerprinting avoids these problems with a transparent and secure mecha-
nism for automatically updating ￿ngerprint values where a Data File dependency
is modi￿ed by the application that depends upon it. A summary of the process
is shown in Figure 5.7. When a trusted program makes an open() system call
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to open a ￿le for writing, the kernel performs matching on that program’s RTD.
However, unlike when opening a ￿le for reading, this matching process is normally
only applied to Data File dependencies that are immediate descendants of the
active node (AN) and that do not have an STL value. This approach ensures that
automatic updates are only applied to non-executable data that are actual direct
dependencies of AN and not dependencies of secondary helper applications.
The request to open the ￿le for writing succeeds regardless of whether a match is
found. However, if the ￿le being modi￿ed was identi￿ed as a dependency of the
161program performing the modi￿cation, the kernel captures these writes and initiates
the calculation of a new hash value from them. All subsequent modi￿cations are
added to the context for the hash calculation and, once writing is complete and
the ￿le closed, the hash calculation is ￿nalised and the ￿ngerprint of the modi￿ed
￿le is updated in the program’s RTD and the user’s vault. This design exploits
the iterative nature of existing hash functions to avoid the need to bu￿er the entire
￿le [17, pp. 86, 87].
5.5.3 Automatic Update Restrictions
There are situations where automatic updating is undesirable. To address this, the
No Auto Update ￿ag can be set on speci￿c dependencies to disable automatic
updating of their ￿ngerprints. When set on a given program’s dependency, the pro-
gram may make modi￿cations to this ￿le but ￿ngerprints will not be automatically
updated. As a result, the next time the ￿le is opened for reading by the program (or
any other for which it is a dependency), veri￿cation will fail and access is denied.
This ￿ag is intended to be used where any updates to a dependency ought to be
user-veri￿ed before allowing access to a dependent program. Alternatively, the ￿ag
may be set to express the semantics that the dependency should not be modi￿ed
by the program. For example, although non-natively executable source code may
be a dependency of a speci￿c interpreter, the interpreter software generally should
not modify this source code.
Automatic updating is also intrinsically restricted to dependency digraphs belong-
ing to the user concerned. The automatic updating of a ￿ngerprint for a dependency
in one user’s digraph does not cause ￿ngerprint values to be updated in the digraphs
of any other users who may have ￿ngerprinted this object. As a result, this mod-
i￿cation will be detected by these other users upon access. Similarly, ￿ngerprint
values in GPUB are never updated automatically. However, neither of these situa-
tions is likely as users will not generally depend on the integrity of objects that can
be legitimately modi￿ed by others and non-privileged users should not be able to
162modify objects that are globally trusted.
5.5.4 Installer Applications
As described in Section 5.5.2, automatic updating normally only applies to the
immediate Data File dependencies of the AN where they do not have an STL.
However, to further reduce the need to perform manual updating, the Installer
￿ag may be set on any dependency with an STL. When set, this ￿ag reduces the
restrictions on automatic updates so that they may be performed on all descendants
of the AN, regardless of type.
The purpose of the ￿ag is to allow trusted installers to update installed programs
and their related objects in a secure way, where automatic updates are used to
eliminate the potential race conditions that exist with manual updating. This
further requires that all programs that are to be updated by the installation software
must be speci￿ed as dependencies of the program. However, the ￿ag should be used
with caution and only set on programs that may be trusted to take on the critical
role of updating applications on the system. Note that the setting of the Installer
￿ag does not take precedence over the e￿ect of the No Auto Update ￿ag.
5.6 Managing Process Trust
5.6.1 Trusted Fingerprinting and Trusted Path
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, trusted path is a mechanism found in some traditional
trusted systems that allows users to gain assured access to the TCB such that they
may be certain that they are not interacting with malicious code. Trusted path
is traditionally implemented through some physical mechanism, such as Windows
NT’s ‘Secure Attention Sequence’ where the pressing of the Control, Alt and Delete
keys together is trapped by the kernel and is never passed to an application (Section
2.3.2). Through a physical trusted path mechanism, users can perform a set of
speci￿cally de￿ned security-related operations. For example, under Windows NT,
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a task manager to kill selected processes. However, the operations that can be
performed are limited to these prede￿ned tasks hardcoded into the TCB and there
is no ￿exibility for them to be customised to local or individual requirements.
The Trusted Fingerprinting scheme in Vaults also provides an authenticated means
by which users can interact with secure code. However, instead of relying on a
physical mechanism for ensuring communication with the security kernel, Trusted
Fingerprinting utilises cryptography to verify the integrity of the code with which
the user is interacting. Trusted ￿ngerprinting therefore represents a ‘virtual trusted
path’ mechanism. However, unlike traditional physical mechanisms, Trusted Fin-
gerprinting is highly ￿exible, being able to be applied to any program deemed
relevant to security requirements, both globally by the security administrator and
locally by each individual user.
Beyond this additional ￿exibility, the principal di￿erence between existing physical
trusted path schemes and the virtual approach of Trusted Fingerprinting is the lack
of a physical mechanism for the latter. However, the security of such a physical
mechanism depends upon two assumptions. First, that the integrity of the kernel
remains intact and is able to trap the requests it receives; and second, that the
physical link between user and kernel has also not been compromised. In fact,
the security of a virtual trusted path scheme such as Vaults Trusted Fingerprint-
ing also depends on these same assumptions, although it lacks the psychological
reassurance that stems from a physical mechanism. A user securely launching an
application that, along with any external objects it depends upon, has been cryp-
tographically veri￿ed can place a similar amount of trust in this program as if they
had performed it through a physical trusted path mechanism. Indeed, the crypto-
graphically veri￿ed code provides additional assurance in the event that the task
performed is implemented in a separate program and not kernel code. Furthermore,
if trusted processes that have been veri￿ed can be visually di￿erentiated from those
executing at L0 (for example, by colour coding their window border), then users are
164able to identify the trust level of a program without needing to physically invoke
communication with the TCB. Trusted Fingerprinting therefore provides most of
the security properties of a physical trusted path mechanism but with signi￿cantly
enhanced ￿exibility. In fact, if implemented with a mechanism to allow the kernel
to clearly ￿ag to the user the trust level of given applications (such as labelled all
colour-coded title bars or window borders), then it achieves equivalent or superior
security, while maintaining its ￿exibility advantage.
5.6.2 The Trust Elevation Problem
An issue that applies to both virtual and physical trusted path schemes is the direc-
tion of the trust involved. Trusted ￿ngerprinting provides the user with assurance
that they are interacting with trusted code. However, it is also implicitly assumed
that the requests this code receives come from the user, although this is not guaran-
teed to be the case. For example, when one program executes another, the parent
can often exercise a signi￿cant degree of in￿uence over the child’s behaviour. Signif-
icant aspects of this include controlling its environment, command line parameters
and standard input. While this is normal system behaviour, it becomes a potential
security issue when the parent process is of lower privilege than the child, creating
a privilege boundary between them (Section 2.2.3). This situation can occur with
Vaults Trusted Fingerprinting where the parent process is untrusted and does not
have access to the user’s vault whereas the program it executes has a ￿ngerprint.
In this scenario, it is important to prevent the untrusted parent from manipulating
the behaviour of its privileged child to violate security policy 6. This issue is referred
to as the ‘trust elevation’ problem.
Examples of this problem are highly dependent upon the interface of the trusted
program and particularly its responses to command line parameters and environ-
mental variables. However, ￿nding examples of such programs is nonetheless trivial.
The rm program under Unix is used to remove a directory entry for a ￿le, which
6This is the converse of the issue that the Required Trusted Child ￿ag resolves, where a
helper application is executed by a trusted parent process (Section 5.4.6).
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need to access users’ directories, it must be designated at trust level L2. However,
this means that malicious code executing at L0 can e￿ectively elevate its privileges
to trust level L2 and delete all ￿les for which the user has the requisite privileges by
executing the rm program with the parameters ￿-Rf /￿. While such a vulnerability
is easy to identify, related problems in other programs are likely to be less obvious
and require careful analysis of that program’s external interface. Guaranteeing that
all such problems have been identi￿ed is likely to be intractable. Therefore a more
general solution is needed and this will now be described.
5.6.3 Limiting Process Trust Elevation
The trust elevation problem must be resolved in a general way that avoids requiring
the analysis of the speci￿c behaviour of all trusted applications in response to
potential manipulation by a malicious parent. The solution is achieved by applying
the general principle that a child process will not execute at a higher trust level
than its parent. This principle is the origin of the distinction between the STL,
which is that given in the dependency record for the program, and the ETL, which
is stored in a process’s credentials that determines its current vault access privileges
(Section 3.4.1).
A speci￿c algorithm to determine where the trust level of a new process needs to be
restricted is given in Figure 5.8. In the general case, the new process inherits the
lower of its STL and its parent’s ETL. However, beyond this, there are two special
cases to consider. One of these applies when the parent is executing at trust level
L1. In this case, the new child process is downgraded to trust level L0 unless the
parent and the child are the same program. This response is necessary because two
processes executing at trust level L1 are likely to have di￿erent sets of privileges
unless they are the same program. Note that this applies even when the child’s
ETL is normally L2, as a latent set of protection key bindings may still exist if this
166if parent.ETL == L1 AND parent.fpr != child.fpr
child.ETL = L0
else
if parent.ETL >= L2 AND child.STL == L3
child.ETL = L3
else
if parent.ETL < child.STL
child.ETL = parent.ETL
else
child.ETL = child.STL
Figure 5.8: Trust elevation restriction algorithm
program was previously set to run at L17.
The other exception allowed by the algorithm is where an L2 process attempts
to spawn a program with an STL of L3. In this case, it is necessary to allow
the new process to elevate its ETL to L3. If this were not permitted, either L3
applications would not be able to be executed or otherwise many programs that do
not require L3 privileges would have to be set with this trust level simply to allow
legitimate L3 programs to be spawned. However, this exception is not problematic
since, as described in Section 3.4.2, L3 applications are designed speci￿cally with
resistance to trust elevation attacks in mind and must be used interactively. In
order to minimise exposure, this exception is not applied where an L0 or L1 process
attempts to spawn an L3 program and, in this scenario, the child’s trust level will
be con￿ned to that of the parent. Note that in this case, while the L3 process will
still execute, it will not execute at its usual privilege level and will not have the
level of vault access required. As a result, the program will be unable to function
and will terminate.
5.6.4 Impacts of Variable E￿ective Trust Levels
As a result of the algorithm described in Figure 5.8, programs may execute with an
ETL lower than that speci￿ed in their ￿ngerprint record. This will naturally impact
7A this subtle scenario was identi￿ed as part of the attack tree analysis and is discussed in
more detail in Section 226.
167Identi￿er Description
parent.ETL ETL ￿eld in the data structure associated with the parent process.
parent.fpr Fingerprint ￿eld in the data structure associated with the parent process.
child.fpr Fingerprint ￿eld in the data structure associated with the child process.
child.STL STL ￿eld in the data structure associated with the child process.
child.ETL ETL ￿eld in the data structure associated with the child process.
L0-3 Trust level symbolic constant.
Table 5.3: Key to identi￿ers in the trust elevation restriction algorithm
on what the program is able to do at runtime; for example, possibly preventing it
from accessing objects that it would normally be able to access if executing at
its STL. The exact outcomes of this will di￿er depending the speci￿c program
involved. Furthermore, the expectations of the user are also relevant as the user
may anticipate that the program will always execute at its normal trust level. This is
a more subtle variation of the issue considered when discussing matching techniques
in Section 5.3.1.
If a new process cannot execute at its STL due to its ancestry, the system may
either terminate it or let it continue at the lower ETL. Terminating the process
has the advantage that there is no possibility of the user incorrectly believing that
the program is executing at its normal trust level; this is therefore the most se-
cure outcome. However, in many cases, this is likely to be a heavy-handed and
impractical response as many programs may execute successfully even under these
circumstances. For example, a program capable of displaying a given ￿le format
may be executed automatically by another process when data is encountered of this
type that the parent process cannot display itself. Examples of this scenario range
from simple software displaying certain types of media, to more complex applica-
tions such as web browsers and word processors. However, all of these programs
may also be executed directly from the shell by the user. Therefore, such common
programs could well end up being executed with an ETL lower than their STL.
To address this issue, the Require STL ￿ag may optionally be set for all depen-
dencies that have an STL. If the ￿ag is set and the program cannot execute at its
STL, it will not be permitted to execute at all. Also, if a ￿agged program has its
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in Table 5.2, the ￿ag defaults to On. However, such policy may be inappropriate
for some systems and so the system-wide default should be con￿gurable to allow
administrators to trade-o￿ security for increased usability in this instance. For pro-
grams that are likely to be executed with a variety of parents￿and therefore may
often need to execute at a lower trust level￿it may be more appropriate to set this
￿ag to Off. As long as the user is aware that the program may not execute with its
stated trust level, this approach has minimal impact on security. This issue further
highlights the importance of user interface support in ￿agging the trust levels of
speci￿c applications by visual means such as a colour-coded title bar.
5.6.5 Trust Levels of Non-Program Dependencies
As previously described, libraries are not assigned a trust level in a dependency
record as they may be linked with a wide variety of programs. However, a trusted
program may only be linked with libraries that have been cryptographically veri￿ed,
and execution fails if linking is attempted with a library that does not have a
Library dependency record in the RTD. Therefore a library notionally takes on
the trust level of each program with which it is linked.
The situation is more variable in relation to Data File dependencies. If a program
accesses a Data File dependency that has a trust level speci￿ed, the process’s
ETL is set to the lower of its current ETL and the STL of the dependency. This
scenario applies primarily where the data object represents non-natively executable
code that is to be interpreted by the program for execution. This approach means
that the interpreter program must be assigned a trust level equal to or greater than
the most trusted non-native program that it needs to execute. However, in general,
trust levels should not be set for data ￿les; opening a ￿le for reading that does
not have a dependency record, and therefore cannot be veri￿ed, does not a￿ect
a program’s ETL. Many trusted programs need to deal with untrusted data (i.e.,
data that comes from a source other than a ￿le indicated as a dependency for that
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their assigned privileges. However, there are situations where it is desirable for a
program dealing with data that has no ￿ngerprint (notionally L0) to lower its ETL.
An example is the case of command line interpreters and, as discussed in Section
5.4.9, the Require Trusted Data ￿ag addresses this issue. However, it is also
possible that a process which is Vaults-aware may voluntarily reduce its ETL for
the duration of its current execution instance by making a request to the security
kernel. However, regardless of the cause, once a process’s trust level is lowered, it
cannot revert to its previous level.
5.7 Summary
This chapter has described Trusted Fingerprinting, a cryptographic ￿le integrity
veri￿cation mechanism that is made possible by the Vaults security model and
also enhances other Vaults security features by allowing the privileges of executing
processes to be determined based upon their authenticated identity and a user-
speci￿ed trust level. Trusted Fingerprinting allows for veri￿cation of both native
and non-native executable program code, along with other objects upon which they
depend for secure behaviour at runtime such as shared libraries and con￿guration
￿les. These dependency relationships are modelled using digraph structures that
allow the veri￿cation status of each object to be monitored at runtime. Leveraging
the information provided by this data structure, veri￿cation can be performed in
such a way as to prevent race condition attacks based on the time between verify-
ing an object and loading it into memory for use. This mechanism also facilitates
automatic updating of ￿ngerprints for data ￿les that are dependencies of a trusted
process. The trust level assigned to such processes is also tracked at runtime and
used to prevent untrusted malicious code from manipulating trusted programs in
order to obtain elevated privileges. Finally, the objects that are to be ￿ngerprinted
and the trust levels assigned to these programs can be speci￿ed both globally by the
security administrator for software that a￿ects system-wide security and locally on
170a per-user basis in relation to each individual’s security requirements. This makes
Trusted Fingerprinting a highly ￿exible and secure mechanism for code authentica-
tion and integrity veri￿cation.
171Chapter 6
Security Analysis Background and
Methodology
6.1 Introduction
This thesis presents a new operating system security model that maintains a sim-
ilar interface to existing approaches while di￿ering signi￿cantly through its use of
cryptography to obtain a higher level of security. In particular, the Vaults model is
designed to maintain its stated security properties, even in the face of an attacker
who has obtained a high level of privilege on the system. It is therefore necessary
to analyse the model with regards to its use of cryptography and to test the valid-
ity of this assertion. In particular, to consider the question, ￿is the security model
able to resist penetration by a privileged attacker?￿ In order to do this, potential
attacks available to a privileged attacker need to be identi￿ed and evaluated as to
whether these enable the attacker to defeat the de￿ned security properties. In order
to identify a suitable methodology for this analysis, literature on security analysis
and assessment techniques will now be reviewed. This review focuses particularly
on threat-oriented techniques useful for de￿ning valid attacks by a privileged at-
tacker and modelling the possible outcomes of these. Following on from this, the
methodology adopted for the analysis will be described in detail.
1726.2 Review of Security Analysis and Assessment Liter-
ature
6.2.1 Petri Net-Based Approaches
Petri nets are a widely used tool for graphically representing and modelling systems
[213]. A Petri net model consists of places, transitions and connecting arcs. Places
contain tokens that collectively described the overall state of the system. Transitions
are activities that occur (‘￿re’) and cause tokens to move to a new place, thereby
indicating a change in the system’s state. Figure 6.1 gives an example of a trivial
Petri net for the purposes of illustration. In the example, transition t1 ￿res, causing
the token to move from place p1 to p2. According to Murata [214], Petri nets
are especially suited to analyses of distributed, parallel, nondeterministic and/or
stochastic systems, as well as those involving concurrency. These properties suggest
the suitability of Petri nets for security analysis.
McDermott [215] ￿rst proposed the use of Petri nets for modelling security and re-
ferred to them as ‘attack nets’. Attack nets are Petri nets where the places represent
security-relevant states or modes of a system, and transitions the events that alter
these states. McDermott’s attack nets are disjunctive such that transitions are able
to ￿re as long as at least one of the incoming places has a token. Depending upon
the nature of the system being modelled, typically transitions represent commands
or inputs that impact on the system’s security. The movement of tokens from place
Figure 6.1: Petri net example
173to place within the attack net as a result of these inputs shows the progress of the
attack and these places model both intermediate and ￿nal objectives.
McDermott [215] suggests that attack nets are particularly useful for investigating
combinations of ￿aws, especially those involving concurrency and multiple stages.
This attribute allows attack nets to potentially show where the combined impact
of a number of di￿erent ￿aws may be greater than the sum of their individual
e￿ects. The technique is also well-suited for describing attacks involving a sequence
of attack stages, particularly where there are interdependencies between these steps.
However, according to McDermott, attack nets are most suited where a bottom-up
analysis is appropriate. McDermott suggests that the technique would be more
di￿cult to apply where a top-down approach is required due to the low-level details
of the system not being available; for example, where documentation is not available
or when analysing a high level security model, as applies in this case.
A further limitation of attack nets is that, while the technique may reveal addi-
tional information about the vulnerabilities being analysed, it is largely unsuitable
for identifying them in the ￿rst place. Instead, to facilitate vulnerability identi-
￿cation, McDermott recommends pairing attack nets with the Flaw Hypothesis
Methodology (FHM) described by Weissman [216]. FHM is a four-stage approach
for identifying, and ultimately eliminating, ￿aws in the system being studied. A
structured approach is used for generating potential ￿aws that may exist. These
￿aws are subsequently ordered according to priority, investigated to con￿rm their
presence, generalised to identify if the same problem re-occurs elsewhere in the
system and, ￿nally, eliminated by developing an appropriate solution [217]. The
FHM approach for generating hypothetical ￿aws involves conducting a detailed
background study using resources such as documentation and source code, fol-
lowed by use of the Delphi technique and brainstorming by the team of analysts
involved [218￿220]. Therefore, while the coupling of the FHM and attack net tech-
niques may be useful for a team of penetration testers analysing a new product, the
approach is unsuitable for a single researcher evaluating a new security model.
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both the limited scope for descriptive detail in diagrammatic modelling techniques
and the need to further facilitate collaboration between engineers and security ana-
lysts. To address these issues, Ste￿an & Schumacher combine the attack net method
with a web-based ‘wiki’ collaboration tool. However, while both of these approaches
can be used to model existing vulnerabilities and possibly reveal additional infor-
mation about them, neither assist with identifying unknown vulnerabilities in a
speci￿c system, which limits their usefulness in this instance.
A more extensive approach employing Petri nets is presented by Xu & Nygard [222]
and speci￿cally uses Predicate/Transition nets, extended to support aspect-oriented
modelling. The technique involves de￿ning the security model (intended functions)
from a detailed speci￿cation, modelling the threats by formalising anomalies that
violate these goals and then specifying appropriate mitigation aspects. This ap-
proach is then applied iteratively until the model has been veri￿ed as being secure.
The principal weakness of the technique is that it veri￿es how the threat model
applies to the speci￿ed behaviour model, but has no scope for demonstrating that
this model is complete. Therefore, the absence of threats in the mitigated behaviour
model may be veri￿ed, but only for the speci￿c set of threats already identi￿ed. As
with McDermott’s attack nets, Xu & Nygard’s scheme requires a detailed, low-level
speci￿cation in order to be applied, and its iterative, time-consuming nature makes
it more suitable as a complement to informal threat modelling such as FHM rather
than a stand-alone technique. In another application of Petri nets to security mod-
elling, Fukuzawa & Saeki [223] propose the use of coloured Petri nets to evaluate
the architectural design of software systems for a number of properties including
security. However, the focus of this approach on software architectures makes it
unsuitable for analysing security models or more general systems.
1756.2.2 Graph-Based Multistage Attack Modelling
Philips & Swiler [224] propose the idea of an ‘attack graph’ for describing the inter-
actions between a series of ‘atomic attacks’ that may be combined to achieve some
ultimate outcome. By analysing these interactions between component vulnerabili-
ties, new attacks may be discovered. While not speci￿cally identifying the result as
a graph, Templeton & Levitt [225] describe a similar concept where interrelation-
ships between atomic attacks can be constructed by specifying their requirements
(e￿ectively pre-conditions) and the outcomes they provide (post-conditions) using
an attack speci￿cation language. The authors suggest that the bene￿t of the tech-
nique is in the discovery of new attacks in complex systems where a number of
existing attacks are already known. Sheyner Haines, Jha, Lippmann & Wing [226]
improve upon this earlier work by describing an algorithm for automated genera-
tion and analysis of attack graphs rather than requiring this labourious task to be
completed by the security analysts. More recently, Ou, Boyer & McQueen [227]
have described a logic-based approach to improving severe scalability issues with
these earlier schemes.
Unlike the Petri net-based approaches discussed previously, attack graph-based
methodologies have the potential to facilitate discovery of previously unidenti￿ed
attacks. However, these methodologies are restricted to attacks that may be syn-
thesised through a combination of existing atomic attacks as there is no means
for discovery of new atomic attacks. These techniques are therefore unsuitable for
analysing new proposed models where no or few attacks are currently known. They
are also not well-suited to analysing abstract systems or models. Instead, as Lipp-
mann & Ingolds [228] observe, attack graph-based approaches are likely to be most
e￿ective in complex, multi-component systems, such as networks, where suggested
applications include network security analysis and intrusion detection systems.
1766.2.3 Attack Patterns and Pro￿les
Moore, Ellison & Linger [229] describe an approach for documenting speci￿c attacks
in a structured and reusable form. A major component of this documentation
is ‘attack trees’, which are used for both identifying new attacks and describing
existing generalised attack methodologies. Attack trees are an important analysis
tool in their own right and are described in detail in Section 6.2.7. However, Moore
et al. also introduce the notion of an ‘attack pattern’ as ￿a generic representation
of a deliberate, malicious attack that commonly occurs in speci￿c contexts￿ (p.
8). They propose that attack patterns and corresponding generalised attack trees
can be organised into related groups known as ‘attack pro￿les’. These represent
reusable attack groupings that may be used to analyse the security of a given system.
From this foundation, the authors suggest that further work on documenting and
identifying commonly occurring sets of attack patterns could lead to collections of
reusable pro￿les.
Gegick & Williams [230] extend and formalise the textual descriptions used by
Moore et al. by using regular expressions to represent attack characteristics. They
also present the results of experimental studies showing that regular expression-
based attack patterns can be successfully applied even by those with a relatively
limited security background. More recently, the same authors have provided a
detailed taxonomy of 30 regular expression-based attack patterns and pro￿les [231]
and have related these to existing taxonomies, such as those by Landwehr et al.
[232], Krsul [233] and Hoglund & McGraw [234].
The idea of reusable patterns for vulnerability identi￿cation is a useful one and
Gegick & Williams’ results are encouraging. However, the principal weakness of
this technique is that it is dependent upon a comprehensive database of existing
￿aws and their corresponding patterns. In the experiments conducted, the systems
analysed were deliberately seeded with vulnerabilities speci￿cally corresponding to
the patterns that were to be used. The results show that the attack patterns
methodology was reasonably successful in detecting these vulnerabilities. However,
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system with unintended and unknown vulnerabilities not inserted speci￿cally for
the purpose of being detected. Further work therefore needs to be conducted to
determine whether attack patterns can reliably detect subtle vulnerabilities caused
by interaction between multiple components in complex contemporary systems.
Attack patterns also cannot be used for identifying entirely new vulnerabilities
or those unique to individual architectures and systems. More speci￿cally, the
technique is unsuitable in this work as attack patterns do not yet exist for the
newly devised security model being studied. This is reinforced by the focus on
implementation-related vulnerabilities in the attack patterns described by Gegick
& Williams [231].
6.2.4 Security Metrics and Assessment Techniques
Numerous metrics for security assessment exist, although many of these are focused
along organisational lines [235]. Wang & Wulf [236] describe a preliminary frame-
work for quantifying security utilising a tree-based decompositional approach, while
Alves-Foss & Barbosa [237] take the opposite approach by attempting to quantify
the susceptibility of a computer system to attack, based on a number of generic
factors in￿uencing security.
A more speci￿c and precise approach to security measurement is given by Manad-
hata & Wing [47]. This metric is based on the notion of an attack surface, which
represents externally visible system resources and the actions associated with them.
Intuitively the more actions and resources exposed, the more vulnerable the system
will be to attack. A state machine is used to formally model both the system and
the threats involved. A subsequent paper by the same authors [48] adds a frame-
work to assist identi￿cation of resources that contribute to the attack surface and
which therefore must be included in the measurement. Weightings can be assigned
to these resources based on the number of times they are in￿uenced by system
actions, the number of reported vulnerabilities associated with this resource, and
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used to compare the systems being studied; an example is presented in that paper
comparing the security of four di￿erent Linux distributions.
Unfortunately, the technique has a number of limitations. For example, the process
is particularly dependent upon the expert domain knowledge of the analyst. There
are also a large number of choices involved in precisely how the metric is applied.
As a consequence, while the results of the technique are quantitative, they generally
support only relative comparisons between the systems being analysed. These re-
sults are therefore not externally valid as they cannot then be compared to systems
studied separately, unless the metric has been applied in precisely the same way in
all cases. Further, the technique cannot be applied to a single system in isolation.
In its current form, attack surface-based methodologies are therefore not suitable
for assessing abstract security models, particularly in isolation, and therefore are
not suitable for analysis of the Vaults scheme.
6.2.5 General Threat Modelling Methodologies
A variety of security analysis and modelling methodologies have been developed that
typically take a risk or threat-driven approach [238,239]. The CORAS methodology
is typical of these and speci￿es a seven stage process for conducting a security anal-
ysis. Den Braber, Hogganvik, Lund, Stłlen & Vraalsen [240] present a description
of CORAS, including a detailed example. Step 4 of CORAS involves risk identi￿-
cation and is therefore relevant to the problem at hand. The suggested approach
is referred to as ‘structured brainstorming’, where ideas for potential attacks are
workshopped by the analysts in a manner that somewhat resembles the ￿aw hy-
pothesis methodology [216] described previously in Section 6.2.1. The results are
documented using the diagrammatic ‘CORAS security risk modelling language’ to
construct threat scenario diagrams. These are graph-like but involve a rich symbol
set and show the connection of a threat source to a set of one or more vulnerabilities
to speci￿c threat scenarios and ultimately to the assets a￿ected. These diagrams
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elled in separate diagrams. Although den Braber et al. suggest that the CORAS
diagrams are inspired by tools such as attack trees, they lack the latter’s ability
to assist in the generation of new vulnerabilities and, instead, rely heavily on the
group brainstorming process. As a result, the technique cannot be used for this
research.
6.2.6 Argument Trees
Kienzle [1] introduces a technique called Methodically Organised Argument Trees
(MOAT)1 where a tree-based structure is used to develop assurance that a given
system is able to provide speci￿ed security properties. Although Kienzle’s work pre-
dates attack trees (described in the next section), he acknowledges the in￿uence of
the earlier technique of fault tree analysis on his methodology [242]. Kienzle’s
argument trees are less threat-orientated than these other techniques and have a
desired security property as their root node. This property is then decomposed into
its detailed requirements in a hierarchical, top-down fashion. This approach allows
assumptions made about security properties and their provision to be identi￿ed
and documented at multiple levels. However, it also facilitates veri￿cation of these
properties by assigning justi￿cations to each node in the tree. Internal nodes contain
arguments that this property does in fact decompose to its child nodes, while leaf
nodes contain a justi￿cation as to why the property they assert is true. The actual
form of the justi￿cation is ￿exible and depends upon the goals of the analysis,
the level of threat associated with the node, and the level of rigour required for a
su￿ciently convincing argument.
Argument tree nodes may be conjunctive (AND) or disjunctive (OR), with the
former re￿ecting dependence on multiple sub-properties and the latter either design
alternatives or defence in depth. An example argument tree for maintaining the
con￿dentiality of a user’s e-mail is given in Figure 6.2. A small icon beneath the
1A summary of the technique by Kienzle & Wulf is also available [241].
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node box indicates whether the node is conjunctive (convex top with a ￿at base)
or disjunctive (angled top and concave base). For example, the node ￿User’s e-mail
kept private in transmission￿ is conjunctive and requires that the e-mail is both
encrypted and that the encryption key is known only to the sender and receiver.
By comparison, the node ￿User’s e-mail kept private on disk￿ is disjunctive and
indicates that either encryption or OS-based security measures may be used to
satisfy this requirement.
Kienzle demonstrates the practicality and e￿ectiveness of the methodology by ap-
plying it to the ‘Legion’ security model [243]. Kienzle observes that this facilitated
discovery of the security properties required to meet its security objectives, and that
employing the methodology as part of the design and development process helped
to inform the compromise between design criteria such as performance and the
established security goals. The results of these analyses aided communication be-
tween developers and proved to be easily accessible to those involved in the project.
Other more general bene￿ts were also reported. The approach is ￿exible in that
it does not provide a ￿xed notion or level of evaluation and may be integrated
with other additional supplementary validation techniques as required. Further-
more, identifying the underlying assumptions behind various security mechanisms
181enabled these designs to be potentially reused in the future in other scenarios where
the same assumptions apply. A similar approach has been successfully employed
more recently by Dojen & Co￿ey [244] to support logical veri￿cation of crypto-
graphic protocols. However, a limitation of the approach is its dependence upon
other veri￿cation methodologies in order to obtain a high level of assurance. If these
supplementary methodologies must be applied at multiple levels in the tree to ver-
ify the security property arguments made at these points, this would result in the
amount of analysis needing to be performed rapidly escalating. Consequently, this
may necessitate some of the analysis work being omitted, with the result that the
argument tree structure primarily serves to highlight the areas where the analysis
fails to adequately support the claimed security properties.
6.2.7 Attack Trees
Attack trees have their origins in fault tree analysis [245], which has been used
for decades in the domain of safety-critical systems such as those in the nuclear
and aerospace industries [242, 246]. Fault trees have also recently been applied
to security. Foster [247] describes a model for security protocol development that
includes an enhanced fault tree analysis technique for determining protocol security
requirements. Brooke & Paige [248] also show how fault trees may be used to
analyse security-critical systems, while Helmer et al. [249] apply the technique to
requirements analysis for intrusion detection systems, with coloured Petri nets later
employed to aid design of detector mechanisms [250].
However, attack trees dominate fault trees in the security literature and are dis-
cussed in relation to a wide range of security analysis, veri￿cation and modelling
topics [215,221,222,227,229￿231,238,240,250￿254]. Schneier [255] is generally cred-
ited with being the ￿rst to introduce the term ‘attack trees’2 and he describes them
as ￿a formal methodology for analysing the security of systems￿ (p. 21). The tech-
2Some authors refer to these as ‘threat trees’ [49, 253, 256]. However, these should not to
be confused with the threat trees described by Amoroso, Kleppinger & Majette [257] which,
Foster [247] argues, use a more restrictive threat categorisation scheme.
182nique is also widely used by practitioners for threat modelling and vulnerability
analysis in systems and software [2,3,28,49].
Construction and Use
The tree and associated analysis are highly threat-centric, with the root node being
the overall goal and leaves being di￿erent speci￿c ways of achieving this goal. How-
ever, trees will typically also have a number of internal nodes that are incomplete
in the sense that they represent a general means of achieving the overall goal but
still lack the required detail and speci￿city. In this way, attack trees are a highly
top-down approach facilitating re￿nement and decomposition of generic classes of
attack into more speci￿c attack modes. As a result, Moore et al. [229] refer to at-
tack trees as being ‘referentially transparent’ such that the lower-level details of an
attack are abstracted in the higher level nodes. This property in particular assists
in the management of complexity associated with analysing detailed attacks of large
systems and facilitates convenient navigation of these trees. It is this design that
also makes attack trees so useful as a structured and systematic means of deriving
previously unidenti￿ed vulnerabilities in the system being analysed [215,229]. As
with argument trees, internal nodes are characterised as either disjunctive (OR) or
conjunctive (AND), with OR being the default in most notations. Disjunctive nodes
allow a choice so that the attack goal is attained if any of the sub-goals is satis￿ed,
whereas conjunctive modes require satisfaction of all sub-goals. In a qualitative
sense therefore, a large proportion of OR nodes indicates greater opportunities for
achieving the overall attack goal whereas AND nodes suggest greater constraints
on the attacker.
Figure 6.3 gives an example of a simpli￿ed attack tree for learning a user’s Unix
password. The notation used in the diagram is one of several commonly used and
represents leaf nodes as a square, OR nodes with an angled top and concave base,
and AND nodes with a ￿at base and convex top. These symbols are similar to those
used as part of Kienzle’s [1] argument trees. At the root of the tree is the stated
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overall goal and, in this example, there are four di￿erent methods of achieving the
goal given at the top level. In all but one instance, these methods are subsequently
decomposed further to indicate more speci￿c ways of achieving the sub-goal. De-
composition continues until a su￿cient level of detail appropriate for the analysis
is achieved. The example in the diagram is highly simpli￿ed as decomposition is
halted very early. Note that, in all instances, tree branches terminate in a leaf
node. Also observe how OR nodes describe options available to the attacker. For
example, the attacker has the choice of attempting to convince the user to reveal
their password either by threatening them or tricking them through ‘social engi-
neering’. Depending on the analysis, OR nodes may also re￿ect di￿erent scenarios
that might arise. For example, the work that is required for the attacker to obtain
the password hash is di￿erent depending upon whether these hashes are stored in a
world readable password ￿le or ‘shadowed’. Finally, AND nodes describe multiple
constraints placed on the attacker. In the example, as Unix only stores one-way
hashes of passwords, in order to recover the plaintext password the attacker must
both obtain the hash and then successfully mount a dictionary attack on it. This
requirement is modelled through the AND node in the diagram.
Values may also be assigned to leaf nodes to facilitate further analysis beyond sim-
ply vulnerability enumeration [256]. Schneier [255] suggests that the use of simple
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propriate, depending on the intended purpose. With appropriate application tool
support, these attributes allow the tree to be ‘pruned’ to remove branches that are
logically impossible according to the determined criteria. Alternatively, use of con-
tinuous values, like cost or probability, facilitates analyses such as removing attacks
with the cost over a certain value or retaining attacks that are more likely than not.
Assigning multiple attributes enables more sophisticated querying of attacks with
di￿erent characteristics, increasing the ￿exibility and reusability of the information
captured in the tree. Although trees are often represented in diagrammatic form,
which is the most intuitive approach, complex trees can also be written in textual
‘outline’ form for convenience [3,255].
Enhancements and Applications
As noted earlier, attack trees have received considerable attention in the security
literature and this has resulted in numerous enhancements and extensions. As de-
tailed previously in Section 6.2.3, Moore et al. [229] incorporate attack trees into an
approach for documenting attacks in a structured and reusable form. Salter, Sayd-
jari, Schneier & Wallner [45] also use attack trees as a key component in a broader
secure design methodology. This methodology uses the results of modelling likely
adversary behaviour and objectives and combines them with attack trees to inform
application of countermeasures. Tidwell, Larson, Fitch & Hale [258] augment at-
tack trees by adding multiple parameters, pre- and post-condition assertions, and a
complementary speci￿cation language to allow ￿systematic visualisation, vulnerabil-
ity assessment and attack prediction￿ (p. 54) in the context of a network intrusion
detection system. Buldas, Laud, Priisalu, Saarepera & Willemson [256] also em-
ploy multi-parameter attack trees but select them according to game theory in an
attempt to improve the quality of risk estimations. However, the authors acknowl-
edge the di￿culties in quantitatively estimating risk for unknown parameters and
it is consequently unclear whether the level of precision obtained in the results of
185this speci￿c approach is fully justi￿ed.
Swiderski & Snyder [49] present their version of attack trees, which include both
unmitigated and mitigated threat conditions in the same tree. Dowd, McDonald &
Schuh [2] also suggest including mitigation nodes in attack trees. These are drawn
with a di￿erent (circular) symbol so as to clearly di￿erentiate them from attack
nodes. However, Dowd, McDonald & Schuh also urge caution on the addition of
mitigation nodes to an attack tree as this may prematurely curtail exploration of
seemingly unlikely attack vectors. Dowd et al. therefore recommend some form of
validation of these countermeasures before they are included in the threat analy-
sis. McDermott [254] describes a similar process suitable as a lightweight assurance
methodology centred around abuse cases. Finally, Yager [259] introduces the con-
cept of ordered weight averaging (OWA) trees that support node types beyond the
simple disjunctive and conjunctive types commonly used. Non-leaf nodes in Yager’s
OWA trees may have weightings assigned to them to support modelling in cases
where there is some probabilistic uncertainty concerning how many of that node’s
children must be satis￿ed for the branch as a whole to be evaluated as being suc-
cessful. While potentially valuable for certain types of analysis, Yager’s extension
does not appear to have been otherwise adopted.
There has also been some work on developing a more fundamental understanding
of attack trees. Mauw & Oostdijk [260] describe a formalisation of attack trees that
uses the notion of attack suites to abstract the internal structure of the tree. The
aim of this work is to clarify the semantics of trees and the transformations that
may be performed on them in order to assist work on automated support tools for
attack tree analysis. An early example of such a tool is that by Opel [261], although
this tool appears to no longer be available. However, sophisticated commercial tools
such as SecurITree [262] have appeared to ￿ll the gap.
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Attack trees have numerous advantages. Schneier [255] argues that they provide
structure to the security analysis, taking an ad hoc brainstorming process, such as
that involved in the CORAS and ￿aw hypothesis-based approaches [216,240], and
replacing it with ￿a repeatable methodology￿ [29, pp. 332]. According to Tidwell
et al. [258], attack trees can also support expression of multi-stage attacks. Once
constructed, trees with labelled nodes can be further analysed according to prob-
ability of attack, cost constraints or other parameters as appropriate [256]. This
process is supported through the use of software tools [261,262]. The hierarchical
structure also allows multiple experts from within a single group to work on di￿er-
ent branches of the tree concurrently [221]. The methodology is both intuitive and
￿exible and the literature contains examples of its application in scenarios ranging
from e-mail message security [29,247,255] to network attacks [258] and even, less
seriously, how to get a free meal at a restaurant [260]. McDermott [215] suggests
that the top down, decompositional structure of the trees facilitates the ability to
analyse systems for vulnerabilities, even where low-level details are not available.
This makes attack trees more suitable for the current project than bottom-up analy-
sis techniques, such as attack nets described in Section 6.2.1. Attack trees therefore
provide ￿a standardized approach for identifying and documenting potential attack
vectors￿ [2, p. 59].
Although they have been widely adopted, some limitations of attack trees have
been observed. Ste￿an & Schumacher [221] found that they lacked the ability
for modelling preconditions and the graphical format restricted the capacity for
explanatory detail. However, the combination of attack trees and attack patterns
devised by Moore et al. [229], and extended by Gegick & Williams [231], avoids this
problem. Furthermore, software tools such as SecurITree have extensive support
for incorporating and categorising detailed notes for each and every node in the tree
being analysed [262]. The other principal de￿ciency of the technique is that it is
highly dependent upon the expertise of the analysts who construct it [3]. However,
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equivalent analysis and assessment techniques [215,221,263].
6.2.8 Summary and Conclusion
Of all the analysis methodologies considered, attack trees are most suited to the
current work. Unlike attack nets and attack graphs, attack trees can be applied
to a high-level security model where some level of abstraction is involved and do
not require a detailed low-level speci￿cation in order to produce worthwhile results.
Signi￿cantly, attack trees are also useful as an independent technique for identify-
ing unknown ￿aws in a new system. On the other hand, McDermott’s [215] attack
nets are more useful for gaining additional information about known vulnerabili-
ties, while Xu & Nygard’s [222] application of Predicate/Transition nets serve to
demonstrate the absence of a set of speci￿ed threats. Other techniques for the
elucidation of new vulnerabilities, such as FHM and CORAS [217,240], are heavily
dependent upon brainstorming-like processes within a team. As Schneier [255] ar-
gues, these somewhat ad hoc processes lack the methodical approach of attack trees
to vulnerability discovery. Attack patterns are also unsuitable for identifying new
vulnerabilities, especially those that are speci￿c to a particular system. Manadhata
& Wing’s [47] attack surface measurement technique is useful for notionally com-
paring the relative security a￿orded by two or more systems but cannot be applied
to a single system in isolation. Finally, Kienzle’s [1] argument trees provide valuable
structure to other non-threat orientated analysis techniques but do not necessarily
provide su￿cient rigour on their own.
Since an entirely new system is being analysed, the identi￿cation of potential vul-
nerabilities is of particular importance. The existence and nature of potential vul-
nerabilities is a critical indicator of both the overall security of the model and of
the validity of the proposition that use of cryptography within an operating system
security model provides signi￿cant security bene￿ts. Furthermore, the ability of at-
tack trees to manage complexity supports a rigorous analysis by a single researcher
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methodology based around attack trees was employed for assessing the security of
the Vaults model.
6.3 Analysis Background and Methodology
6.3.1 Overview
This thesis argues that the use of cryptography in operating system security models
has the potential to signi￿cantly improve security over conventional approaches. In
particular, it is claimed that certain security properties can be achieved, even in
the presence of an attacker who has attained a high level of privilege on the system
such as would be su￿cient to bypass security entirely under conventional models.
To test this claim, attack trees were developed to model potential attacks on each
of the Vaults scheme’s stated security properties. Speci￿cally, three trees were con-
structed to analyse the con￿dentiality property, the veri￿able integrity property and
the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism. The assumptions of the analysis (detailed
in Section 6.3.6) were set to allow for the possibility that the attacker had obtained
a privilege level equivalent to superuser access under traditional Unix systems. This
meant that the attacker could bypass the active enforcement of security properties
by the kernel and directly access and modify data stored on disk. The attack trees
sought to identify the di￿erent possible ways that the system might be attacked
under these assumptions in order to ascertain to what degree the Vaults security
model is able to resist such attacks by a highly privileged adversary. These attack
trees also served more generally to validate the model’s security and present evi-
dence as to its robustness. Details of the assumptions and methodology employed
in this analysis will now be described.
1896.3.2 Trees and Security Properties
As just stated, three attack trees were constructed, one for each of the three princi-
pal security properties provided by the Vaults model. These properties were de￿ned
as follows.
Con￿dentiality Property Within the limits of the relevant underlying cryptographic
primitives and algorithms, Vaults guarantees the con￿dentiality of objects
designated as being read-protected. This property is de￿ned as the plaintext
content of designated objects can only be read by those with a valid access
ticket and only those authorised users will be able to use such a ticket.
Veri￿able Integrity Property Vaults guarantees the veri￿able integrity of objects
designated as being write protected. This property is de￿ned such that only
authorised users in possession of a valid and usable ticket may make legitimate
modi￿cations to write protected objects and that any other modi￿cations will
be detected upon subsequent legitimate access to the object, regardless of
mode.
Trusted Fingerprinting Mechanism This mechanism within the Vaults model en-
compasses a number of speci￿c security properties, namely:
￿ Trusted code and its dependencies accessed via a speci￿ed ￿lesystem path
are cryptographically veri￿ed on execution or access (as appropriate) to
con￿rm that these have not been modi￿ed.
￿ Privileges of trusted code determining access to cryptographically pro-
tected objects are assigned based on whether this code has been suc-
cessfully veri￿ed and the code’s corresponding speci￿ed trust level. A
corollary of this property is that unveri￿ed code is considered untrusted,
has no access to the user’s vault and therefore has e￿ectively no privileges
under the Vaults security model.
￿ Access to application keys is dependent upon the cryptographically ver-
i￿ed identity of a process.
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this code may not be used indirectly by malicious code to obtain unau-
thorised privileges.
Attack trees were constructed to address each of these properties. In the case
of both the con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity properties, each property was
analysed with a single tree. However, the attack tree analysing the Trusted Fin-
gerprinting mechanism incorporates a separate top-level branch to consider each of
the mechanism’s sub-properties.
6.3.3 Tree Construction Methodology
The attack trees were generally constructed by following the top-down decompo-
sitional approach as described in the literature. However, as the work progressed,
a re￿nement of this approach was developed and was employed to make the at-
tack tree construction process even more methodical. This improved methodology
involves dividing a high-level node into a set of logically complementary attack sce-
narios. Particularly at the higher levels there are often only two mutually exclusive
alternatives, which leads to this portion of the structure resembling a binary tree.
However, the principle is also often applicable where three or more branches are
required.
The technique is best applied by beginning with the highest node in the tree that
represents an attack scenario. In most attack trees, this will be the root node.
This was true for all of the trees in this analysis except for that analysing Trusted
Fingerprinting, which included attacks on four distinct but closely related security
properties. From the high-level attack scenario node, the analyst should identify
a speci￿c high-level property that may apply to a subset of the attacks within
this general scenario. If it is a binary property such that it either applies to the
speci￿c attack scenario or does not, the analyst should create two branches from
the high-level node to re￿ect each of these cases. Where there are three or more
attack scenarios that collectively address all possible outcomes, a separate branch
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all branches logically encompass all possible scenarios. Typically the easiest way of
ensuring this is to develop the analysis using binary properties of the attack where
possible. The process is subsequently repeated for each of the new branches in the
tree with another attack property of the re￿ned scenario identi￿ed and another set
of logically complementary attack scenarios created from this point. An example
of how the process was applied in this analysis is given in the next section.
Clearly the order in which the decomposition is applied is important. If a sub-
property is found to apply in both branches of its parent, this strongly implies that
it should appear further up in the hierarchy. As a result, the tree may require some
minor rearrangement while it is being developed and this rearrangement should
occur as early as possible.
It was found during the analysis that the technique described was most bene￿cial
higher up in the tree. Iteratively categorising scenarios according to whether hier-
archical attack properties were applicable to a speci￿c attack helped to ensure that
less obvious scenarios were still identi￿ed. This outcome is particularly important
at the upper levels of the tree, as neglecting an entire branch of high level attacks
at this point as a result of an implicit assumption has the potential to lead to a
large number of scenarios being unintentionally omitted from the analysis. As the
process for applying the technique became clear, branches in the tree that had been
constructed previously were reviewed and restructured explicitly according to the
improved methodology. This process proved to be bene￿cial as several additional
attack scenarios were subsequently identi￿ed and the overall structure of the tree
became clearer and more logical.
6.3.4 Logically Complementary Attack Scenarios Example
Figure 6.4 gives an example of the application of the logically complementary at-
tack scenarios technique. Speci￿cally, the diagram shows a relatively high level
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of the branches demonstrate the technique being described. For example, in the
leftmost branch considering attack scenarios where an object is modi￿ed and the
modi￿cation is not detected, the scenario is subdivided into those scenarios where
the modi￿ed object is stand-alone trusted code and those where it is a dependency
of some other program. These two cases cover all possible scenarios as, under the
model, they are the only two possibilities. Furthermore, if the modi￿ed object
is a dependency, it can either be a helper application, a shared library or a data
￿le dependency. As these are the only three possible types of dependency, again
collectively these are comprehensive. Note this is an example of a case where the
attack property being considered cannot be treated as binary as three branches are
required.
The second top-level branch of the tree analyses attacks where privileges are in-
correctly assigned. This node is divided into scenarios where privileges are incor-
rectly assigned to a trusted program and when they are incorrectly assigned to an
untrusted program. As programs cannot be anything except either trusted or un-
trusted, again this incorporates all possibilities. The same process is also applied to
this leftmost branch, as the only two ways that a trusted program can be assigned
privileges incorrectly are if it executes at its speci￿ed trust level (STL) when it
should not or if it does not execute at its STL when, in fact, it should. While many
of the subtrees in the diagram are rolled up, a similar process has been repeated
within these subtrees where appropriate.
In some cases the methodology suggests the inclusion of nodes within the tree that
are trivially invalid. For example, in the right most top-level branch in the diagram
considering where a trusted program is subverted by its malicious parent, the child
of a malicious program executing at trust level L1 may either be the same program
or a di￿erent program. However, if the parent and child are the same then there is
no di￿erence in privileges and no ability for the parent to manipulate the child. As
a result, the subtree describing scenarios where the child program is the same as its
3Refer to Section 206 for details on the attack tree notation used in this diagram.
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194parent is simply written as an impossible leaf node. This is an example of where
the methodology may lead to a small amount of overhead in terms of additional
nodes in the tree. However, this redundancy does not add to the overall complexity
of the tree and, in fact, may simplify the process of navigating the tree due to the
more methodical and logical way in which the attack scenarios are structured.
6.3.5 Trees and Libraries
The attack trees in this analysis were constructed with the SecurITree software
package4. As already stated, three separate trees for each aspect of the Vaults model
were created. However, early on in the analysis, it was identi￿ed that the details
of lower level attacks were often the same and that these attacks frequently re-
occurred as speci￿c ways of achieving di￿erent high-level goals. One of the features
of the SecurITree software is the ability to create ‘attack tree libraries’. These
are reusable subtrees that can be incorporated within other trees as required. Li-
braries can also include other libraries, which creates a ‘meta-hierarchy’ beyond the
structure of the actual trees themselves. If a modi￿cation is made to any library,
loading or reloading a tree which uses that library results in all instances of the li-
brary being updated to re￿ect the latest changes. This feature is a powerful tool for
the construction of sophisticated and detailed attack tree models and was pivotal
in enabling the degree of comprehensiveness achieved in the analysis.
As the tree analysing the con￿dentiality property was developed ￿rst, libraries were
constructed to re￿ect attacks on this property. Each library was assigned an alpha-
betic identi￿er which was assigned as a pre￿x to its descriptive label. For example,
the ￿rst library developed for the tree analysing the con￿dentiality property was
named: (A)Modify GPUB without Fundamental Ticket.
When the analysis progressed to considering the veri￿able integrity property, it was
identi￿ed that these existing libraries could not be applied in their original form
to the new property. In some cases this was due to often subtle di￿erences in the
4Use of the software was very generously provided by Amenaza Technologies Limited.
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the general attack structure was the same, sometimes the labels and descriptions
of the speci￿cs of the attack needed to be altered to re￿ect the di￿erent context.
However, the most signi￿cant change involved interdependencies between the two
security properties. Speci￿cally, a number of attacks described in the con￿dentiality
property tree and its libraries required violation of the veri￿able integrity property.
To re￿ect this interdependency between the two trees, the labels for these nodes were
pre￿xed with the ￿ag TREE. When considering the con￿dentiality property, these
nodes were initially assumed to be possible in order to identify the impact of the
interdependence between the two properties. However, if an attack on the veri￿able
integrity property requires defeating the same property to succeed, this attack has
becomes circular and therefore should be excluded from the analysis 5. Therefore,
when constructing the veri￿able integrity property tree, all of the libraries developed
for analysing the con￿dentiality property were adapted and revised with separate
versions being created. To clearly distinguish between these new versions, all attack
tree libraries corresponding speci￿cally to the veri￿able integrity property were
￿agged with the pre￿x [I]. When analysing the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism
these libraries were again reviewed. However, for this tree, only one of the subtree
libraries needed to be revised and modi￿ed. When the analysis was completed, a
total of 41 attack tree libraries were created in addition to the three primary trees.
Construction Optimisation
The use of attack tree libraries signi￿cantly assists the analyst in managing the
complexity associated with larger attack trees. However, modelling the security
properties at such a level of detail resulted in very large attack trees being devel-
oped. Details of trees are described in Chapter 8. As the trees grew in size during
the development, there was a concomitant reduction in performance and the time
5In some rarer cases, an attack on the con￿dentiality property required violation of only a
subset of the veri￿able integrity property. In these cases, the node was ￿agged with the pre￿x
PROP and again was treated as being possible.
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stantially. In particular, typically when the tree reached a size of between 5,000
and 10,000 nodes, this slowdown would begin to signi￿cantly impact the speed at
which construction could be performed. Although the SecurITree tool remained
extremely reliable, to improve general responsiveness, one of the most common and
largest attack tree libraries, (H), was compressed down into a single node stub
which was used instead of the complete library while the construction work was be-
ing performed. This technique signi￿cantly increased the speed at which the trees
could be constructed. As the stub node was stored as a library, overwriting this ￿le
with the complete version of the library and reloading all of the trees allowed the
full tree to be conveniently reconstructed when required for analysis.
6.3.6 Assumptions
A number of assumptions were made to de￿ne the scope of the analysis. This
was important both to ensure all necessary attacks were included and to exclude
attacks not relevant to the questions being considered. As discussed in Section
6.3.7, assumptions were used in determining the value to assign to the leaf nodes in
the tree. If the actions required by a leaf node violated one of these assumptions,
the value of the node was set to Impossible. Otherwise the node was considered
possible for the purposes of the analysis. Each of these assumptions will now be
discussed.
Assumption 1 Keys, including passwords, contain su￿cient entropy to be secure
against any guessing or cryptanalytic attacks within the capabilities of the
attacker.
Attacks targeting low entropy keys are often successful in compromising the
security of systems that depend on these keys. As Vaults employs cryptogra-
phy as the underlying means for attaining superior security, the strength of
such keys becomes critically important. However, this is a well understood
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ically secure keys, selection of high entropy passphrases and/or use of addi-
tional authentication technologies such as smartcards. Further, the problem
is not speci￿c to Vaults and applies in the same way to other systems. There-
fore, attacks involving this do not re￿ect a fault with the Vaults model but
rather a more general issue a￿ecting systems that utilise passwords. As a
result, these problems are excluded from the analysis under this assumption
with the acknowledgement that they are an important issue that must be
addressed in practice.
Assumption 2 Users will adhere to appropriate practices required to keep pass-
word and key values secure, including, but not limited to: not writing pass-
words down; not revealing passwords over unsecured remote login sessions;
and making use of physical trusted path mechanisms where appropriate and
available. Furthermore, users will not reveal their password or other con￿-
dential values directly to an attacker, although they will supply these to the
computer system where it appears appropriate.
There are a myriad of ways in which users could reveal sensitive values, such
as passwords, to an attacker. However, again these are not speci￿c to the
Vaults model and therefore were not included in the analysis.
Assumption 3 Prior to an attack commencing, the initial integrity and correct-
ness of the security kernel and trusted computing base (TCB) ￿les and con-
￿guration are assumed. This includes the following:
￿ The kernel correctly implements the speci￿ed security model.
￿ Other TCB components are correctly implemented according to their
speci￿ed requirements under the model.
￿ The integrity of all TCB software (including L3 applications) is intact
at the point at which it is received from an authorised distribution point.
This also includes the integrity and correctness of all subsequent autho-
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￿ The con￿guration and use of the security mechanisms is correct. For
example, L2 and L3 kernel ￿les, applications and relevant dependencies
are cryptographically write protected.
However, this assumption does not exclude the general prospect of malicious
code or attacks on the kernel and TCB integrity at runtime pursuant to As-
sumption 5.
This assumption is also intended to ensure that the focus of the analysis is
the design of the model and not a range of external and largely universal fac-
tors. For example, including attacks requiring the model to be implemented
incorrectly introduces an e￿ectively in￿nite number of ways that the model
might fail, the bulk of which are not speci￿c to the model’s design. Prob-
lems caused by miscon￿guration are also excluded as they are the user-level
equivalent of programming errors. Similarly, attacks involving subversion of
the software prior to it being received by the user are also excluded as they
are unconnected with the model itself and could equally a￿ect any scheme.
Assumption 4 Users will not mistakenly give away their privileges or otherwise
explicitly undermine their own security through any overt mechanism or se-
ries of steps. For example, it is assumed that the user will not give away
their privileges by issuing secondary tickets or granting arbitrary code and its
dependencies a trust level of L2 or L3, regardless of how convincing the at-
tacker’s social engineering is, as these actions involve explicitly giving away
the user’s privileges. However, covert attacks, such as inducing the execution
of malicious code, are not excluded by this assumption. Indeed, the existence
of malicious code is explicitly assumed.
As with any discretionary system, users can compromise their security by giv-
ing away privileges in an almost unlimited number of ways. In the cases where
the leakage of privilege involves some explicit privilege-granting action on the
part of the user, these actions are excluded from the analysis. Otherwise a
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the user’s behaviour and have nothing to do with the security model being
analysed. However, the analysis also acknowledges that more subtle attacks
exist that do not involve the user directly assigning privileges to the attacker.
Such attacks are highly relevant to the question of the model’s security and
are therefore included in the analysis.
Assumption 5 It is assumed that the attacker already has some form of access on
the system such as a local user account that allows them to log in and work in-
teractively. This assumption also encompasses the possibility that the attacker
may have attained a high level of privilege equivalent to superuser access that
allows them to bypass the security kernel and directly access secondary storage
devices on the system.
Although in reality the bulk of attackers may not initially have access to the
system at all, the purpose of the analysis is to consider the security prop-
erties provided by Vaults and not the di￿culty of overall penetration of the
system by an outsider. Therefore, in practice, this is likely to be a generous
assumption in favour of the attacker. However, this assumption is critical
to validating the hypothesis that the Vaults security model can continue to
provide its stated security properties even against highly privileged attackers.
Assumption 6 The isolation of the kernel and its data is assumed such that an at-
tacker cannot directly manipulate or subvert its behaviour at runtime. There-
fore, the kernel is able to maintain itself and data securely in memory, inac-
cessible to all system processes.
Hardware-based support for restricting user process access to designated areas
of memory is available on a typical computer system and this is required for
the kernel to operate and enforce the security model correctly.
Assumption 7 All cryptographic algorithms and primitives used by the system are
assumed to be su￿ciently secure in design and implementation to resist any
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While the Vaults model is highly dependent upon cryptography for achieving
its stated security properties, the security of speci￿c algorithms or primitives
is not relevant to this analysis. As a result, all forms of cryptanalytic attack
on these algorithms and primitives are excluded by this assumption.
Assumption 8 It is assumed that the user will not trivially leak plaintext from read
protected objects to which they have legitimate access; for example, by copying
this text into an unprotected ￿le. This assumption also excludes a similar
incidental leaking of plaintext by legitimate (non-malicious) applications in
the kind of failure described by Czeskis et al. [264].
As with Assumption 4, this assumption excludes behaviour by both the user
and their applications that is not malicious but nonetheless involves explic-
itly and unavoidably causing security to fail. While such problems could be
mitigated by extending the model to monitor and restrict information ￿ow,
mandatory security policies of this type are not within the scope of the model
and were therefore excluded from the analysis.
Assumption 9 The security of unprotected objects is not considered in the analy-
sis.
The de￿ned security properties only apply for designated objects and this
assumption makes it explicit for the purposes of the analysis. Therefore,
attacks that a￿ect unprotected objects, but do not negatively impact the
security properties that apply to those objects designated as being protected,
are not considered to be successful attacks within the scope of this analysis.
Assumption 10 It is assumed that the hardware on the system provides the neces-
sary security features, implements these correctly and cannot be subverted by
the attacker. Speci￿cally these features include memory protection, the ability
of system hardware to provide a secure bootstrap process to ensure the integrity
of the system kernel prior to booting and the presence of trusted platform mod-
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The Vaults model only requires basic hardware security features as are typ-
ically found in commodity PC systems. However, this assumption requires
that these features work correctly and are su￿ciently resistant to attack. It
also addresses the need for the hardware to facilitate a secure boot sequence
to ensure that the attacker cannot tamper with or replace the kernel with
a malicious version as a means of bypassing the security of the model. Se-
cure booting may be achieved through use of a TPM chip or by booting from
physically secured read-only media such as a CD-ROM.
Assumption 11 Administrative practices and protocols undertaken by the prime
user are assumed to be conducted with su￿cient care and rigour as to not
result in any reduction of the security provided by the Vaults model. This as-
sumption includes both online and o￿ine procedures and particularly relates to
Vaults PKI administrative tasks, such as verifying user identity and signing of
certi￿cates. It also involves correct con￿guration of the system where required
to avoid or mitigate well-known avenues of potential attack. In general, this
assumption addresses the integrity of procedures that are necessary to support
the Vaults security model but are not central to the model itself and cannot be
guaranteed by it.
This assumption is an extension of those previously described, addressing the
need for secure con￿guration and excluding user error but speci￿cally applying
to the actions taken by the prime user. If the system is not maintained
correctly and the prime user does not properly authenticate users’ identities
before issuing certi￿cates, this has signi￿cant potential to result in a failure
to achieve the stated security objectives but not as a result of failure in the
model itself. For this reason, these events are excluded from the analysis.
Assumption 12 The Vaults model speci￿es that certain encrypted items used within
the model must also be integrity protected. However, the speci￿c means of
protection (for example, a MAC or authenticating block cipher mode) may be
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anism in order to change an integrity protected parameter depends upon the
mechanism used, for this analysis it is assumed that if the attacker learns the
encryption key they may also violate the ciphertext authentication.
This assumption models the scenario where an authenticating block cipher
mode is employed and only a single key is used for encryption and authenti-
cation. However, if a MAC were used instead, this might require the attacker
to obtain an additional key. Therefore, this assumption establishes the sce-
nario that is most favourable to the attacker. This issue is further discussed
in Section 7.2.
Other Excluded Scenarios
In most cases where an attack was excluded from the analysis, this was because it
had violated one of the above assumptions. However, in some cases, attacks were
excluded due to their requirements having become circular. For example, in order
to steal a user’s private key from their vault to allow the decryption of a secondary
ticket available to this user in GPUB, the attacker would need the victim to execute
malicious code that has been designated as L3. In order to assign their code trust
level L3, the attacker must be able to modify GPUB, and one way of achieving this
is to steal the fundamental ticket using malicious code executed by the prime user.
However, this in turn requires that the second piece of malicious code execute at
L3, making the attack cyclical. In cases such as these, a leaf node is included in the
tree to show that this attack methodology has been considered but was nonetheless
considered to be impossible due to this circularity.
Some scenarios constructed by combining existing scenarios were also excluded from
the analysis unless there was some advantage to the attacker in combining these.
For example, scenarios concerning an attacker stealing a ticket belonging to another
user and then attempting to use this themselves were considered separately to
scenarios where an attacker attempts to revive an expired secondary ticket that
203was previously issued to them. While it is possible that an attacker could steal an
expired ticket belonging to another user, this only unnecessarily complicates both
attacks and therefore combinations such as this were not considered.
6.3.7 Node Attributes
In attack tree analyses generally, leaf nodes may be assigned a variety of di￿erent
attributes. The tree can then be queried in order to identify the properties of the
attack based on these inputs and the logical structure of the tree. For example,
assigning values to leaf nodes to indicate the cost to the attacker of that component
of the attack can be used to reveal the cheapest way that security may be compro-
mised. Alternatively, the analyst could identify all attacks that may be completed
for under a certain ￿gure.
However, in this analysis, parameters such as cost or di￿culty are of little relevance.
The objective is to identify any and all attacks that allow violation of the speci￿ed
security properties, irrespective of their cost or di￿culty. If the attack is at all
achievable, then it is of interest. As a result, all leaf nodes have an attribute
labelled Impossible that is assigned a Boolean value. If the node does not clearly
violate one or more of the assumptions, or there is not some other compelling reason
for excluding it from the analysis, then this attribute is assigned the value FALSE
and this value is also the default.
While the possibility or otherwise of speci￿c attack scenarios is of the greatest in-
terest in this analysis, a second attribute was also created. This attribute is labelled
Difficult and also stores Boolean value. The purpose of the attribute is to indi-
cate the existence of some signi￿cant obstacle or constraint that could prevent the
attacker from successfully completing this component of the attack. For example,
the obstacle may re￿ect a scenario that could occur but cannot be controlled or
otherwise in￿uenced by the attacker. However, it can not be de￿nitively stated
that the attacker will be unable to achieve this or the constraint will not otherwise
be satis￿ed simply by chance. As a result, a number of elaborate and relatively
204unlikely attack scenarios were identi￿ed and included in the analysis. As these sce-
narios did not strictly violate any of the assumptions they could not be considered
impossible and were therefore ￿agged as Difficult. The value of this attribute
also defaulted to FALSE.
6.3.8 Pruning Analysis and Presentation of Results
Once the tree analysing a speci￿c property was completed and all leaf nodes assigned
appropriate values, the tree was then ‘pruned’ by removing all attack scenarios
modelled as being impossible according to the logic de￿ned by the structure of the
tree. This process is performed by the SecurITree software after specifying the
relevant criteria. The result is a pruned tree containing only those attacks that are
actually possible. While a great deal of additional information is available in the
tree, in this analysis the principal question concerns whether an attacker with a
su￿ciently high level of privilege is able to violate the stated security properties.
Therefore, any attacks remaining after pruning are of great interest.
Results of the attack tree analysis are presented in three parts. In Chapter 7,
a number of attacks identi￿ed while the attack trees were being constructed are
described in detail. The identi￿cation of these attacks through the attack tree
technique demonstrates the e￿ectiveness of the attack tree approach for locating
vulnerabilities in security models. Where these vulnerabilities were discovered, the
model was revised to eliminate the problem and the improved version subsequently
re-analysed by updating the attack tree. As a result, these vulnerabilities are not
present in the pruned trees. In Chapter 8, the remainder of the results from the
analysis are presented. For each tree, a high-level summary is given of the attacks
modelled in the tree and then the results of pruning are presented and any remaining
attacks discussed. Full details of the annotations of each node describing the attack
logic and reasons for leaf node indicator values are given in the accompanying CD.
Refer to Appendix 325 for further information.
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In the following chapters attack trees are presented diagrammatically, which is
generally superior to textual form in terms of intuitiveness when examining a tree.
A brief overview of a typical attack tree notation was given previously on page 184.
However, Figure 6.5 provides another example with some additional details speci￿c
to the diagrams presented from this analysis. The nodes in this tree are labelled
and include the root node, which is an OR node, as is usually the case. There are
two top-level nodes; one an OR node and the other an AND node. The top-level
OR node includes two child OR nodes, one of which has been ‘rolled up’. This is
a feature provided by the SecurITree software to hide the details of a subtree
in order to conserve page and screen space when another part of the tree is being
considered. In some of the diagrams presented here of complete unpruned trees,
some subtrees have been rolled up where the low-level details of the attack are not
central to the discussion and where it would not be feasible to present a complete
tree due to the number of nodes involved and space constraints imposed by the
printed page. In these cases, an indication of the complexity of the abstracted
subtree will be given in terms of the number of nodes. In some diagrams of pruned
trees, some subtrees are also rolled up in order to ￿t the diagram on a single printed
page. However, in these cases full details of the low-level attack will be given and
discussed as required.
The square notation for leaf nodes is also shown in the diagram. Leaf nodes have
attributes that are assigned values and are shown on the right-hand side adjacent to
the node. For example, the node ‘Default leaf node’ has the default values of FALSE
set for both the Impossible and Difficult attributes. In the case of ‘Impossible
leaf node’, the Impossible attribute is set to TRUE while Difficult remains
FALSE. The converse applies for ‘Di￿cult leaf node’ and a node is also presented
that is both Impossible and Difficult. Therefore, as is shown in the diagram, the
value of the Difficult attribute is stated on the top and the Impossible attribute
below this. Finally, SecurITree provides support for internal links within the tree.
206Figure 6.5: Attack tree notation
This feature allows a speci￿ed subtree to exist at multiple locations within a single
tree and changes to any of these instances are automatically inherited by the others.
Internal links are shown with a ￿chain￿ icon immediately above the node as can be
seen in the node ‘Linked leaf node’ that occurs twice within the example diagram.
Note that ‘Default leaf node’ also exists twice; however, these nodes are not linked
and any changes made to one do not automatically a￿ect the other.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the security analysis literature, focusing on threat-
oriented methodologies that may be suitable for both identifying vulnerabilities
in the newly developed model and answering the question as to whether a privi-
leged attacker may be able to violate the claimed security properties. The attack
tree technique was selected as being the most suitable for identifying whether the
model is capable of resisting attack by a privileged attacker and the details of the
speci￿c methodology developed for the analysis have been described. This method-
ology involved developing trees by decomposing a high-level attack into logically
complementary attack scenarios. Leaf nodes in these trees were then assigned val-
ues according to whether this stage in the attack could be accomplished under the
stated assumptions. From this, trees were pruned to remove impossible attacks,
207thereby revealing valid attacks on the studied security properties. In the next
chapter, a discussion is presented of vulnerabilities discovered in the Vaults model
while the attack trees were being constructed and Chapter 8 reports on the results
of the analysis.
208Chapter 7
Attacks Identi￿ed during Tree
Construction
7.1 Introduction
Attack trees reveal information about vulnerabilities in two di￿erent ways. The
results of the pruning analysis identify which of the enumerated potential attacks
are actually possible for a given set of criteria, and these results are presented in the
next chapter. However, the tree construction process itself also assists in elucidating
security problems through the methodical formulation and organisation of attack
scenarios and their properties. As hypothetical high-level attacks were identi￿ed,
and these attacks re￿ned and further details added, in some cases potentially feasible
vulnerabilities became apparent. As a result, a number of potentially problematic
issues in the design of the security model were identi￿ed prior to pruning, while the
trees were still being constructed. These issues are discussed in this chapter. The
issues discovered vary as to the danger they pose. The less serious are best described
as ambiguities in the model’s original speci￿cation, which could potentially lead to
undesirable behaviour in certain circumstances. Others were simply undesirable
properties in certain aspects of the design, which were not su￿cient in themselves
to lead to a violation of the security properties but nonetheless were best eliminated.
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were identi￿ed. All of these issues were subsequently recti￿ed by altering the design
of the model based upon the information revealed by the analysis. Therefore, these
attacks do not appear in the pruning trees given in the next chapter. However,
these now-eliminated vulnerabilities remain of interest as they demonstrate the
success of the attack tree methodology in identifying what were generally extremely
obscure (but nonetheless potentially dangerous) vulnerabilities resulting from subtle
combinations of factors. Details of these attacks will now be discussed.
7.2 Integrity Checking on Encrypted Parameters
When the Vaults model was ￿rst being developed, the need to protect encrypted
data against modi￿cation of the ciphertext was identi￿ed with respect to some of the
tokens involved where these were speci￿cally exposed to tampering by an attacker.
Examples of these values included secondary tickets and PSA values. However, as
the attack tree analysis proceeded, it was identi￿ed that the lack of authenticated
encryption of the various other tokens and parameters used throughout the model
created further possibilities for attackers to tamper with these pieces of ciphertext.
Although no speci￿c attacks were identi￿ed initially, it became apparent that there
was a need to clarify the security properties of all the various pieces of ciphertext
used in the model and to provide defence-in-depth to mitigate partial attacks that
might be discovered in other components of the scheme1.
Integrity checking of encrypted values can be achieved several ways, such as through
the use of a MAC applied in addition to the encryption [17]. However, while robust,
use of a MAC has the disadvantages of additional computational overhead and stor-
age of a separate key. A technically superior alternative is the use of a cipher mode
that provides both authentication and encryption, such as OCB mode proposed by
1As will be discussed in the following sections, as the analysis progressed it was subsequently
discovered that the use of authenticating encryption prevented at least one complete attack against
the con￿dentiality property under the model’s original design and also played a role in preventing
another related attack.
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overhead and does not require a separate key. At present, the principal limita-
tion of OCB mode appears to be its patent-encumbered status. However, this is
not relevant from the strictly technical perspective of the analysis. Furthermore,
alternative authentication and encryption modes exist, although these are not as
computationally e￿cient as OCB mode [265,266].
Therefore, regardless of whether a MAC or an authenticated encryption mode is
used, the same required security property is achieved. The only di￿erence with re-
spect to the analysis is precisely what an attacker must do in order to undetectably
modify an encrypted parameter in some way. In the case of a MAC, the attacker
must obtain or otherwise cryptanalytically compromise the key used for authenti-
cation, whereas in the case of an authenticated encryption mode, and for the modes
discussed, this will be the same as the decryption key. Therefore, for the purposes
of the analysis, it is assumed that defeating the integrity check requires learning
the decryption key, or some equivalent attack, and this is stated as Assumption
12 in Section 6.3.6. If a speci￿c implementation employs a MAC rather than an
authenticated encryption mode, this would make the attacker’s job more di￿cult
as an additional key would need to be recovered.
The following values within the Vaults model are therefore both authenticated and
encrypted:
￿ Primary tickets
￿ Secondary tickets
￿ Fundamental tickets
￿ User vaults
￿ All system vaults (GPUB, GPRIV, Escrow)
￿ Fundamental Vault
￿ PSA values
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normally be strictly necessary. However, the precise e￿ect of modi￿cation of unau-
thenticated PSA ciphertext on PSI generation depends on the block cipher mode
employed. Therefore, the use of an authenticated encryption mode ensures that
the security of the PSA scheme remains intact. The original motivation for not
employing authenticated encryption for PSA values was to minimise the perfor-
mance impact of these as they must be checked upon each access to every ￿le, even
if the ￿le is not protected. However, experimental results reported by Rogaway
et al. [197] indicate that OCB mode imposes an overhead of only 6.4% compared
with CBC encryption. Therefore it is held that the performance impact of us-
ing an authenticating encryption mode is signi￿cantly outweighed by the security
and defence-in-depth advantages. The use of authenticating encryption has there-
fore been assumed in the attack tree modelling and included as part of the Vaults
model speci￿cation.
7.3 Secondary Ticket Known Plaintext and Key Reuse
Properties
The attack tree analysis of the con￿dentiality property identi￿ed two properties of
the original design of secondary tickets that were undesirable and have subsequently
been corrected. Collectively these two properties represented an almost complete
attack. Originally, secondary tickets were constructed as:
T2
f := Kf(H(Kf; t1); t2; tE; VIDr); (7.1)
where a hash of the ￿le protection key Kf and protection timestamp t1 is encrypted,
using the protection key, along with the secondary ticket timestamp t2, expiry time
tE and recipient’s VID VIDr. The revised structure for a secondary ticket involves
the use of the unique ticket key KTr
f :
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f := H(VIDr; Kf; t1); (7.2)
which, as previously described in Section 4.3.3, is used to encrypt the secondary
ticket constructed for each user:
T2
f := KTr
f (t2;tE; H(VIDr; Kf; t1)): (7.3)
The ￿rst undesirable property found was that all of the individual plaintext com-
ponents of the original ticket design from Equation 7.1 are either known, selectable
or can otherwise potentially be learned by an attacker. This property therefore
allows an attacker to construct the plaintext, although not the required ciphertext,
of a secondary ticket they do not possess. Speci￿cally, while the KID of the ticket,
constructed as H(Kf; t1), is not a public value, it is also not regarded as a secret.
After applying the assumptions of the analysis, it was therefore identi￿ed that the
possibility that an attacker might learn the value of the KID could not be de￿ni-
tively excluded. Appropriate timestamp and VID values could also be chosen by
the attacker.
This known plaintext property by itself does not facilitate the attacker creating
their own secondary tickets. However, the attack tree analysis also identi￿ed that
the key Kf used to encrypt secondary ticket plaintext was also used for encrypting
the data written into the protected ￿le. If an attacker could inject their selected
secondary ticket plaintext into the ￿le protected with this key (for example, if they
had write permission to the ￿le), then this data would be transparently encrypted
by the kernel. The subsequent ciphertext could then be retrieved and would be
extremely close to representing a valid secondary ticket for read access 2. Despite
this, no means for actually exploiting this combination of undesirable properties
was identi￿ed. To actually use a secondary ticket constructed in this way, the
2It should be noted that this attack only applies to the con￿dentiality property. No equivalent
attack was found for the veri￿able integrity property as write protection keys are not used for
encrypting ￿le contents or any other user-modi￿able parameter.
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with the key in GPRIV and also generate the required authentication information
for the constructed ticket ciphertext. No attacks for accomplishing either of these
objectives were found. Nonetheless both of these properties are clearly undesirable
and the structure of secondary tickets was consequently modi￿ed to make the design
more robust.
The ￿rst change involved removing the KID value from the ticket. While the KID
may be di￿cult for an attacker to learn, the model also does not treat it as a secret
and its use for associating protection keys with speci￿c ￿les increases its risk of being
exposed. This problem was resolved by replacing the KID with a hash of the ticket
recipient’s VID prepended to the KID pre-image as shown in Equation 7.3. Unlike
the KID, this new value is not used for any other purpose and the attacker would
need to learn the ￿le protection key in order to calculate the value. Furthermore,
placing the VID at the start of the pre-image prevents an attacker potentially using
the length extension properties of common iterative hash functions [17] to extend
the known KID value. The order of the parameters that make up the secondary
ticket was also changed with the two timestamps (secondary ticket creation time
and expiry time) repositioned to before the hash value. While the model requires
that ciphertext be authenticated, even without this requirement, changes to the
ciphertext for the timestamps will likely lead to errors propagating through to the
second ciphertext block and corrupting the hash value when encrypted with most
common block cipher modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. This
placement improves the robustness of the ticket without incurring additional cost.
The ￿nal improvement was to change the key used to encrypt the secondary ticket
from the ￿le protection key Kf to a unique key speci￿c to the ticket. This is referred
to as the ticket key KTr
f (Equation 7.2) and is constructed in the same way as the
hash value contained within the ticket itself. This design means that the value
does not need to be recalculated when conducting ticket veri￿cation. Encrypting
the secondary ticket with a value derived from the recipient’s VID makes the ticket
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eliminates the property where ￿les and secondary tickets were previously encrypted
with the same key and therefore resolves the weaknesses described above. It also
has the added advantage of more tightly binding a ticket to its intended recipient.
Further partitioning the privileges assigned to each user increases the di￿culty
of attacks involving substitution of ciphertext acquired from tickets belonging to
di￿erent users.
7.4 Improvements to Primary and Fundamental Ticket
Structure
The attack tree modelling also identi￿ed an issue equivalent to that just described
a￿ecting primary tickets. The original structure of a primary ticket involved the
protection key Kf, owner’s VID VIDo and timestamp t1, all encrypted with the
protection key Kf:
T1
f := Kf(Kf; VIDo; t1): (7.4)
However, the analysis showed that if an attacker could steal a primary ticket issued
to another user, they could learn from this the ciphertext corresponding to the
encrypted protection key and timestamp. If the attacker could then subsequently
write their VID into a read-protected ￿le encrypted with the same key, it would give
them the ciphertext for a complete primary ticket issued to themselves. As with
the attacks on secondary tickets, this synthesised primary ticket would be valid but
not usable by the attacker. However, in the case of primary tickets it was only the
mandated use of authenticated encryption discussed in Section 7.2 that would have
prevented an attacker from using tickets created this way3. Therefore, in light of
the improvements made to secondary tickets to deal with a similar problem, the
design of primary tickets was also revised to achieve equivalent robustness. The
3In practice, the choice of cipher mode could also a￿ect the success of this attack methodology.
215new design involved replacing the VID and protection timestamp in the primary
ticket with the ticket key hash used in the improved secondary ticket design. This
new design, previously described in Section 4.3.2, eliminates the known plaintext
property:
T1
f := Kf(Kf; H(VIDo; Kf; t1)): (7.5)
The plaintext structure of fundamental tickets was similarly modi￿ed from the
Fundamental Key and prime user’s VID to the hash of these two values. The
original design involved encrypting the prime user’s VID VIDp and Fundamental
Key KF
V with that key:
TF
V := KF
V (KF
V ; VIDP); (7.6)
while the revised structure hashes this plaintext prior to encryption:
TF
V := KF
V (H(KF
V ; VIDP)): (7.7)
However, this change was done solely to give fundamental tickets the same conser-
vative design as the other types of tickets and not because of any speci￿c exploitable
attack. In fact, the attack tree analysis indicated that the partial attacks a￿ect-
ing primary and secondary tickets could not be applied in the case of fundamental
tickets due primarily to the di￿erent exposure of the internal parameters used.
7.5 Discussion of Improved Ticket Design
After the discovery of the partial weaknesses and the development of improved ticket
designs as discussed in the previous sections, the relevant attack trees were revised
to re￿ect the new structures. The results of this revision con￿rmed the bene￿ts
of the improved designs. For example, revisions to the subtree covering theft of
216a secondary ticket indicated that the new secondary ticket structure resulted in
stolen secondary tickets being essentially useless to the attacker. This result was
demonstrated by the subtrees describing modi￿cation of the stolen tickets to refer
to the attacker’s VID being identical to those for creating a secondary ticket from
scratch. In other words, the improved design means that a stolen secondary ticket
does not assist the attacker in any way.
Similarly the new design for primary tickets resulted in attacks involving modi￿ca-
tion of a primary ticket to access a di￿erent object being signi￿cantly inhibited. If
the attacker opted to alter only a single part of the primary ticket ciphertext then,
even ignoring the impact of ciphertext authentication, this modi￿cation would still
automatically invalidate the ticket as the two parts of the ticket would no longer
correspond when veri￿cation was subsequently performed. Alternatively, if the at-
tacker attempted to modify all parts of the ticket then, once again, this attack
became equivalent to creating an entire ticket from scratch.
Furthermore, under the new design, primary and secondary tickets are now en-
crypted with di￿erent keys and this applies even if the tickets refer to the same
object. This design therefore inhibits potential attacks that attempt to convert
a secondary ticket into a primary. In fact, the attack tree model again indicated
the possession of a secondary ticket was of no assistance in the construction of a
primary ticket for the same object, again forcing the attacker to begin their task
from scratch.
7.6 Protection Instantiation Race Condition
During the course of the attack tree analysis, it was identi￿ed that it might be
possible for an attacker to instantiate protection of an object while the process of
protection instantiation by the legitimate owner was already in progress. If the
attacker were able to make this request prior to the protection status information
being updated, the request would succeed. While clearly an undesirable outcome,
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attacker were able to successfully mount such a race condition attack and receive
a ticket for the object, this ticket would not allow them to, for example, read the
contents of the ￿le encrypted by the legitimate owner as this would involve the
use of a di￿erent protection key. However, despite this conclusion, the protection
instantiation protocol was modi￿ed to require the kernel to lock out any changes
to the speci￿c object’s protection status prior to protection instantiation being
completed. This approach eliminates any such race conditions.
7.7 VID Assignment Vulnerability
In protocols involving public key cryptography, certi￿cates are typically used to
link the identity of a principal to a speci￿c public key. As the public and private
keys are intrinsically cryptographically linked, if knowledge of the private key is
demonstrated through the running of the protocol, this also constitutes proof of
identity. However, the original Vaults protocols for verifying a user’s identity were
not completely consistent with the above approach. While the certi￿cate associates
an identity with a given public key and a cryptographic link exists between the
public key, private key and VID, in certain cases the protocols did not always
require the user to demonstrate knowledge of the private key. While the private
key is required in order to decrypt and receive secondary tickets issued by other
users, the initial protocol for assigning a VID to a process was based purely upon
the user supplying the necessary passphrase to decrypt the vault associated with
this VID. Also, the original speci￿cation of vault structure meant that there was
not necessarily a cryptographically strong association between a VID and a given
vault stored on disk. These issues and their implications were identi￿ed during the
attack tree analysis.
The absence of a strong link between a VID and the user’s vault created the po-
tential for an attacker to tamper with this association. For example, assigning the
attacker’s VID to another user’s vault provides one means for performing an online
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attacker could attempt to associate the user’s VID with their own vault for which
they already know the passphrase. If successful, this false association would allow
the attacker to assume that user’s VID and subsequently use tickets stolen from
them. Such an attack would be particularly serious and was made possible by the
assignment of a VID to a process when instantiating a new vault session being
based purely on knowledge of the vault key (passphrase) and not on the private
key associated with the VID. In other words, the original protocols only veri￿ed
knowledge of the passphrase and did not con￿rm that the private key corresponding
to the VID was actually present in the vault being accessed.
In light of these results from the attack tree modelling, the protocols for vault in-
stantiation were modi￿ed. The new protocols verify that the public key on the
certi￿cate matches the VID and that the private key stored in the vault being
accessed also corresponds to this public key. The use of authenticated encryp-
tion also prevents ciphertext tampering; for example, substitution of the ciphertext
corresponding to another user’s private key. However, without knowledge of the
appropriate vault decryption key, the attacker still cannot recover another user’s
private key and is ultimately prevented from assuming that user’s VID.
7.8 Secondary Ticket Revocation Semantics
It was identi￿ed prior to beginning the attack tree analysis that the semantics for
secondary ticket revocation were somewhat anomalous. This issue stemmed from
secondary tickets not being uniquely identi￿able and, as a result, revocation was
previously performed by removing the recipient’s VID from a list stored in GPRIV.
While separate lists were maintained for each protection key, this arrangement
meant that, for a given object, it was the user’s ability to use the ticket rather
than the ticket itself that was actually revoked. The e￿ect of these semantics in
practice was that, if the user had a secondary ticket that was revoked and a sub-
sequent ticket issued for the same object, the original ticket would become usable
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analysis whether this property could lead to any undesirable security outcomes, as
possession of two separate tickets for the same object did not appear to provide
any advantage. However, while constructing the attack tree for analysing the con-
￿dentiality property, it was identi￿ed that these semantics could be problematic.
Speci￿cally, if a user were reissued a second ticket for an object after their original
ticket had been revoked, the original ticket would not only become usable again but
also might allow them to retain access to the object beyond the time intended if the
￿rst ticket had a later expiry timestamp than the second. In such circumstances,
the owner of the object could not reasonably be expected to remember to revoke
the original ticket a second time.
This problem was resolved by creating a unique identi￿er for secondary tickets
known as the Ticket ID (TID). The TID is constructed as a hash of the KID, the
recipient’s VID and the creation timestamp of the secondary ticket:
TIDr
f := H(KIDf; VIDr; t2): (7.8)
Prior to permitting use of a secondary ticket, the kernel calculates its TID and
con￿rms that this value is present in a list of valid TIDs stored in GPRIV. Since
reissuing a secondary ticket at a later point in time results in a di￿erent TID,
any revoked secondary tickets previously issued to the user for the object remain
unusable. Furthermore, this approach signi￿cantly increases the di￿culty of certain
potential attacks on secondary tickets. For example, modi￿cation of secondary
ticket ciphertext now requires that the attacker not simply produce timestamps
that fall within the correct ranges, but also be the exact value of the secondary
ticket creation timestamp used in the construction of the original valid TID. This
new design therefore both resolves the original problem and further increases the
robustness of the security model.
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A number of attacks were also discovered when analysing the Trusted Fingerprint-
ing mechanism within the Vaults security model. When the analysis began, the
model included a ￿ngerprint ￿ag called Priority Override that could be set on
dependency records in either the user’s vault or GPUB. The default behaviour, if
the ￿ngerprint values for the same target are di￿erent, is for veri￿cation to auto-
matically fail and execution be denied. Previously, however, setting the Priority
Override ￿ag on only one of these records caused the con￿ict to be ignored and
the ￿ngerprint on the ￿agged record to be used for veri￿cation. The ￿ag existed to
address situations where a program or dependency with both local and global ￿n-
gerprint records had been modi￿ed but the ￿ngerprint value had not been updated
in both vaults.
However, the attack tree analysis identi￿ed that the existence of the ￿ag could
allow an attacker to negate the defence-in-depth bene￿ts that the two-tier trust
architecture is intended to provide. Speci￿cally, if an attacker were able to modify
a ￿ngerprint in one vault but not the other, they could likely also set the Priority
Override ￿ag on the modi￿ed ￿ngerprint record. The setting of this ￿ag would
leave the attacker free to substitute malicious code for the trusted program, as the
presence of the ￿ag on the corrupted ￿ngerprint record would cause the legitimate
value to be ignored.
This attack was identi￿ed when considering attacks concerning execution of trusted
programs and the problem was subsequently corrected. However, when later analysing
attacks on veri￿cation of shared libraries, it was realised that this vulnerability
would have been particularly dangerous with respect to these, as libraries are not
assigned a trust level and e￿ectively assume the trust level of the program with
which they are linked at runtime. If the Priority Override ￿ag were set on
a maliciously modi￿ed library, this would have the potential of subverting all pro-
grams linked with the library concerned across all of their speci￿ed trust levels. The
success of the attack trees in detecting this vulnerability also highlights the value of
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expected. It is only by adopting the point of view of an attacker that the potential
to subvert this seemingly innocuous behaviour becomes apparent. It should also be
noted that, for this e￿ect to apply, the attacker would need to be able to modify the
￿ngerprint record in the ￿rst place, and no valid attacks were found that allowed
this. Nonetheless, this potential behaviour is clearly undesirable.
After the detection of this vulnerability, the potential bene￿ts of the Priority
Override ￿ag were further scrutinised and determined to be minimal. For ex-
ample, if an administrator were to upgrade software on the system, they would
also update the ￿ngerprint at this time. While this modi￿cation might temporarily
lead to users who have created their own ￿ngerprints ￿nding execution of the soft-
ware being denied, this outcome is arguably the correct behaviour as the user has
speci￿cally indicated that they wish to make sure that the program has not been
modi￿ed prior to their executing it. On the other hand, if the user has installed a
piece of software for their exclusive use, it is unlikely this target will have a global
￿ngerprint record. As a result, and considering the potential vulnerability that it
creates, the Priority Override ￿ag was removed from the model.
7.10 Caching of Mutually Trusted Veri￿ed Shared Li-
braries
A potential vulnerability was discovered during the attack tree analysis concerning
the caching of previously veri￿ed shared libraries that are dependencies of multiple
programs. In particular, it was determined that using a ￿le name to match cached
libraries in the runtime digraph was potentially insecure. To exploit this vulnera-
bility, the attacker would create a malicious version of an existing legitimate library
with the same name and then link this library with a separate program that they
also constructed. The program itself need not do anything malicious but, by cre-
ating ￿ngerprint records for both the library and program and then executing the
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of veri￿ed objects. If a trusted program linked with the legitimate version of the
library were subsequently executed, this vulnerable behaviour could have led to this
code being linked with the cached and veri￿ed malicious library. To resolve this
problem, the speci￿cation of the model was clari￿ed to ensure that both fully quali-
￿ed pathnames and ￿ngerprint values of cached objects match those in the runtime
digraph. In particular, if the ￿ngerprint values match then, barring cryptographic
failure, the two objects must be the same and any vulnerability is thereby avoided.
7.11 Runtime Digraphs of the Non-Natively Executable
Code
A runtime digraph (RTD) is constructed for a program when its execution begins
and is used to identify dependencies that require veri￿cation at runtime. In par-
ticular, a program’s RTD speci￿es which Data File dependencies will be veri￿ed
when opened for reading and may potentially have their ￿ngerprints automatically
updated when opened for writing. In the case of non-natively executed code, the
root of the RTD will be the natively executable interpreter or runtime environ-
ment and the non-native code will then be speci￿ed as a Data File dependency.
These in turn may have their own Program (helper applications) and Data File
dependencies.
In the original speci￿cation for processing of these runtime digraphs, when searching
the RTD prior to opening a ￿le for reading, the search would be performed recur-
sively and all dependencies in the digraph would be searched until one matching the
target was found. However, the attack tree analysis revealed a serious problem with
this approach. In particular, it was identi￿ed that the RTD for natively executable
interpreter programs will contain all of the non-natively executable programs as
Data File dependencies. Therefore when one of these non-native programs is
executing, all of the other non-native programs that share the same interpreter
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will exist in the runtime digraph. This situation is illustrated in Figure 7.1 where
programs P1 and P2 share the same interpreter.
This approach had a number of negative consequences of varying degrees of serious-
ness that were uncovered while constructing the attack trees. For example, there is
potential ine￿ciency as unnecessary veri￿cation of objects may occur when a script
such as P1 is currently executing and opens ￿le f3 which, as a dependency of P2,
requires that the ￿ngerprint of f3 be veri￿ed even though f3 is not a dependency
of P1. The dependency ￿ags may also have a negative e￿ect and, in particular, the
Required ￿ag could potentially cause P1 to be terminated if f3 were not available
to it at runtime. This behaviour is undesirable as the policy is intended to apply to
P2 rather than P1. However, there is an even more serious problem whereby, if P1
were to open f3 for writing, this situation would normally result in these modi￿ca-
tions automatically updating the ￿ngerprint value for f3 even though this ￿les is
not a dependency of P1. This behaviour is particularly problematic if, for example,
P1 happens to execute at a lower trust level than P2 as indicated in the diagram.
These problems were resolved by clarifying the roles played by the di￿erent nodes
in the RTD. The model now distinguishes between the executing process (EP),
which is the native code running, and the active node (AN), which is the actual
program that is notionally being executed. In the case of native code, the AN and
EP will be the same. However, if a non-natively executable program is running, the
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its interpreter or runtime environment. Under the modi￿ed version of the model,
all ￿les in the runtime digraph will still be veri￿ed if opened for reading. However,
automatic updating of ￿ngerprints has been signi￿cantly restricted. Updates are
now normally only performed if the No Auto Update is not set and the depen-
dency is both an immediate Data File child of the active node and does not have
a trust level speci￿ed in its ￿ngerprint record. This restriction is relaxed slightly if
the Installer ￿ag is set on the active node and, in this case, automatic updating
applies to all descendants of the active node, again subject to the No Auto Up-
date ￿ag not being set. This design was subsequently modelled in the attack trees
with no vulnerabilities being discovered.
7.12 Trust Level Changes and Open Objects
Another issue identi￿ed through the attack tree analysis concerns the e￿ects of
changing trust levels at runtime and the implications of trust level changes for
objects that are already open. Vaults previously employed the Unix paradigm
of determining whether a subject has su￿cient privileges to access an object at
the time of the request and, if the privileges of the subject subsequently change,
this change will not a￿ect access to objects that are already open. However, this
approach created problems where the trust level of a process is lowered at runtime.
This change in trust level can occur because the process voluntarily requests it,
if the process accesses a dependency object with an STL lower than its ETL or
if the process accesses a non-dependency object and has the Require Trusted
Data ￿ag set. This con￿ict between the new trust level of the process and its latent
privileges represents a particular threat if the program is a script interpreter and the
reason for its trust level being lowered is that it has been given an untrusted script
to execute. While this problem could be dealt in a number of ways, it was decided
that the safest and cleanest approach from the point of view of compatibility was
for the system to automatically close all open ￿les that would not be accessible
225if parent.ETL >= L2 AND
child.STL == L3
child.ETL = L3
else
if parent.ETL < child.STL
child.ETL = parent.ETL
else
child.ETL = child.STL
Original Algorithm
if parent.ETL == L1 AND
parent.fpr != child.fpr
child.ETL = L0
else
if parent.ETL >= L2 AND
child.STL == L3
child.ETL = L3
else
if parent.ETL < child.STL
child.ETL = parent.ETL
else
child.ETL = child.STL
Revised Algorithm
Figure 7.2: Original and revised trust level elevation restriction algorithms
to the program at its new trust level prior to allowing execution of the process to
proceed at the new trust level. The model has now been updated to re￿ect this
new approach.
7.13 Process Trust Elevation Restrictions and L1 Pro-
cesses
As discussed in Section 5.6.2, it is necessary for the model to prevent malicious pro-
grams from manipulating more trusted children in order to elevate their privileges.
When this aspect of the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism was analysed using the
attack trees, it was identi￿ed that, in certain circumstances, the original algorithm
for restricting process trust had ￿aws.
The original algorithm, given in Figure 7.2, would restrict the child process to the
lower of its speci￿ed trust level (STL) and its parents e￿ective trust level (ETL),
except in the case of highly trusted L3 processes. However, while constructing the
attack tree to analyse this behaviour, it became clear that this algorithm did not
adequately con￿ne L1 processes. An L1 program is granted limited indirect access to
designated protected objects only. The attack tree analysis showed that, unlike the
226other trust levels, two di￿erent L1 programs would therefore usually have di￿erent
sets of privileges. Consequently, it is not secure for an L1 program to be executed
by a di￿erent L1 parent as the parent may be able to manipulate the child in order
to indirectly gain privileges it is not intended to have. Similarly, if an L1 program
executes a more trusted program with an STL of L2 or L3 then, under the original
algorithm, the trust level of the new process would be con￿ned to L1. However, if
the nominally more privileged program had previously been con￿gured to run at
trust level L1, a variation of the previous scenario applies as the program may have
a latent set of protection key bindings for objects to which it had previously been
granted access. Such bindings would normally have no impact when executing at
the higher trust level but, if con￿ned to trust level L1 after being executed by an
L1 parent, this situation would once again create a privilege di￿erential between
parent and child.
This vulnerability was resolved by modifying the algorithm to con￿ne the children
of L1 processes to L0 unless the ￿ngerprints of the parent and child are the same.
In this case, as the parent and child have been cryptographically veri￿ed to be the
same program, execution at L1 is permitted. Figure 7.2 contains both the original
and revised versions of the algorithm for comparison. Refer to Table 5.3 on page
168 for information about the speci￿c identi￿ers used in the algorithm.
7.14 Summary
This chapter has summarised those weaknesses found in the Vaults model while
the attack trees were being constructed and also discussed details of how the model
was strengthened to eliminate these problems. These results demonstrate the value
of the attack tree methodology for identifying undiscovered ￿aws, as the problems
found were typically obscure and often relied upon subtle interactions between var-
ious elements of the model’s design. The threat-oriented nature of the analysis
helped to uncover these properties where otherwise they were likely to have re-
mained undiscovered. In particular, considering the system from the perspective
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behaviour could be leveraged to potentially violate the intended security proper-
ties. The attack tree analysis also indicated how the design of the model could
be adapted to eliminate or mitigate the weaknesses discovered. However, merely
discovering these problems does not provide substantive evidence that the re￿ned
model was now secure. Therefore, the revised speci￿cation was then re-analysed
to validate the success of these changes and veri￿ed that new problems had not
been introduced. As the weaknesses that were discovered have since been resolved,
they do not appear in the ￿nal pruned trees. Details of the pruned trees, as well as
summaries of the complete unpruned trees, are given in the next chapter.
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Attack Tree Results
8.1 Introduction
To analyse the Vaults security model, three attack trees were constructed. These
complete trees contained a large number of hypothetical attacks devised by consider-
ing only the design of the model and not the assumptions and constraints described
in Section 6.3.6. Boolean values were then assigned to the Difficult and Impos-
sible attributes of these nodes according to the assumptions of the analysis. After
this process was complete, pruning criteria were applied to the trees. Pruning re-
sulted in removal of all of the hypothetical attack scenarios except those identi￿ed
as valid according to the logic modelled by the structure of the tree, the value of
the node attributes and the speci￿ed criteria.
This chapter provides a summary of each of the unpruned trees, giving an overview
of the hypothetical attacks considered. Due to the extremely large size of these
complete trees, it is not practical to describe details of the low-level attacks. Instead,
copies of the complete trees and node descriptions are available on the provided CD-
ROM (refer to Appendix C for details). However, detailed descriptions are given
here of the pruned trees and the results, in terms of the attacks that both were
eliminated and remained after pruning, are also analysed and discussed extensively.
These results showed that, when considered in total, for the two principal security
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This result supports the claim that the Vaults model is able to maintain the proper-
ties of con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity, even when faced with an attacker who
has gained e￿ective superuser privileges on the system. The Trusted Fingerprinting
mechanism also proved highly resilient under these assumptions, although a small
number of minor and severely constrained attacks were identi￿ed. Details of these
are discussed in Section 8.4.4.
8.2 The Con￿dentiality Property Attack Tree
8.2.1 Overview
An attack tree was constructed to analyse whether an attacker could defeat the
con￿dentiality property of the Vaults security model as de￿ned in Section 6.3.2. The
￿nal complete tree consisted of a total of 160,509 nodes representing the unpruned,
hypothetical attacks. The total number of attack scenarios in the unpruned tree
could not be calculated by the SecurITree software as this number apparently
exceeded the maximum positive integer able to be stored in the data type used.
Assuming the data type to be a 32-bit value and, given the ￿gure reported by the
program of -899,728,224, this suggests the number of attack scenarios considered to
be at least 2.2 billion. However, given the number of attack scenarios reported by
far smaller trees, the actual ￿gure is likely to be in the tens of billions 1. Due to this
limitation in the software, the number of reported attack scenarios for large subtrees
must be treated with caution and will not be stated in the following discussions
unless of speci￿c interest. A screen capture showing the attack tree properties
reported by the SecurITree software is given in Figure 8.1.
This complete tree then had pruning criteria applied to it to identify which of
these hypothetical attacks were valid when considering node attribute values and
tree logic. The results showed that the con￿dentiality property could be violated
1For example, one tree, which contained a subset of 7752 of these nodes, was reported to have
just over 2 billion attack scenarios.
230Figure 8.1: Properties of the ￿Defeat con￿dentiality property￿ attack tree
only if the attacker were also able to defeat the veri￿able integrity property and
adequate care was not taken to avoid race conditions surrounding manual updating
of trusted program ￿ngerprints. These attacks, and the issues associated with them,
are discussed at length in Sections 8.2.4 and 8.2.5.
8.2.2 Summary of Unpruned Con￿dentiality Attack Scenarios
Access plaintext contents without ticket
This section provides an overview of the hypothetical attack scenarios 2 contained in
the con￿dentiality attack tree, with the next section summarising the results of ap-
plying pruning criteria to this complete tree. Potential attacks on the con￿dentiality
property were divided into two categories according to the logically complementary
attack scenarios technique described in Section 6.3.3. The categories were those
where the attacker utilises a usable and valid ticket to access the contents of a
protected ￿le and those where access to plaintext was gained without such a ticket.
Figure 8.2 gives a top-level view of the con￿dentiality property attack tree with an
expanded leftmost branch showing the category of attacks that do not involve the
attacker acquiring a ticket.
As shown in the diagram, for these attacks, four di￿erent high-level scenarios were
identi￿ed and evaluated. First, the attacker might acquire the ciphertext and then
2Note that in the discussions of attack scenarios in this and the following sections, the hypo-
thetical attacks are often described as if they are, in fact, possible. However, it is important to
bear in mind that the validity of a given attack scenario is dependent upon it remaining in the
tree after pruning criteria have been applied.
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expanded left-most branch
232obtain the protection key with which to decrypt it. Details of these attacks are
abstracted in the diagram and are contained in attack tree library (M), which
includes 16 nodes and 9 attack scenarios. Since the analysis assumes that the
attacker has the ability to bypass the kernel and access data directly on the disk,
the majority of the complexity involved in this attack is in obtaining the protection
key. Second, by compromising the integrity of the kernel code, the attacker may
cause the protection key or plaintext to be revealed directly. Third, scenarios
were explored where the attacker sought to access the plaintext after it had been
decrypted by the kernel for some legitimate purpose. The complete subtree for this
category of attacks is given in the diagram. Finally, hypothetical attack scenarios
were analysed where the attacker was able to trick the kernel into believing that a
protected object is not protected. In this event, data subsequently written to the
￿le by an authorised user would not be encrypted and the con￿dentiality of the data
thereby compromised. The critical element of this attack is changing the protection
status of the ￿le and this is analysed in attack tree library (I), which contains 3,375
nodes and 6,768,882 attack scenarios.
Obtain usable valid ticket
If the attacker cannot otherwise obtain the plaintext, they would need a usable
and valid ticket in order to gain access to the read-protected object. The subtree
modelling attacks that fall into this category is given in Figure 8.3, expanded from
the right-hand top-level branch in Figure 8.2. Note that the analysis distinguishes
between a valid ticket, which is correctly formed and can be processed by the
kernel, and a ticket that is actually usable and will result in access being granted.
For example, a ticket issued to another user or one that has been issued to the
attacker legitimately, but has since been revoked or expired, is valid but not usable.
Therefore, while the tree extensively considers scenarios involving theft of a ticket
held by an authorised user, in many cases these also include subtrees relating to the
attacker satisfying the requirements for the use of such a ticket that has not been
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In Figure 8.3, the leftmost branches are partially expanded and show hypothetical
attacks where the ticket is created from scratch. A total of 47,372 nodes exist in
this subtree. This may involve the attacker creating either a primary ticket or a sec-
ondary ticket3. As shown in the diagram, in both cases these tickets potentially may
be constructed in one of two ways. For example, the attacker may build the ticket
by obtaining its plaintext components and then encrypting it with the appropriate
key. Alternatively, they may attempt to obtain from di￿erent sources the various
pieces of ciphertext that make up the ticket and then concatenate them without
learning the encryption key. Note that, although these two general approaches ap-
ply in both cases, the speci￿cs of the attacks involved are quite di￿erent depending
on whether a primary or secondary ticket is sought due to the di￿erent structures
of both ticket classes.
Alternatively, if the attacker cannot create the required ticket from scratch, they
must use an existing valid ticket as shown in Figure 8.4, where the leftmost branch
covering scenarios where the ticket is issued to the attacker has been expanded.
The ￿rst set of hypothetical scenarios analysed are those where the attacker is able
to utilise a ticket previously issued after the attacker’s certi￿cate, and therefore
their vault ID (VID) has been revoked. If the user’s VID is revoked, then all tickets
associated with it should become unusable; continuing to be able to use these is a
technical violation of the security property. A total of 14,500 nodes are contained
in this rolled up subtree.
The next branch analyses where a ticket has been issued to an attacker but was
actually intended for another user. This covers a number of scenarios but focuses
on the attacker attempting to obtain a usable primary ticket for an object that is
already protected. It also covers possible means for tricking the owner of a protected
object into issuing a secondary ticket for the attacker’s identity rather than that of
3Since possession of a primary ticket confers greater privileges, this is likely to be preferred
by the attacker if achievable. However, possession of a valid and usable ticket of either class is
su￿cient to violate the con￿dentiality property.
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235Figure 8.4: Subtree of the ￿Defeat con￿dentiality property￿ attack tree showing
attacks where the attacker uses an existing valid ticket
236some legitimate user. This subtree includes 6,693 nodes.
The third branch of the subtree contains 20,004 nodes and examines the various
ways an attacker may attempt to modify an existing ticket to violate the con￿den-
tiality property. Scenarios modelled include how the attacker might modify their
own primary ticket to make this refer to a di￿erent object that they do not own,
modifying a secondary ticket to facilitate access to a di￿erent object, and converting
a secondary ticket into a primary. Note that this branch does not consider attacks
associated with modi￿cation of stolen tickets as these are addressed in a di￿erent
subtree (see Figure 8.5).
Attacks that involve reviving expired and revoked secondary tickets are also anal-
ysed in Figure 8.4. Reviving an expired secondary ticket requires modifying the
expiry timestamp stored encrypted within this token and 6,691 nodes are contained
in this subtree. Alternatively, revoked tickets may be used again if the required
ticket ID (TID) can be added to the list associated with the protection key in
GPRIV or if the VID and timestamp of the ticket can be modi￿ed to match an
existing valid TID. This branch consists of 24,118 nodes. Note that in all scenar-
ios involving both expired and revoked secondary tickets, it is assumed that the
attacker already has such a ticket and the ticket has been issued to them.
Finally, Figure 8.5 shows the expanded right-most branch of Figure 8.4 and covers
potential scenarios where the ticket used by the attacker was not issued to them.
Here a distinction is drawn between scenarios where the attacker utilises another
user’s ticket to access the protected data without actually taking possession of this
ticket, and those scenarios where the attacker takes possession of the ticket by
importing it into their vault. In the former case, the attacker may gain use of the
ticket through the use of malcode and three subtrees have been developed, one for
each of the relevant trust levels (L3, L2 and L1). These subtrees consist of 3,265,
2,179 and 2,199 nodes, respectively. Alternatively, the attacker may attempt to gain
control over the victim user’s vault and the question here is whether the attacker
can learn that user’s vault key and thereby e￿ectively assume their identity. This
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attacks where the attacker uses a ticket not issued to them
238is evaluated in attack tree library (N) which consists of 11 nodes.
The right-hand branch shown in Figure 8.5 examines how the attacker may take
possession of a ticket to facilitate access to the target object. One means for achiev-
ing this is by stealing the ticket from an authorised user and subtrees are included
considering scenarios for both primary and secondary tickets (10,820 and 17,397
nodes, respectively). However, acquiring the ticket is not enough and these sub-
trees also include scenarios considering how the attacker can actually use the ticket
by ensuring that the VID of their process matches that speci￿ed by the ticket. This
can be achieved either by changing the VID speci￿ed in the ticket or changing the
VID of the process. Alternatively, tickets may be acquired by the attacker through
the escrow mechanism. This can be achieved by gaining possession of the funda-
mental ticket for the Escrow Vault, which is normally used by the prime user to
obtain a secondary ticket to allow access to a protected object or by attempting to
directly recover the primary tickets stored in the Escrow Vault. Attacks relating to
this scenario are contained in a library (T), which consists of 1,809 nodes.
8.2.3 Overview of Pruning Results
Pruning was applied to the complete tree just described to remove impossible sce-
narios according to the assumptions described in Section 6.3.6. After removing all
nodes evaluated as Impossible, the ￿nal pruned tree had 1,057 nodes with 110
di￿erent attack scenarios with 99.54% of nodes being eliminated. For the mini-
mum possible number of attack scenarios in the original tree, this means at least
99.99999% were eliminated. No means were identi￿ed enabling attackers to cre-
ate their own tickets or modify existing tickets for unintended purposes. Expired
and revoked secondary tickets also remain unusable by an attacker and no means
for taking possession of another user’s vault was identi￿ed. Finally, the remaining
pruned tree also evaluated as Difficult, indicating that the ability of an attacker
to successfully complete the attacks it described is constrained in some way beyond
the attacker’s control as described in Section 6.3.7. In particular, it was found
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that facilitated the attacker’s subversion of designated trusted code. Even more
signi￿cantly, the attack tree modelling demonstrated that attacks on the con￿den-
tiality property are dependent upon successfully violating the veri￿able integrity
property. While the initial attack tree model for the con￿dentiality property, as
described here, assumed that this could be achieved, the results of the attack tree
analysis of the veri￿able integrity property indicate that it cannot. Consequently,
the 110 attack scenarios that remained after pruning are only valid if these con-
straints are ignored. Further details of this are discussed in Sections 8.2.6 and
8.3.3.
Nonetheless, the non-empty pruned tree is an interesting result and is indicative of
potential weaknesses in the con￿dentiality property. The ability of the attack tree
methodology to model the preconditions and structure of attacks therefore allows
for the nature of the attacks identi￿ed to be further explored and this proved to be
informative.
The pruned tree (Figure 8.6) showed that, within the constraints indicated previ-
ously, the con￿dentiality property may be violated by an attacker without obtaining
a ticket by removing the read protection designation from a ￿le resulting in subse-
quent legitimate writes to this ￿le not being encrypted (6 scenarios). Alternatively,
the attacker could violate the property by: using a valid ticket after their certi￿cate
had been revoked (4 scenarios); tricking a user into issuing them with a ticket us-
ing a false certi￿cate (6 scenarios); using malicious code to indirectly obtain access
to encrypted data (54 scenarios); using a stolen primary or secondary ticket (36
scenarios); and obtaining a ticket via the escrow mechanism (4 scenarios). The
underlying causes of these theoretical attacks will now be discussed.
8.2.4 The Manual Update Race Condition Attack
An advantage of the attack tree methodology is that its hierarchical nature facil-
itates exploration of the prerequisites of a given attack and the reasons why the
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241attack occurs. Drilling down into the pruned attack tree showed that the same sub-
tree occurred in all of the remaining attack scenarios. In particular, two speci￿c leaf
nodes were identi￿ed as preconditions for all of the 110 attack scenarios. Examining
the tree structure indicated that removal of either one of these leaf nodes resulted
in the entire tree becoming Impossible. This was tested experimentally by setting
the values of each of these nodes in turn to Impossible and then recalculating the
pruned tree. In both cases an empty tree resulted, indicating no valid attacks.
The cause of these attacks is the ability of malicious code to execute with an elevated
trust level of either L2 or L3. Subtrees representing this type of attack exist in all
branches of the pruned tree. Twenty of these subtrees involve malicious code being
able to execute at L3 and the relevant subtree is shown in Figure 8.7. Only in two
cases did malicious code executing at L2 lead to a successful attack and Figure 8.8
gives the subtree that applies in this case. Note that two instances of the subtree
from Figure 8.7 were removed from Figure 8.8 for purposes of clarity. Also note
that the two subtrees are extremely similar, with the only non-super￿cial di￿erence
being that, in the case of L2 programs, the modi￿cation of the hash value can
occur in either the user’s vault or the global public vault. Signi￿cantly though, in
both subtrees the same leaf nodes and tree structures are responsible for making
the attack possible. In particular, the subtree present in both Figures 8.7 and 8.8,
beginning from the AND node ￿Perform manual update race condition attack￿, is
pivotal in the success of the overall attack. This subtree is given in Figure 8.9,
and Figure 8.10 provides a high-level view with all instances of the subtree in the
overall pruned tree circled. While the labels of the individual nodes in Figure
8.10 are not readable due to the scaling necessary to present the entire tree on a
single page, the diagram highlights the role that these nodes play in violating the
con￿dentiality property. In all the scenarios, this set of nodes occurs at the leaf-end
of the subtree and, as discussed before, changing the value of either of the leaf nodes
to Impossible prevents all of the attack scenarios identi￿ed.
The ￿rst of the leaf nodes in Figure 8.9 represents what has been termed the ‘man-
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243Figure 8.8: Pruned subtree showing attacks where malcode executed at L2
244Figure 8.9: ￿Perform manual update race condition attack￿ subtree
ual update race condition attack’ (MURCA). This attack applies when a trusted
program on the system has been legitimately changed; for example, being upgraded
to a new version. Such a change requires that its ￿ngerprint must be updated. The
attack tree analysis identi￿ed that any time elapsing between the modi￿cation of
the program and the recalculation of its trusted ￿ngerprint potentially allows an
attacker to substitute malicious code for the trusted program. This requires the at-
tacker to be able to bypass the system kernel and directly access the storage device.
However, this ability is speci￿cally allowed in the analysis under Assumption 5, as
stated in Section 6.3.6. As a result of these modi￿cations, when the ￿ngerprint is
subsequently updated, it will now re￿ect the attacker’s code rather than the trusted
program. When the attacker’s code is then executed, it will run with the trust level
of the trusted program it is impersonating. If this attack can be performed for a
￿ngerprint update of an L3 program, then the attacker gains the ability to arbitrar-
ily access the contents of the vaults belonging to any users who execute this code,
including the prime user. An equivalent attack applies for L2 programs. However,
this attack is less severe as these programs cannot directly access the contents of
user vaults. Nonetheless it still permits violation of the con￿dentiality property.
The leaf node representing the MURCA can be found in Figure 8.9. This node
is ￿agged as being Difficult (but not Impossible), as the attacker’s ability to
successfully perform it is constrained by the requirement that an L3 program is
245Figure 8.10: Pruned ￿Defeat con￿dentiality property￿ attack tree with MURCA
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246legitimately updated in an insecure way that allows for substitution to occur and
the attacker is unlikely to be able to in￿uence the occurrence of this event. Note
that, if the node becomes Impossible, then so do all four AND nodes above it
in the subtrees in Figures 8.7 and 8.8. As noted above, this causes all identi￿ed
attacks against the model’s con￿dentiality to become impossible and highlights their
dependence upon this speci￿c problem.
However, the MURCA alone is not su￿cient for the attacker to substitute malicious
code for a legitimate program; violating the veri￿able integrity property of the
model is also required. This is because programs with trust levels of L2 or L3 are
considered to be of su￿cient importance that they will be cryptographically write
protected, which is stated in the analysis under Assumption 3. Therefore the failure
to successfully verify the object’s MAC will reveal the illicit modi￿cation, even if its
￿ngerprint does not. Defeating the veri￿able integrity property of the Vaults model
is therefore the second prerequisite in order to violate the con￿dentiality property,
and this is indicated in the second leaf node in Figure 8.9.
When modelling the con￿dentiality property, nodes relating to the defeat of the veri-
￿able integrity of the system were treated as being possible. This was partly because
an attack tree for the veri￿able integrity property had not yet been constructed,
but principally to highlight any interdependence between the con￿dentiality and
veri￿able integrity properties.
Nodes relating to the veri￿able integrity property appear three times in the subtree
given in Figure 8.7 and four times in Figure 8.8. These nodes appear multiple times
to re￿ect the need to defeat the veri￿able integrity property in relation to di￿erent
requirements of the attack. However, these requirements can all be satis￿ed with
a single successful illicit modi￿cation. The uppermost occurrence (two levels below
the root on the left-hand side of the tree) relates to an attacker modifying a legiti-
mate trusted program via the kernel interface. This action would require a violation
of only one part of the veri￿able integrity property and is therefore pre￿xed with the
label PROP. This node has no impact on security, as that branch of the subtree’s
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node’s parent OR node. However, if either of the other two occurrences (eight and
two levels down below the root on the right-hand side) become Impossible, the
entire subtree will also evaluate in this way, again eliminating all attacks in the
pruned tree.
8.2.5 Speci￿c Attack Instances
Plaintext Data Written to Encrypted File
The attack tree analysis did not identify any way in which an attacker could directly
cause encrypted data to be decrypted for them without possession of a valid and
usable ticket. However, one attack methodology was found for accessing plaintext
without a ticket and this involved removing the read-protected designation from
an encrypted ￿le. This was a somewhat limited attack as it would not cause the
￿le to be decrypted and would prevent legitimate users reading the encrypted data
already in the ￿le4. However, data subsequently written to the ￿le by legitimate
users would no longer be transparently encrypted, which is su￿cient to violate the
con￿dentiality property.
The most di￿cult aspect of this attack is the removal of the read protection designa-
tion from the ￿le. Although no means was identi￿ed for defeating the cryptographic
mechanism for verifying ￿le protection status, the analysis identi￿ed an attack that
used malicious code to remove the designation. A high-level view of the attack
is given in the leftmost branch of Figure 8.6. This branch shows that changing
the protection status of a ￿le requires a process to have an L3 trust level, which
could ultimately be achieved by the MURCA. The MURCA requires that the mali-
cious code be evaluated by the kernel as an L3 program and scenarios for achieving
this are modelled in library (F). The simplest means involves the subtree shown
previously in Figure 8.7.
4A potential race condition exists whereby, if an attacker could remove the read-protected
status from a ￿le after the contents of this ￿le had been bu￿ered to memory but prior to the
contents being rewritten, then this attack could be extended to decrypt existing plaintext.
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249An attack was also identi￿ed involving the creation of the dependency record for the
malicious code by the attacker stealing and using a fundamental ticket. Ultimately
though, this attack also depends upon the MURCA. Further details of the latter
attack are given in Figure 8.11, which follows on from the left-most branch of Figure
8.6, and shows how the fundamental ticket can be stolen using malicious code and
subsequently used by the attacker assuming the prime user’s VID. In order to
assume the prime user’s VID, the attacker must either take control of the prime
user’s vault or associate the prime user’s VID with the attacker’s vault, which is
shown in Figure 8.12. No possible scenarios were identi￿ed for the former attack
but the latter could be achieved by learning the prime user’s private key. This in
turn was achieved using malicious code executing with trust level L3 to access the
prime user’s vault and represents another application of the MURCA.
Ticket Used with Revoked Certi￿cate
Once a user’s certi￿cate has been revoked, the kernel should not permit the use of
any ￿le access tickets assigned to that user; to do otherwise is considered a viola-
tion of the security properties of the model. Certi￿cate revocation is implemented
through a certi￿cate revocation list (CRL) stored in GPUB and only the prime user
is able to modify the contents of this vault. However, if an attacker is able to steal
the fundamental ticket permitting modi￿cation of GPUB, they can remove their
VID from the CRL. The attack for the theft of the fundamental ticket from the
prime user’s vault is the same as that described in the previous section and, once
again, the attack is enabled by the MURCA by allowing malicious code to execute
with an L3 trust level and therefore to gain direct access to users’ vaults. A high-
level view of the attack is given in Figure 8.6 which extends down to the beginning
of attack tree library (B). Further details continuing on from (B) are contained in
Figures 8.11 and 8.12.
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Figure 8.13 shows an attack where the user is tricked into issuing a secondary ticket
for an object. This is ultimately achieved by the attacker creating a fraudulent
certi￿cate for themselves containing the intended recipient’s name and signing it
with the prime user’s private key stolen from their vault. Once again, this attack
is enabled by the presence of the subtree from Figure 8.7 containing the MURCA.
The central AND node in Figure 8.13 highlights the highly constrained nature of
this attack and three of its four children evaluate as Difficult.
To be successful, the user issuing the ticket must select the attacker’s certi￿cate
over that of the intended recipient and must not already have a cached copy of the
intended recipient’s certi￿cate from a previous ticket exchange. Note that as the
attacker and intended recipient’s certi￿cates will have the same name, the issuing
user may notice this if, for example, the names are adjacent in an alphabetically
sorted list presented to them. This duplication would likely arouse their suspicion
and perhaps cause the attack to fail in practice. Consequently, the attacker might
construct the certi￿cate’s Identifier ￿eld so as to subvert the normal alphabetical
sorting; for example, by prepending non-printable characters. The practicality and
e￿ectiveness of such an approach is implementation-dependent but was regarded as
possible for the purposes of the analysis. However, most signi￿cantly, the user must
be able to verify the prime user’s signature on the attacker’s fake certi￿cate. It
was found that the attacker could create this signature by learning the prime user’s
private key, having stolen the key from the prime user’s vault using malicious code
executing at trust level L3 via the MURCA.
Leak Contents using Malcode
Figure 8.6 contains a high-level attack involving the use of malicious code to leak
the contents of read-protected objects and this attack is expanded further in Figure
8.14. As the diagrams show, the malicious code that leaks the plaintext may be
executing at either L3, L2 or L1. In the case of L3 malicious code, this attack is
252Figure 8.13: Pruned subtree for when an attacker has a ticket mistakenly issued to
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253Figure 8.14: Pruned subtree showing use of malcode to leak read-protected ￿le
contents
contained in attack tree library (C) and was illustrated in Figures 8.11 and 8.12.
Attack scenarios involving L2 malicious code are structurally almost identical to
those utilising code with trust level L3. These are included largely for completeness
as the same underlying attack in the form of the MURCA applies to both and it
seems unlikely in practice that an attacker would have their code execute at a lower
trust level given the choice. This applies even more with respect to L1 code and
the attack is further complicated by the need to have the protection key speci￿cally
bound to the L1 malicious program. Note that, as shown in Figure 8.14, the only
attacks identi￿ed for instantiating this binding were if the user chose to, or was
otherwise tricked into, this situation. These scenarios seem relatively unlikely but
could not be de￿nitively excluded under the assumptions of the analysis.
254Figure 8.15: Pruned subtree for stealing a usable primary ticket
Steal Usable Ticket
The subtree for stealing a usable primary ticket is shown in Figure 8.15, which is the
continuation of a high-level tree from Figure 8.6. This attack requires the attacker
to both steal the ticket and then be able to use it by ensuring that the VID of the
ticket matches that of the process making the access request. The left branch of the
tree shows how the attacker may steal the primary ticket from the user’s vault by
having the user execute malicious code. However, in order for the code to steal the
ticket, it must have direct access to the user’s vault which requires that it executes
with a trust level of L3 (Figure 8.11). As with the previous attack scenarios, this
could be achieved through the MURCA.
In order to use the primary ticket once it has been acquired, the attacker must
ensure that the VID speci￿ed by the ticket matches that of the process attempting
access. No means for altering the VID speci￿ed by a ticket was found. However,
the attacker may assume the user’s VID by using L3 malicious code to steal the
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order to have the malicious code execute with this high trust level.
The subtree for stealing a usable secondary ticket is shown in Figure 8.16. This
is very similar to that for stealing a primary ticket except that secondary tickets
can also potentially be stolen from GPUB. This occurs when a secondary ticket
is distributed to a recipient by encrypting it with their public key and storing the
result in GPUB. If the attacker is able to retrieve the recipient’s private key from
their vault via the MURCA, then they may retrieve and decrypt the secondary
ticket while it is awaiting collection. Note that this latter attack is no more di￿cult
than the former as the recipient’s private key must be acquired in order to use the
ticket in both cases. Use of the secondary ticket is therefore similar to that for
primary tickets except that the attacker must know the VID to which the ticket
was issued. However, this is unlikely to be a signi￿cant impediment.
Obtain Ticket through Escrow Mechanism
An equivalent attack to that just described allows an attacker to obtain a secondary
ticket through the escrow mechanism, which is shown in Figure 8.17. Normally the
prime user may use their possession of the fundamental ticket for the Escrow Vault
to obtain a secondary ticket for a protected object. However, the attacker may steal
and use this fundamental ticket in the same way as previously described using the
MURCA.
8.2.6 Discussion
As indicated, all the attack scenarios in the pruned tree contain at least one instance
of the subtree from Figure 8.9 and depend upon the attacker being able to violate
the veri￿able integrity property and perform the MURCA. The results con￿rm that
removing either leaf node leads to the entire tree being evaluated as Impossible.
Signi￿cantly, therefore, the results show that the security of the con￿dentiality prop-
erty of the Vaults model is not dependent upon the veri￿able integrity property.
256Figure 8.16: Pruned subtree for stealing a usable secondary ticket
Defeating the veri￿able integrity property does not, by itself, allow the attacker
to defeat the con￿dentiality property as successful completion of the MURCA is
still required. However, defeating the veri￿able integrity property remains a pre-
requisite for bypassing con￿dentiality ￿ even if the MURCA is possible. That the
interdependence of the two properties is only in regards to the attacks that may
be performed on them, and not with respect to their security, is therefore an ideal
result.
The existence and occurrence of the MURCA is therefore of particular importance.
The attack highlights the importance of code integrity and rea￿rms that, if the
integrity of highly trusted code can be violated, even strong security models are
very likely to fail. On this basis, it is positive that the failure was limited to only six
257Figure 8.17: Pruned subtree for obtaining a ticket through the escrow mechanism
258high-level attack outcomes and demonstrates resilience in extreme circumstances.
The MURCA is also interesting as it is not an attack on the model itself but rather
on the user’s actions in support of the model. It is therefore more of a vulnerability
in a practical aspect of administration rather than a theoretical ￿aw in the model
itself. Consequently, the vulnerability can be avoided through procedural changes
and does not necessarily require alteration of the underlying model. For example,
precalculating ￿ngerprints for updated L3 programs obtained from a trusted source
prior to writing these programs to disk avoids the issue entirely. Indeed, one of
the most valuable outcomes of this part of the attack tree analysis is to highlight
the need for greater care when updating the ￿ngerprints of trusted programs; the
analysis has shed light on the extent of the impact of not doing so.
Another approach is to use an L3 program to act as a trusted installer. This
program would obtain the new version of the object to be updated from a trusted
source (for example, read-only optical media), calculate the new ￿ngerprint value
and update this in GPUB prior to installing the new program. This approach
eliminates the need to perform manual updates and therefore prevents the MURCA.
To facilitate this, the Installer ￿ngerprint ￿ag (Section 5.5.4) was introduced.
This ￿ag allows a program to have the ￿ngerprint values of all of its dependencies to
be automatically updated and therefore avoids the MURCA entirely. Repeating the
attack tree analysis after adjusting the assumptions to require that trusted installers
are used to upgrade all L3 software, prevents the MURCA from happening and
thereby eliminates all attacks on the con￿dentiality property, irrespective of whether
the attacker can violate the veri￿able integrity property. Indeed, although not
explicitly stated in the analysis assumptions made at the outset and given in Section
6.3.6, the spirit of Assumption 3 (relating to the security of system con￿guration)
and Assumption 11 (concerning secure administrative practices) are consistent with
the use of trusted installers to avoid race condition-related problems. However, the
extent of these problems was not anticipated when the assumptions were laid down
and therefore this requirement was not explicitly included. Consequently, it is
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appropriate that the attack tree analysis should identify the MURCA as this result
serves to highlight the need for users and administrators to protect systems against
this threat. While mandating the use of trusted installers would avoid the problem,
such an approach is arguably too prescriptive and the ￿exibility to allow manual
updating, where performed securely, is likely to be appropriate in practice for many
systems.
8.3 The Veri￿able Integrity Property Attack Tree
8.3.1 Overview
After the completion of the attack tree to evaluate the security of the con￿dential-
ity property, a second tree was constructed to analyse whether an attacker could
defeat the veri￿able integrity property. When complete, this second tree consisted
of a total of 163,816 nodes. As with the con￿dentiality tree, the size of the tree
meant that the total number of attack scenarios could not be calculated by the Se-
curITree software as the result exceeded the maximum storable positive integer.
Hence a value of -1,434,440,612 was reported, as indicated in Figure 8.18.
As with the con￿dentiality tree, pruning criteria were then applied to remove all
impossible attacks from the set of hypothetical attacks represented by the complete
tree. Again, the subtree relating to the MURCA also existed in the unpruned
tree. However, unlike with the con￿dentiality tree, when considering attacks on
the veri￿able integrity the MURCA was no longer possible. This was because
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property to complete successfully, leading to a set of circular attack requirements.
Consequently, pruning led to all of the nodes from the complete tree being removed
and the resulting empty tree indicates that no valid attacks were identi￿ed on
the veri￿able integrity property. As discussed in Section 8.2.6, as defeat of the
con￿dentiality property was found to depend upon successful violation of veri￿able
integrity, the absence of attacks in this latter security property means that no valid
attacks were identi￿ed in either of the two main security properties of the Vaults
model. Details of the analysis will now be discussed.
8.3.2 Summary of Unpruned Veri￿able Integrity Attack Scenarios
Figure 8.19 gives a high-level view of the complete, unpruned tree and shows that
the hypothetical attacks it describes fall into one of two categories. First, there
are those attacks considered in the left-most branch of the tree where the attacker
makes an illicit modi￿cation through a request sent via the kernel interface. This
requires the attacker to take some action to ensure that the request succeeds despite
being in contravention of the veri￿able integrity property. The second category of
attacks, described in the right-hand branch of the tree, apply where an attacker
with su￿cient privileges bypasses the kernel interface and directly modi￿es objects
on the disk, as permitted by Assumption 5 (Section 6.3.6). However, subsequent
to this, the attacker must take further action to prevent the kernel from identifying
that this illicit change has occurred.
Attacks Via the Kernel Interface
In Figure 8.19, the left-hand branch of the tree is expanded showing details of the
attacks that take place via the kernel interface. The tree shows that the attacker
can potentially perform modi￿cations via the kernel interface as a result of three
di￿erent scenarios. The ￿rst of these is due to kernel error, which is speci￿cally
excluded by Assumption 3. Alternatively, the attacker can make a modi￿cation to
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with expanded left-most branch 262the object if they have access to a usable and valid ticket. The methodologies for
this subset of attacks are almost identical to the equivalent attacks considered in
the attack tree analysing the con￿dentiality property. The tree structure shows that
these attacks involving the use of a ticket may be as a result of the attacker either
creating the ticket from scratch or using an existing valid ticket. Where the ticket is
created from scratch, it may be either primary or secondary, and scenarios involving
the construction of the ticket from both plaintext and ciphertext are considered in
the tree. A total of 19,898 nodes are contained in the subtree for creating a primary
ticket, 13,244 concerning the creation of a primary ticket from plaintext and 6,654
for the creation of the ticket from ciphertext components. By comparison, the
subtree for creating a secondary ticket contains 27,440 nodes, 24,087 of these for
the creation of the secondary ticket from plaintext and 3,353 for ciphertext attacks.
Alternatively, when the attacker uses an existing valid ticket, this ticket may be one
that has been issued either to the attacker or to some other party. Scenarios where
a ticket has been issued to an attacker include where the attacker attempts to revive
an expired or revoked secondary ticket (6,691 and 24,118 nodes, respectively), where
a ticket is mistakenly issued to the attacker (6,693 nodes), and where the attacker
attempts to use a ticket after their certi￿cate has previously been revoked (14,473
nodes). An attacker may also modify a primary or secondary ticket to refer to a
di￿erent object (6,618 and 10,050 nodes respectively) or modify a secondary ticket
to attempt to convert it into a primary ticket (3,358 nodes).
The other branch of the subtree considering use of existing valid tickets is where
the ticket was not issued to the attacker. This can be achieved by gaining use of
an authorised user’s ticket through malicious code (7,644 nodes) or by gaining ac-
cess to the user’s vault (15 nodes). Alternatively, the attacker may take possession
of a ticket by placing it in their vault, either by obtaining the ticket through the
escrow mechanism (1,809 nodes) or by stealing it from another user (10,793 nodes
for the theft of a primary ticket and 17,397 nodes for a secondary). Finally, an-
other high-level attack on the veri￿able integrity property via the kernel interface
exists where the attacker can alter the ￿le’s apparent protection status such that
263the kernel believes the ￿le is not protected and will therefore permit write access.
Attack scenarios for this are addressed in the integrity version of the subtree library
‘(I)Remove protection from ￿le’ and this comprises 3,375 nodes.
Attacks Bypassing the Kernel Interface
Figure 8.20 shows an expanded version of the right-hand branch of the top-level
tree rolled up in Figure 8.19, and describes scenarios where the attacker illicitly
modi￿es an object through bypassing the kernel interface. When the attacker seeks
to accomplish this attack, they must ￿rst be able to make the modi￿cation and,
second take some action to cause the kernel to not identify the modi￿cation on
subsequent access to the a￿ected object. This constraint is re￿ected in Figure 8.20
using an AND node with two corresponding children at the root of this subtree. As
the analysis assumes that the attacker will have su￿cient privileges on the system to
potentially bypass the kernel and directly access the data on the disk, the principal
question is whether the attacker can prevent this modi￿cation from being detected.
The two scenarios where this may apply are when the kernel checks to see if the ￿le
has been illicitly modi￿ed and still fails to detect the change, and when the attacker
can cause the kernel to not perform this check.
In the case of the former scenario, the result may simply be due to kernel error or
because the attacker has been able to cause the hashes to match. This latter cir-
cumstance would occur in the event of a cryptographic failure in the one-way hash
function causing a collision (excluded by Assumption 7 requiring secure cryptogra-
phy) or if the MAC value stored in GPRIV were to be modi￿ed. The modi￿cation
of this value could be performed by the attacker recalculating and updating the
MAC. However, being able to update the MAC requires learning both the ￿le pro-
tection key (modelled in subtree library (M) containing 16 nodes) and also gaining
access to the value in GPRIV (subtree library (G) containing 14 nodes). Alterna-
tively, the MAC could be updated either by another user modifying the ￿le or by
the kernel acting independently. In the case of a user modifying the ￿le, the model
264Figure 8.20: Subtree of the ￿Defeat veri￿able integrity property￿ attack tree showing
attacks where the modi￿cation bypasses the kernel interface
requires that the kernel verify the MAC value of write-protected ￿les before permit-
ting write access. For this not to occur, either the kernel has behaved incorrectly
(excluded by Assumption 3) or the attack has become circular. The kernel acting
independently to incorrectly modify the MAC value also violates Assumption 3 that
requires the kernel to implement the model correctly. Both of these scenarios are
therefore excluded by assumption.
Excluding these scenarios leaves the right-hand branch of the tree from Figure
8.20 addressing hypothetical scenarios where the attacker takes some action to
prevent the kernel from checking for illicit modi￿cations. This scenario will apply
if the attacker is able to cause the kernel to no longer be able to identify that
the ￿le is designated as write protected, which is addressed in the subtree library
(I) (3,375 nodes). Although not visible in Figure 8.20 due to being abstracted
within the library, this subtree library considers attacks targeting the protection
265status veri￿cation scheme employed by Vaults and also re￿ects the importance of
verifying the protection status of an object in a security model intended to be secure
against privileged attackers.
Alternatively, the kernel may fail to check whether a write-protected ￿le has been
modi￿ed if the kernel code itself has been compromised, either by the attacker
modifying the code in memory or on disk. Modi￿cation of kernel code in memory is
excluded by Assumption 6, which concerns the isolation of the kernel and hardware
enforcement of secure memory. Modi￿cation of the code on disk is also not possible,
as booting of code modi￿ed directly by the attacker will fail due to the requirement
for a secure bootstrap sequence (Assumption 10). Any attempt to modify the code
by the kernel interface represents a circular attack. Finally, the kernel could fail to
perform the check due to internal error but this is also excluded under Assumption
3.
8.3.3 Pruning Results
It was initially anticipated that the MURCA, identi￿ed when analysing the con-
￿dentiality property, would also be problematic when modelling attacks on the
veri￿able integrity property. However, the pruning results of the con￿dentiality
property tree identi￿ed that MURCA-related scenarios were dependent upon the
attacker being able to defeat the veri￿able integrity property. Therefore, as the
prospective attacks performed via the kernel interface using a ticket are largely the
same for the veri￿able integrity property as for the con￿dentiality property, this
leads to circularity whereby one of the requirements for an attack on the veri￿able
integrity property is defeating the same. This is highlighted in Figure 8.9 from
the con￿dentiality analysis that contains nodes representing both the MURCA and
defeat of the veri￿able integrity property (pre￿xed with the label TREE) with a
parent AND node. This tree structure models that the attacker must overcome
the veri￿able integrity property in order to successfully exploit the MURCA by
replacing trusted code on the disk with malicious code.
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i￿able integrity property were considered to be possible. One reason for this was
that, as the con￿dentiality property was modelled ￿rst, the result of the veri￿able
integrity property tree was not known. More importantly, setting this node’s Im-
possible attribute to FALSE also ensured that subtrees describing valid attacks
were not prematurely eliminated, and assisted with identifying dependency rela-
tionships between the two trees.
However, in the context of attacking the veri￿able integrity property, the attack
requirements for the nodes referencing this same property became circular and
consequently the MURCA-based scenarios became no longer possible. That is,
if an attack scenario for defeating the veri￿able integrity property contains the
node that requires defeat of this same property, the attack has become circular
and therefore impossible. Consequently, all 5,107 occurrences of these nodes in the
veri￿able integrity tree and its subtree library versions were changed to Impossible.
Therefore, although the underlying MURCA still exists in the veri￿able integrity
tree, the attack is not exploitable in this new context. The single underlying problem
that caused all the attacks identi￿ed on the con￿dentiality property in the pruned
tree therefore does not apply when analysing the integrity property.
As a result, pruning of the veri￿able integrity tree to remove impossible nodes leads
to removal of all subtrees relating to the MURCA. Since no additional attacks
speci￿c to the veri￿able integrity property were identi￿ed, an empty pruning tree
containing no nodes resulted. This result indicates that no means for compromising
the veri￿able integrity of the model were identi￿ed. However, signi￿cantly, the
absence of attacks on the veri￿able integrity property also means that the security
of the con￿dentiality property remains intact, as all of the attacks on con￿dentiality
also depend upon successful exploitation of the MURCA and thus violation of the
veri￿able integrity. Therefore no successful attacks were identi￿ed on the two major
security properties of the model.
Beyond this, it should also be noted that a large number of nodes exist in both the
267con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity property trees that reference only a speci￿c
subset of attacks on the veri￿able integrity property. The label of these nodes is
pre￿xed with PROP. In the con￿dentiality property tree, these nodes are designated
as being possible in the same way as those that refer to the full tree. However, in the
veri￿able integrity property tree, some of these nodes are logically impossible where
they occur in the subtree modelling attacks on the same subset of the property.
Despite this impossibility, to avoid the complexity involved in making multiple
versions of these nodes, the same node for each property subset was used in all
subtrees of the veri￿able integrity property tree and was treated as being possible.
In total, this a￿ected 1,276 nodes. Note that including these nodes does not have
any deleterious impact on the outcome of the pruning process as this approach
could only result in the inclusion of invalid attacks rather than excluding potentially
legitimate ones. The lack of impact of including these logically impossible nodes
on the pruned tree results for the veri￿able integrity property therefore further
suggests a signi￿cant degree of defence-in-depth in relation to the design of the
overall security model.
8.4 Trusted Fingerprinting Attack Tree
8.4.1 Overview
The Trusted Fingerprinting feature of the Vaults security model plays a signi￿cant
role in supporting both the con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity properties. Con-
sequently, some of the aspects of Trusted Fingerprinting have been evaluated in the
previous two attack trees. However, as the attacks considered in these other trees
were restricted to those that speci￿cally supported violation of the security property
being considered, it was identi￿ed that certain aspects of the Trusted Fingerprint-
ing feature had not been fully studied. In particular, issues relating to the user’s
expectations in relation to the privileges held by certain programs had not been
considered in detail, and the behaviour of the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism in
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scenarios not speci￿cally pertaining to the violation of the other two security prop-
erties required further evaluation. As a result, a third attack tree was constructed
to evaluate the security properties of Trusted Fingerprinting, namely:
￿ Trusted code and its dependencies accessed via a speci￿ed ￿lesystem path are
cryptographically veri￿ed on execution or access (as appropriate) to con￿rm
that they have not been modi￿ed.
￿ Privileges of trusted code determining access to cryptographically protected
objects are assigned based on whether this code has been successfully veri￿ed
and its determined trust level. A corollary of this property is that unveri￿ed
code is considered untrusted, has no access to the user’s vault, and therefore
has e￿ectively no privileges under the Vaults security model.
￿ Access to application keys is dependent upon the cryptographically veri￿ed
identity of a process.
￿ The privileges of authenticated trusted code are constrained such that this
code may not be executed by a malicious program to indirectly obtain these
privileges.
The attack tree for analysing Trusted Fingerprinting has four top-level branches
corresponding to the security properties just described. The entire attack tree
consisted of 63,124 nodes. Once again, the number of attack scenarios present in
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reported by the software to be -759,101,058, as stated in Figure 8.21.
8.4.2 Summary of Unpruned Trusted Fingerprinting Attack Sce-
narios
Undetected Modi￿cations
Figure 8.22 gives a high-level view of the complete, unpruned attack tree analysing
the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism with each of the four top-level branches
corresponding to the four security goals. The diagram shows the leftmost branch
expanded and covers those hypothetical attacks where an object is modi￿ed and
the modi￿cation is not detected. This leftmost branch, in turn, is split into two
branches, one considering the potential for undetected modi￿cations to trusted code
and the other considering undetected modi￿cations to dependencies of the trusted
code. The former branches are fully expanded down to the low-level attack libraries
and show that, if the code can be modi￿ed (as permitted by Assumption 5, which
allows the attacker to bypass kernel and modify objects directly on the disk), this
modi￿cation may not be detected if the code is either not veri￿ed or the veri￿cation
is performed but the change is not detected regardless. Code may not be veri￿ed if
matching does not identify the speci￿ed target due to, for example, the ￿ngerprint
record having been removed (4,328 nodes). Alternatively, matching may succeed
but veri￿cation still not be performed for some reason (2 nodes). On the other hand,
hypothetical attacks where veri￿cation does occur, but the modi￿cation is still not
detected, are addressed in the right-hand branch of this subtree labelled ‘Veri￿cation
performed but change not detected’. Attacks considered in this branch include
alteration of the stored ￿ngerprint value to make this match malicious code (4,326
nodes), and attempts to make the code being veri￿ed match the stored ￿ngerprint
(9 nodes); for example, through possible race conditions where legitimate code is
veri￿ed but malicious code substituted at execution time.
The second-level subtree considering detection of modi￿cations to dependencies is
270Figure 8.22: Top-level view of the ￿Defeat Trusted Fingerprinting￿ attack tree with
undetected modi￿cation branch partially expanded
271similar to that for trusted code but is split into subtrees considering helper applica-
tions (8,683 nodes), shared libraries (8,695 nodes) and data ￿le dependencies (8,715
nodes). For example, helper applications have largely the same characteristics as
stand-alone trusted code with the only signi￿cant di￿erence being that matching
is performed on the runtime digraph of the parent program rather than on the
various digraphs stored in vaults. Libraries are similar again. However, as libraries
may be shared between multiple applications, the analysis also considered potential
attacks that attempt to exploit the caching of veri￿ed and unveri￿ed libraries in
memory. Finally, attacks involving modi￿cations to data ￿le dependencies have
much in common with the other subtrees. However, these scenarios also include
attacks involving automatic updates as the model allows ￿ngerprint values for data
￿le dependencies to be automatically updated by the programs that depend on
these ￿les, which potentially creates additional avenues for attack.
Incorrect Assignment of Privileges
An important aspect of the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism is the role it plays
in assigning privileges to a process within the Vaults model. Figure 8.23 gives an
overview of the attack tree branch describing hypothetical attacks on this privilege
assignment, whereby the attacker attempts to have an identity or trust level as-
signed to a process contrary to the speci￿cations of the model. The tree consists
of two branches considering incorrect assignment of privileges to both trusted and
untrusted programs, respectively. One subtree considers scenarios where a trusted
program executes at its speci￿ed trust level (STL). These scenarios should not oc-
cur due to the program accessing an object with a lower trust level, which should
result in the process’s trust level being downgraded (4,338 nodes). There are also
situations where trusted programs should voluntarily lower their e￿ective trust level
(ETL), but for some reason do not, and these have also been considered (23 nodes).
A third scenario involves the Require Trusted Data ￿ngerprint ￿ag that, if set
on a trusted program, should result in the process’s ETL being set to L0 if the
272process accesses any unveri￿ed data (8,671 nodes). Hypothetical attack scenarios,
where this ￿ag is set but not enforced for some reason, were therefore modelled.
Finally, scenarios where a trusted program executes at a trust level higher than its
STL were also analysed (4,330 nodes).
The second branch of the tree in Figure 8.23 considers where a program, which
should execute at L0 (untrusted), for some reason executes at a higher level of priv-
ilege. This could be because the attacker has created a new dependency record to
correspond to the untrusted, and likely malicious, program (4,324 nodes). Alter-
natively, the attacker may be using an existing dependency record and attempting
to have the untrusted program somehow impersonate this trusted code (36 nodes).
These attack scenarios were also evaluated, although were ultimately found to be
largely similar to those relating to undetected modi￿cations.
Unauthorised Access to Application Keys
In some respects, the application keys mechanism is logically and functionally dis-
tinct from Trusted Fingerprinting. However, the security of application keys is
dependent upon that of Trusted Fingerprinting. Therefore, potential scenarios in-
volving unauthorised access to application keys were included in the Trusted Fin-
gerprinting attack tree. Figure 8.24 contains the resulting subtree. The leftmost
branch considers how an attacker’s malicious code might access another user’s ap-
plication key, which is the principal attack methodology. For this to successfully
occur, the malicious code would need to be considered trusted, such that it has a
￿ngerprint in either GPUB or the user’s vault. More speci￿cally, the ￿ngerprint of
the malicious code must match that associated with the application key in order
for the kernel to grant access. This situation potentially may be achieved either
through the malicious code impersonating a legitimate process (10 nodes) or by
the attacker changing the application key’s ￿ngerprint value to match their own
code (3,282 nodes). Finally, access to application keys is only permitted where
either the program is executing with its usual privileges (its ETL is equal to its
273Figure 8.23: Subtree from the ￿Defeat Trusted Fingerprinting￿ attack tree showing
attacks where privileges incorrectly assigned to an executing program
274Figure 8.24: Subtree from the ￿Defeat Trusted Fingerprinting￿ attack tree showing
attacks where unauthorised code accesses an application key
STL) or the Release Trust Fail ￿ag has been set on the application key to in-
dicate that the key may be released, even if the requesting process is not executing
at its normal trust level. Note that, in the attack tree analysis, it was assumed
that this ￿nal requirement would be met and either or both of these conditions
would be satis￿ed. This assumption was made because none of the assumptions
of the analysis de￿nitively excluded these conditions and it ultimately represented
an unlikely, but possible, scenario. Finally, the case where a non-malicious but
otherwise unauthorised program accessed an application key was also considered.
However, very limited scenarios were identi￿ed meeting this criteria and essentially
no hypothetical attacks resulted.
275Figure 8.25: Subtree from the "Defeat Trusted Fingerprinting" attack tree showing
attacks where a trusted program is subverted by its parent
Trusted Program Subverted by Parent
Figure 8.25 presents a complete subtree modelling all of the potential attacks on
the aspect of the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism that aims to prevent malicious
code from gaining additional privileges by executing a trusted program. Vaults im-
poses trust elevation restrictions in order to prevent these attacks. Improvements to
the algorithm for enforcing these restrictions resulting from the attack tree analysis
were described in Section 7.13. In this part of the analysis, attacks involving ma-
nipulation of the victim user’s vault data were excluded since, if the attacker were
able to alter the trust level of their malicious program (for example, by creating a
trusted ￿ngerprint record for it in the victim user’s vault), then they have no reason
to need to manipulate a trusted program that already has such a record. Attacks
involving manipulation of vault data are considered extensively in each of the other
attack trees.
The analysis proceeded by identifying all of the permutations of trust levels for
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scenarios could be safely excluded:
￿ All scenarios where the malicious code has a trust level of L3, as this code
already has unrestricted access to the user’s vault.
￿ Scenarios where the malicious code has a trust level of L2 and the trusted code
has a trust level other than L3 as, in this case, the malicious code already has
either equal or greater privileges than the trusted code.
￿ Scenarios where the child program’s trust level is L0, as such programs are
untrusted and therefore will execute at the same or lower trust level to a
malicious parent.
Excluding the above cases left potential scenarios where the malicious code was
currently executing at L0, L1 and L2. In the case of the malicious code executing
at L0, the attacks simply reduce to either changing the trust level of the malicious
code itself (rather than subversion of a trusted child process) or a kernel error
in the application of the trust elevation restriction algorithm. Similarly, the only
additional privileges that malicious code executing at trust level L2 may obtain are
from an L3 program and, when considering the assumptions of the analysis, this
scenario subsequently reduces to a leaf node in the tree.
In the case of the malicious code executing at L1, the attack scenarios become
more complex. Since two di￿erent programs executing at L1 are likely to also have
di￿erent privileges (as identi￿ed in the attack tree analysis and discussed in Section
7.13), unless the parent and child have the same ￿ngerprint, the child should execute
at trust level L0. The attack tree therefore describes attacks for scenarios where the
￿ngerprints for the parent and child are either the same or di￿erent. These attacks
are shown in the central branch of the tree in Figure 8.25.
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The pruning analysis of the Trusted Fingerprinting attack tree was performed in two
stages. The ￿rst stage was performed on the basis that the attacker could not defeat
the veri￿able integrity property and considers only those attacks speci￿c to Trusted
Fingerprinting. This takes into account the results from the attack tree analysing
the veri￿able integrity property, which found no valid attacks after pruning was
performed. In the second stage, the analysis was broadened and the e￿ect on
Trusted Fingerprinting of the veri￿able integrity property failing was simulated
using the attack tree model. This served to analyse the interdependence of the two
properties.
8.4.4 Trusted Fingerprinting-Speci￿c Attacks
Excluding attacks dependent upon defeat of the veri￿able integrity property re-
sulted in a pruned tree with 37 nodes remaining, representing the elimination of
99.94% of the nodes in the unpruned tree. More signi￿cantly, pruning left only ￿ve
attack scenarios remaining from the billions in the original tree.
The ￿rst of these attack scenarios applies to the detection of illicit modi￿cations
(Figure 8.26) and speci￿cally the detection of modi￿cations to a data ￿le depen-
dency. The attack represents a limited case where a data ￿le object can be modi￿ed
and the modi￿cation will not be detected, despite veri￿cation being performed, as
the ￿ngerprint value in the legitimate ￿ngerprint record is incorrectly modi￿ed
through an automatic update. The attack relates to a very speci￿c and apparently
highly unlikely scenario with numerous constraints, but is nonetheless worthy of
discussion. When the Installer ￿ag is not set on such a program’s ￿ngerprint
record, automatic updates will only be performed for data ￿le objects that are di-
rect dependencies of this program. However, the success of this update also depends
upon the No Auto Update ￿ag not being set on these dependencies, which is the
￿rst constraint applying to the attack. A second and very signi￿cant constraint is
that the malicious code is considered trusted and therefore executes at a trust level
278Figure 8.26: Pruned subtree for attacks involving undetected modi￿cation of a
￿ngerprint object
279above L0. Assumption 4 speci￿cally states that users will not con￿gure the system
to allow arbitrary code to execute at trust levels of L2 and above, as this would
essentially give away all of that user’s privileges. However, this assumption still al-
lows for arbitrary and potentially malicious code to possibly be granted trust level
L1. This might be done, for example, if the user wishes to ensure the integrity of
the program and the objects it depends upon, even if they do not entirely trust the
program. A third constraint is that the malicious code executing at trust level L1
must have su￿cient privileges to write to the object in question. Since L1 programs
are restricted in their access to protected objects to those speci￿c objects and ac-
cess modes designated by the user, this severely restricts the attacks that can apply.
For example, even if an L1 program speci￿es an important system con￿guration ￿le
as a dependency, it still would not be granted write access to the object. How-
ever, it was identi￿ed with further analysis that, if a malicious program executing
with trust level L1 shared a common dependency with another L1 program, and if
all the above constraints were met, then the malicious program could update the
￿ngerprint values of the second program’s dependency through automatic updates.
This would apply even if the malicious program did not ostensibly have a legitimate
need to modify the shared dependency and is considered a possible attack within
the scope of the analysis, as Assumption 4 does not explicitly require L1 depen-
dencies to be write protected. Nonetheless, this represents an extremely limited
avenue of attack. The attack applies only to L1 programs and requires the user to
explicitly designate the object as a dependency of the partially trusted program,
which thereby authorises the program to perform such automatic updates. This is
documented and expected behaviour and therefore, arguably, a somewhat dubious
vulnerability. Indeed, the scenario arguably violates the spirit, although not the
actual letter, of Assumption 4. Furthermore, the analysis also demonstrated that
problems can be easily prevented by cryptographically write protecting objects that
are dependencies of L1 programs but should not be able to be modi￿ed by these
programs.
The other four attack scenarios apply to programs being assigned incorrect privi-
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trusted program should voluntarily lower its e￿ective trust level (ETL) at runtime
but, for some reason, does not do this. The ￿rst attack applies where the attacker
modi￿es the program’s code on disk to prevent it lowering its trust level. This is,
arguably, an unrealistic attack as, if the attacker has the ability to modify a trusted
program’s code, they also have the ability to make it do anything beyond simply
neglecting to lower its trust level. Furthermore, successfully completing this attack
would require violation of the Trusted Fingerprinting security property pertaining
to detection of illicit modi￿cations and, as just discussed, no attacks applying to
modi￿cation of code were found in this branch of the attack tree. Therefore, despite
being found in the pruned tree, the attack tree results indicate this attack clearly
would not actually be possible in practice. Finally, the attack only applies in the
case of L1 programs, as otherwise this would require that the veri￿able integrity
property be defeated, since L2 and L3 programs are assumed to be cryptograph-
ically protected under Assumption 4. Nonetheless, this attack is included for the
sake of completeness.
The remaining three attack scenarios all involve a trusted program failing to lower
its privileges due to an error in that program. Whether this is the result of actions
taken by the attacker to cause the failure, or something that happens spontaneously
in a given set of circumstances, the possibility of such errors is not excluded by the
assumptions of the analysis. However, the Require Trusted Data ￿ag signi￿-
cantly mitigates such problems as it reduces the need for programs to voluntarily
lower their trust levels at runtime. As discussed in Section 5.4.9, the ￿ag oper-
ates by automatically lowering a program’s ETL to L0 if that program opens a
non-dependency object for reading. Beyond this, universally preventing general
malfunctions in programs is outside of the scope of protection a￿orded by Trusted
Fingerprinting. Nonetheless, its inclusion in the analysis recognizes that this rep-
resents an unavoidable problem in practice.
281Figure 8.27: Pruned subtree for attacks involving privileges being incorrectly as-
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282Malicious Code Injection Attacks
A special case of such programmatic errors are malicious code injection vulnera-
bilities, such as bu￿er over￿ows, where an attacker is able to insert malicious code
into a running program so that the malicious code is executed with that program’s
privileges. Such attacks represent a powerful way for an attacker to potentially alter
a program’s behaviour. However, despite this, these attacks do not strictly violate
the ￿rst of the Trusted Fingerprinting security properties, as the mechanism veri-
￿es the integrity of the object at execution or access time and provides no explicit
guarantees as to the maintenance of that integrity beyond this. As a result, these
attacks are not included in the branch of the attack tree analysing this property.
However, these attacks represent a legitimate way of preventing a program from
lowering its trust level and, more generally, represent a serious problem in practice
that is worthy of further discussion. While eliminating these errors in the program
code itself is the ideal way of mitigating the problem, this task has proven to be
di￿cult in practice [41]. Hardware and software mechanisms exist that have the
ability to limit the scope of these attacks and are also bene￿cial [267]. However, the
Vaults architecture itself also assists in the mitigation of this class of vulnerability
with respect to the security goals of the model.
Normally, the amount of code that may be injected into a vulnerable program is
extremely limited and is used to execute a second program that either carries out
a series of tasks on behalf of the attacker or provides them with a generic interface
to the system (such as a shell), thereby granting them all of the privileges of the
vulnerable program [36]. The design of the Vaults security model serves to stymie
both of these attack methodologies.
In the ￿rst case, if the injected code executes a second malicious program then, as-
suming this program does not have a trusted ￿ngerprint, it will not execute with the
privileges of its parent. Similarly, if the attacker uses the injected code to execute
a shell (which would normally have a trust level of L2), any code subsequently ex-
ecuted by this shell will only retain its privileges if it too has a trusted ￿ngerprint.
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exists. Examples of such scenarios include where the vulnerable program is a net-
work server, ￿xed privilege code (e.g., the set UID mechanism in Unix), and code
interactively executed by another user. In the case of network servers and similar
service programs, as these types of programs do not execute interactively and do
not have access to a user vault, they have no additional privileges under the Vaults
model that the attacker can obtain. Similarly, there is no equivalent of Unix’s set
UID programs in the Vaults model and therefore these privilege boundaries do not
exist. Vulnerable code executed interactively by another user could potentially be
exploited by an attacker to obtain its privileges if the attacker were able to identify
a suitable vector for injection of their malicious code into the vulnerable program at
runtime. However, as discussed above, this attack would be limited to the amount of
malicious code that was able to be injected, as Vaults Trusted Fingerprinting would
curtail the privileges of any malicious programs executed subsequently. Therefore,
while not representing a complete solution, the Vaults security model signi￿cantly
limits the impact from this dangerous class of attack.
8.4.5 Veri￿able Integrity Property Dependence
To assess the dependence of the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism on the veri￿able
integrity property, the attack tree model was adjusted to assume that defeating the
veri￿able integrity property is possible. The pruning analysis was then repeated
with a number of attack scenarios increasing from ￿ve to 176, with the new pruned
tree having 2,059 nodes. Of these scenarios, ￿ve were the attacks just discussed. In
addition to these, allowing the attacker to violate the veri￿able integrity property
meant that L2 and L3 programs could be modi￿ed in order to prevent them drop-
ping their privileges when required. This is a direct extension of the attack on L1
programs described in the previous section. It is important to note that, as with
the modi￿cation of L1 programs, for this new attack to be successful, the attacker
would also have to compromise the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism for verifying
284code integrity. As has already been discussed, the attack tree analysis identi￿ed
no means for achieving this goal. The remaining 170 attack scenarios were a direct
result of the MURCA previously discussed and were of the same form as described
in relation to the con￿dentiality property in Section 8.2.4.
8.5 Observations on Attack Trees
As the attack tree analysis was being performed, a number of observations were
made concerning the technique and its practical applications. Signi￿cantly, it was
found that the tree structure assisted greatly in managing the complexity of the
attack properties being analysed. Without this bene￿t, it would have been signi￿-
cantly more di￿cult, if not infeasible, to obtain the level of comprehensiveness that
was achieved with this analysis. However, as the complexity of a given tree in-
creased, there was a corresponding reduction in the manageability of the tree. Over
time, this e￿ect was partially mitigated as familiarity with the attack tree analysis
technique increased and a set of standard practices for constructing and managing
trees was adopted. However, it was always found that the process of manually
‘walking the tree’ to review or evaluate a particular attack remained manageable,
even for the most complex tree structures. This was particularly true when con-
sidering pruned trees where extraneous and impossible attack scenarios had been
removed.
8.5.1 Subtree Libraries
The subtree libraries feature provided by the SecurITree software, described in
Section 6.3.5, assisted signi￿cantly in managing tree complexity during the con-
struction phase and into the pruning analysis. It was frequently found that attacks
on di￿erent aspects of the model shared common attack scenarios and the libraries
feature reduced the amount of manual work involved by allowing reuse of existing
subtrees. An added bene￿t of this approach was that subtrees assisted in abstract-
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allowed conclusions to be drawn between the similarities of di￿erent attack method-
ologies. For example, one subtree related to the subversion of the assignment of
the VID to a process in order for the attacker to execute a process with another
user’s VID. The two methodologies identi￿ed for achieving this goal involved either
the attacker learning the the user’s vault key in order to gain access to the victim’s
vault, or otherwise associating the victim’s VID with the attacker’s vault for which
the attacker would already know the key. The latter attack methodology led to a
subtree of 762 nodes. However, upon reviewing this subtree, it became clear that
all of the attacks it described, which were not trivially impossible, were dependent
upon the same subtree library concerning the attacker learning the user’s vault key
as applied in the alternative high-level attack. From these observations made when
reviewing the tree, it can be concluded that attacks allowing the attacker to execute
a process with another user’s VID are e￿ectively equivalent to the attacker learning
that user’s vault key ￿ which is as it should be according to the security semantics
of the model. These kinds of observations were often repeated and the abstraction
of attack components into subtree libraries assisted greatly with the recognition of
these patterns.
However, an outstanding problem that limits the bene￿ts of subtree reuse involves
identifying at exactly what level a subtree should be separated and placed in a
separate library. If the separation occurs at too high a level, there is an increased
likelihood of potential problems occurring, such as a circularity of attack require-
ments or a disconnect between the goals of the attack at the higher level of the
tree and those speci￿c methods identi￿ed in the lower levels. Further consideration
of general strategies for identifying the appropriate level for decomposition of the
tree may be a valuable future research area leading to improve methodologies and
perhaps enhanced tool support.
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During tree construction, the di￿erent impacts on security of the occurrence of OR
and AND nodes was observed. OR nodes were more common and e￿ectively played
the roles of a delimiter between the various leaf nodes and, at the higher levels
of the tree, a mechanism to organise and categorise attack methodologies as per
the logically complementary attack scenarios technique (Section 6.3.3). Therefore,
while OR nodes represent di￿erent options available to the attacker, in a subtree
containing no AND nodes it is the number of leaf nodes, rather than OR nodes,
that is the more signi￿cant indicator of the vulnerability of the mechanism being
analysed.
However, the impact of AND nodes on the success or otherwise of attack scenarios
was signi￿cantly more dramatic. As was discussed in Section 6.2.7, AND nodes
specify prerequisites that must be satis￿ed in order for an attack methodology
to succeed. As the trees were constructed, more details became clear concerning
the impact of AND nodes on the likelihood of the success of an attack scenario.
Intuitively, the greater the total number of AND nodes, the greater the number
of constraints placed on the attacker with respect to the relevant attack scenarios.
Therefore, the number of AND nodes found in a tree corresponds to the degree of
defence-in-depth of the system being analysed [15]. More speci￿cally, the higher the
proportion of subtrees of a given AND node that evaluate as Impossible according
to the relevant criteria, the more secure a design will be in this respect.
The impact of AND nodes can apply in di￿erent ways. For example, a number
of AND nodes found horizontally immediately below the root node of the tree
would indicate that each attack option was subject to at least two constraints. On
the other hand, a series of nested AND nodes indicates an attack methodology
subject to multilayered constraints. These observations open the possibility for fur-
ther research into quantitative interpretation of attack tree structures. That is, by
analysing the number and placement of AND nodes in a subtree, it may be possible
to obtain a quantitative metric of the security of the design. In particular, factors
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AND nodes (the greater the quantity, the lower the likelihood of an attack succeed-
ing), the depth at which these AND nodes appear in the tree below the root node
(the closer to the top of the tree, the lower the likelihood of attack success), and the
number of descendant nodes of a given AND node. That is, the more descendants
of an AND node, the greater the probability that these attack scenarios will not be
possible. In particular, the greater the number of AND nodes that are descendants
of another AND node, and the greater the number of immediate descendants of the
parent AND node, the lower the likelihood of success of these attack scenarios.
While AND nodes were observed to have a far greater impact on security than
other nodes, such a metric would need to also consider the role of OR and leaf
nodes. For example, a more general scheme for quantifying security using attack
tree structures could consider the average number of nodes above the leaf node
where a particular subtree becomes impossible. The closer this value is to zero, the
greater the security of the design. Such an approach takes into account the impact
of AND nodes to some degree as subtrees often become impossible at this point.
In any case, this and other approaches for quantitatively measuring security using
attack trees represent a signi￿cant avenue for potential future research.
8.5.3 Limitations of Pruning
The processing of the tree using pruning analysis to remove invalid attack scenarios
is critically important as it simpli￿es the tree by leaving only those attacks that are
possible according to the set criteria. However, a disadvantage of this approach is
that it may obscure results that are eliminated during pruning and yet are still of
interest and worthy of consideration. This e￿ect primarily occurs at AND nodes,
where all subtrees of this node must be successful in order to remain in the pruned
tree. However, if one of these subtrees becomes impossible, the other will also be
pruned. A hypothetical example derived from this analysis would be an AND node
concerning theft of a usable and valid ticket broken into subtrees covering both
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either of these subtrees were to be evaluated as Impossible, both would be removed
from the analysis at pruning. However, if the other subtree remains possible, this
is an important result that may represent an opportunity for further securing the
model. This observation indicates that further analysis of AND nodes identifying
scenarios such as this can sometimes yield valuable results concerning the security
of the design being analysed and ways of further improving it.
8.6 Discussion and Summary of Attack Tree Results
8.6.1 Summary of Attacks
The results from the attack tree analysis come in two forms. The ￿rst set of results
is the vulnerabilities identi￿ed during tree construction, which were discussed in
Chapter 7, and informed improvements to the model to avoid these security prob-
lems. The second set of results is those from the pruning analysis described in this
chapter that provide evidence as to the security of the Vaults model.
The pruning results identi￿ed attacks on the con￿dentiality property through a
race condition in manual updates ￿ the manual update race condition attack or
MURCA. This attack involved substituting malicious code for a recently upgraded
program prior to its ￿ngerprint being manually updated. However, the attack tree
model also identi￿ed that these attacks were dependent upon defeat of the veri￿able
integrity property and, when this latter property was analysed, no valid attacks were
found. Therefore, while the MURCA subtrees also exist in the tree analysing the
veri￿able integrity property, the prerequisite of defeating this same property led
to the requirements of these attacks becoming circular and therefore impossible.
Consequently, an empty pruning tree resulted indicating no possible attacks on the
veri￿able integrity property. As compromising veri￿able integrity is required to
violate the con￿dentiality property, under the assumptions of the analysis, no valid
attacks were found on both of the major security properties of the Vaults model.
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analysis brought to light. To further mitigate this problem, the Installer ￿ag was
developed. This ￿ag provides a convenient mechanism for automatically updating
￿ngerprints when installing new or updated software, thereby eliminating the need
to perform potentially vulnerable manual ￿ngerprint updates.
A highly limited set of attacks were also identi￿ed in the Trusted Fingerprinting
mechanism. One of these attacks involved an L1 program automatically updating
the ￿ngerprint of a dependency shared with another trusted program. While some-
what unlikely and subject to numerous constraints, this attack remains technically
possible under the stated assumptions of the analysis. The attack demonstrates
that L1 programs are largely untrusted and need to be treated with caution. It
also highlights that assigning an object as a dependency of a program has the e￿ect
of granting that program a very limited set of additional privileges in relation to
the object; namely, the ability to potentially automatically update that object’s
￿ngerprint if it also has write access. While potentially problematic in a very rare
set of circumstances, this is intended and otherwise correct behaviour. The iden-
ti￿cation of these ‘attacks’ is therefore a valuable result that can serve to inform
user behaviour and system con￿guration. For example, the problem is easily pre-
vented if dependencies of L1 programs are cryptographically write protected and, if
the object concerned is security-sensitive, this should apply regardless. The other
identi￿ed attacks on the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism all involve a trusted
program failing to pre-emptively lower its trust level as a result of some form of
error in the program when circumstance indicates that it should. These attack sce-
narios delineate the limits of the model in being unable to eliminate programmatic
errors in user software and therefore, arguably, are more indicative of ￿aws in the
analysis assumptions than in in the security model itself. However, again the model
provides a mechanism for avoiding these problems in practice through use of the
Require Trusted Data ￿ag, which supports automatic lowering of a process’s
trust level if this program accesses untrusted data.
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Con￿dentiality 86698 30897 35.64%
Integrity 88484 26445 29.89%
Fingerprinting 34075 12177 35.74%
Tree A5 Leaf Possible % A5 Total % A5 Possible A5 Unpruned % A5 Eliminated
Con￿dentiality 7017 8.09% 22.71% 63 99.10%
Integrity 7161 8.09% 27.08% 0 100.00%
Fingerprinting 2768 8.12% 22.73% 1 99.96%
Table 8.1: Statistics on leaf node possibility and Assumption 5
8.6.2 Security against Highly Privileged Attackers
Assumption 5, detailed in Section 6.3.6, permits the attacker to have a high level of
privilege on the system; namely, the attacker has the equivalent of Unix superuser
privileges and is able to bypass the operating system kernel and access secondary
storage devices directly. This assumption is important as its impact on the analysis
results re￿ects the success of the model in achieving its security goals, even against
a highly privileged attacker. To determine the impact of the assumption, leaf nodes
were extracted from the unpruned trees using the SecurITree software and ex-
ported as CSV ￿les. A Perl script was developed to extract the nodes that were
possible from these results, along with information identifying which assumptions
were involved in determining the node’s value. Statistics were then collected on
these results and are presented in Table 8.1. This information showed that, across
all three attack trees, only a single attack scenario remained in the unpruned trees
that was dependent upon the attacker having a high level of privilege. Details of
these results will now be discussed.
The columns in the ￿rst part of Table 8.1 show the total number of leaf nodes in
each of the unpruned trees, the total number of these nodes that were possible,
and this value as a percentage. While the number of leaf nodes is approximately
proportional to the size of the tree, the proportion of possible leaf nodes is notably
smaller in the veri￿able integrity tree compared to the other two trees, which are
close to identical. The similarities in the tree statistics demonstrates the underlying
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trees are quite di￿erent, attacks on the Vaults model were typically found to reduce
to a common set of basic attacks, such as obtaining a system vault key or learning
the user’s vault passphrase. These underlying ‘attack primitives’ were contained
within the attack tree libraries, shared between the main trees. Consequently, the
size and frequent recurrence of these libraries means the properties of the primitives
overwhelm the high-level di￿erences in attack methodologies in the statistics pre-
sented in the table. However, while the attacks modelled in the veri￿able integrity
tree depend upon these same primitives, fewer leaf nodes were possible due to the
circularity in these shared attack methodologies that depend upon violating the
same property as discussed in Section 8.3.3.
The second part of the table reports the number of leaf nodes that were dependent,
either entirely or partly, on Assumption 5. These represented proportionally about
8% of all leaf nodes and 22.7% of possible leaf nodes in the con￿dentiality and
Trusted Fingerprinting trees. However, in the veri￿able integrity tree, this propor-
tion increased to 27.08% as a result of their being fewer possible leaf nodes overall
for the reasons just described.
Finally, the second part of Table 8.1 also includes information about the pruning of
Assumption 5-dependent leaf nodes. Since all of the attack scenarios in the veri￿able
integrity tree were removed during pruning, this shows that, according to the attack
tree analysis, a highly privileged attacker cannot violate this security property.
Similarly, while 63 Assumption 5-dependent leaf nodes remained in the interim
pruned con￿dentiality tree, as discussed in Section 8.3.3, these were all dependent on
the attacker also being able to defeat veri￿able integrity. Since this was not possible,
all of these nodes were ultimately pruned. Consequently, the attack tree analysis
ultimately showed that the Vaults model was able to maintain the con￿dentiality
of protected data when under attack by a highly privileged attacker. These results
with respect to the two central security properties of the Vaults model support the
argument that cryptographically-based security models are better able to maintain
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In the Trusted Fingerprinting tree, only one Assumption 5-dependent leaf node re-
mained after pruning. This represented a 99.96% elimination of such nodes. This
￿gure is a quantitative indication of the security of Trusted Fingerprinting against a
highly privileged attacker. The single remaining attack is that described in Section
8.4.4, where a malicious program assigned L1 privileges becomes able to automat-
ically update the ￿ngerprint of its dependencies when the relevant ￿ags are set
correctly, and the malicious program is allowed to modify the object in question.
As noted, this ‘vulnerability’ is actually correct and intended behaviour, and only
becomes problematic where the dependency concerned is shared with one or more
non-malicious programs. In this particular case, the presence of this attack scenario
primarily serves to highlight this potentially undesirable behaviour so that it can
be avoided in practice. This, therefore, is the only valid attack scenario from the
billions considered in the attack trees that is in any way assisted by the attacker
having a higher level of privileges and demonstrates the resilience achievable by
cryptographically-based models.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the results from the attack tree analysis of the Vaults
security model. Summaries have been given of the complete unpruned trees con-
taining hypothetical attacks against the design of the model. Detailed results have
then been described for applying pruning criteria to these complete trees in order
to remove those attacks not possible according to the assumptions of the analysis.
These results showed that no attacks could be identi￿ed against the two principal
security properties, con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity. However, the attack tree
modelling also identi￿ed the seriousness of the threat posed by potential attacks
involving race conditions when manually updating the ￿ngerprints of trusted pro-
grams. While these attacks were not su￿cient in themselves to violate either of the
two main security properties, the Installer ￿ag was added to the model to facil-
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the need for manual updating in practice.
The attack trees analysing the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism also showed it to
be very secure. However, an attack was identi￿ed involving the ability of potentially-
malicious L1 programs to automatically update the ￿ngerprint values of dependen-
cies that may be shared with other trusted programs. Closer inspection showed
that this attack was, in fact, correct behaviour and its presence in the pruned tree
is therefore valuable in serving to highlight the potential for this undesirable be-
haviour when the user con￿gures and uses the system in a certain way. Attacks on
Trusted Fingerprinting were also found where trusted programs might fail to vol-
untarily lower their trust levels when accessing program-speci￿c types of untrusted
data. However, such issues are entirely indicative of the general unavoidability of
undesirable behaviour by trusted programs, rather than a de￿ciency in the under-
lying security model, and possibly should have been excluded from the analysis by
assumption. In any case, this problem can be mitigated through the use of the
Require Trusted Data ￿ag, which causes the program to lose its privileges if it
accesses any untrusted data.
Finally, the e￿ect of the assumed ability of an attacker to obtain a higher level
of privilege on the system and potentially bypass the security kernel in accessing
objects on secondary storage was also considered. A statistical analysis of the
presence of this assumption in the attack tree nodes showed that it had no e￿ect on
either the con￿dentiality or veri￿able integrity properties, and played only a minor
role in the malicious L1 dependency automatic update attack identi￿ed associated
with Trusted Fingerprinting. These results therefore support the claim that the
cryptographically-based Vaults model is secure, both in general and when defending
against a highly privileged attacker.
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Discussion and Conclusions
9.1 Summary of Research Results
This thesis has presented the Vaults scheme, a novel security model that utilises
cryptographic features in order to achieve superior security compared with exist-
ing non-cryptographic mechanisms. However, the Vaults model also maintains an
access control interface that is notionally similar to existing mainstream schemes,
rather than the often complex and unfamiliar approaches used by other high se-
curity alternatives. The Vaults model includes mechanisms to cryptographically
protect the security of ￿les, verify and assign trust levels to processes and securely
manage the use of user passwords and other keys. However, unlike previous uses
of cryptography, these mechanisms are employed in an integrated manner that ob-
tains maximum bene￿t by recognising the interdependence between these features.
Finally, the complete model was analysed using a threat modelling-based method-
ology in order to evaluate its overall security and, in particular, assess its ability to
resist penetration by highly privileged attackers.
Achieving the goal of maintaining its speci￿ed security properties against a privi-
leged attacker requires addressing the weaknesses of widely used security models,
where all administrative privileges are concentrated in a single user identity. Under
such schemes, the concentration of privileges makes this account the primary target
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be used whenever any administrative task needs to be performed. If an attacker is
able to compromise the superuser account, they are generally able to bypass any
and all security restrictions enforced by the system.
Vaults addresses this problem in a number of ways, such as by limiting the degree
to which identity determines privilege. Under the new scheme, the ability to access
a protected ￿le depends primarily on the contents of the vault to which the pro-
cess has access, rather than the identity of the user nominally associated with the
process. Consequently, gaining access to the superuser account does not, in itself,
confer the privileges necessary to access protected ￿les. Even more signi￿cantly,
the use of cryptography facilitates a passive protection architecture, as de￿ned by
Gi￿ord [127] and discussed in Section 2.5.2. As a result, protection remains in e￿ect
even if a privileged user bypasses the active protection mechanism in the form of
the security kernel and accesses objects directly on the secondary storage device.
This property gives the Vaults model the ability to maintain its speci￿ed security
properties, even if an attacker obtains complete control over the superuser account.
Finally, while Vaults includes a highly privileged account (the prime user) that is
able to bypass its security controls, the design of this account speci￿cally avoids
the problems of privileged identities in existing mechanisms. In particular, the ac-
count is designed to be rarely needed, unlike the ubiquitous superuser. Similarly,
these privileges only apply to interactively executed processes that have access to
the necessary cryptographic tokens held in the prime user’s vault, and then only
to cryptographically-veri￿ed processes that have been speci￿cally authorised to do
this. Consequently, the opportunities to attack these privileged processes are ex-
tremely limited, at best.
9.1.1 Vaults Security Features
The titular component of the Vaults security model are the secure repositories used
for storing sensitive values and access tokens. In the case of user vaults, they store
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privilege of the user on the system. A set of system vaults also exist, which hold
data relevant to the system as a whole, and should not be under the control of any
individual user.
The Vaults model includes the Trusted Fingerprinting feature that allows security-
relevant programs, and other objects these depend on, to be cryptographically ver-
i￿ed prior to execution or access. Trusted Fingerprinting applies on both a global
and per-user basis. Therefore, the security administrator can create ￿ngerprints
for programs that are relevant to the security requirements of all users or the sys-
tem in general. These ￿ngerprints are stored in the Global Public vault (GPUB)
and veri￿ed whenever any user executes one of the speci￿ed programs. However,
users may also instantiate ￿ngerprints for programs relevant to their own individ-
ual security requirements. Fingerprints for such programs are stored in the user’s
vault and similarly veri￿ed upon execution. In the case of both global and local
￿ngerprints, veri￿cation is performed, not just for the executable program, but
also for a variety of objects on which the program depends for secure and correct
operation. These additional dependencies may include shared libraries, as well as
data ￿les containing information such as con￿guration parameters. Fingerprints
for library dependencies are veri￿ed prior to linking, while data ￿le ￿ngerprints are
veri￿ed when the designated program opens the object for reading. The Trusted
Fingerprinting mechanism is also capable of tracking modi￿cations to data ￿le de-
pendencies and automatically updating ￿ngerprint values where these modi￿cations
are performed by the relevant veri￿ed program. This feature means that the ￿nger-
prints of regularly modi￿ed security-sensitive ￿les are kept up-to-date and avoids
the security risks and inconvenience associated with performing manual updates.
Trusted Fingerprinting also facilitates the assignment of privileges to processes.
Program ￿ngerprint records specify one of three trust levels that will then be as-
signed upon successful veri￿cation. The trust level of a process dictates the nature
and extent of its access to cryptographically protected objects on the system. Pro-
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are regarded as untrusted. Untrusted programs have no access to protected ob-
jects and are therefore unprivileged. This design resolves a signi￿cant weakness
in existing code veri￿cation schemes that do not di￿erentiate between veri￿ed and
unveri￿ed code with respect to their privileges. Failing to make this distinction
opens the door to a class of attacks where veri￿cation is suppressed and malicious
code substituted for otherwise trusted code.
Vaults also incorporates a cryptographically-based access control model. Users
may designate speci￿c ￿les to be read protected, write protected or both. Read
protection results in the ￿le’s contents being encrypted, and this data will only be
decrypted if the process attempting to read the object has access to the necessary
token. Write protection involves calculating a message authentication code (MAC)
of the ￿le’s contents. Subsequent attempts to open the ￿le require that the MAC be
veri￿ed to ensure that the ￿le has not been modi￿ed and, again, the correct token is
required for write access. Upon legitimate modi￿cations to the ￿le, the MAC value
is recalculated and securely stored for later veri￿cation. Vaults cryptographically
enhanced access controls are designed to achieve their con￿dentiality and veri￿ed
integrity goals, even against an attacker who is able to bypass the security kernel
and gain unrestricted access to objects stored on the disk.
The access control model also supports sharing and revocation of privileges. When
a user ￿rst protects a ￿le that they own, they receive a primary ticket. Possession
of this token permits subsequent access to the ￿le and also allows the user to grant
access to others by the creation of secondary tickets. These tickets are securely
exchanged using a lightweight PKI, and are irreversibly and cryptographically linked
with the intended recipient’s vault. This design prevents recipients of secondary
tickets from duplicating and distributing them to unauthorised users, and makes
the use of stolen tickets impossible. The primary ticket holder may also revoke
access to the protected object, thereby rendering the speci￿ed secondary tickets
unusable by their recipients. Revocation is computationally inexpensive and does
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￿lesystems, the Vaults approach maintains the properties expected of generic access
control schemes. Finally, the design includes a mechanism to facilitate the secure
veri￿cation of the protection status of system ￿les. This is necessary because naive
storage of metadata in the ￿lesystem can be trivially subverted by an attacker who
is able to bypass the security kernel and tamper with the values directly.
However, all of these features of the Vaults security model are not merely discrete,
independent mechanisms but are designed to be complementary and synergistic.
While the vaults themselves underpin the other two mechanisms by securely storing
keys, tickets and ￿ngerprints, the Trusted Fingerprinting mechanism and associated
trust levels are used to authenticate the release and use of these parameters. This
resolves a serious weakness in many previous secure storage architectures, where
ascertaining whether to release sensitive values to unauthenticated processes re-
mains problematic. Similarly, the integration between Trusted Fingerprinting and
the cryptographic access controls allows for veri￿ed and unveri￿ed code to be distin-
guished from one another in terms of access privileges to protected objects. There-
fore, unlike previous uses of cryptography to improve operating system security
that exist as ad hoc, independent mechanisms designed to achieve a single secu-
rity function, the design of Vaults recognizes the interdependencies between these
mechanisms and integrates them, leveraging their individual strengths to provide
maximum security bene￿ts.
9.1.2 Security Analysis
To examine the security of the Vaults model, and evaluate its success in utilising
cryptography to improve security, a threat modelling-based analysis was performed
using attack trees. The analysis sought to collect evidence, not only as to the overall
security of the model, but particularly with respect to its principal security objective
of maintaining the properties of con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity when faced
with a highly privileged attacker. After considering a number of security analysis
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elucidation of the potential attacks on the model that might be available to a highly
privileged attacker and provided a mechanism to identify which of these attacks
would actually be achievable.
Attack trees were constructed for the model’s major security features and proper-
ties; namely, the con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity properties, and the Trusted
Fingerprinting mechanism. In addition to the natural features of the attack tree
technique, a re￿ned and even more methodical approach involving the identi￿cation
of logically complementary attack scenarios was developed and employed in order
to maximise the completeness of the analysis. All scenarios that could bring the
attacker closer to achieving their goal were included. Attack tree libraries were
also developed, collecting together subtrees containing reusable, generic scenarios.
While libraries often needed to be adapted to the speci￿c tree in which they were
to be used, this approach assisted signi￿cantly in managing the complexity of the
large trees that were developed, as new attacks incorporated into a library after
being discovered would automatically be inherited by all trees referencing that li-
brary. The complete unpruned trees, containing all hypothetical attacks identi￿ed,
constituted a total of 160,509 nodes for the con￿dentiality property tree, 163,816
nodes for the veri￿able integrity property tree, and 63,124 nodes for the Trusted
Fingerprinting tree.
Prior to beginning the building of the attack trees, a list of 12 assumptions was
compiled. During tree construction, leaf nodes were assigned a Boolean value in-
dicating whether the particular stage or component of the overall attack described
by the node could be achieved by an attacker. The value of this attribute was
principally determined by whether or not the action described by the node violated
one or more of the stated assumptions. If the action did not violate any of the
assumptions, it was considered to be possible even if the action was very di￿cult
or required a signi￿cant degree of luck. A small number of leaf nodes were also
designated as being Impossible where the attack requirements of the scenario had
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Once construction of the tree was complete, the tree was then ‘pruned’ by removing
all attack scenarios deemed impossible according to the values of the leaf nodes and
the logic de￿ned by the structure of the tree. This process removed all hypothetical
attacks, leaving only those possible according to the analysis assumptions. These
results initially identi￿ed a number of attacks on the con￿dentiality property, in-
volving a potential race condition when manually updating the ￿ngerprint value for
a trusted program. However, the analysis also identi￿ed that these attacks required
defeating the veri￿able integrity property in order to be successful. Since no at-
tacks were found on veri￿able integrity, when the pruning analysis was repeated on
the con￿dentiality tree taking this result into account, no attacks on con￿dentiality
were ultimately found to be possible. Consequently, the analysis demonstrated that
the Vaults model is able to maintain security, even in the face of a highly privileged
attacker.
A small number of highly limited attacks on Trusted Fingerprinting were found to
remain after pruning. However, closer inspection showed that they either re￿ected
the conservative nature of the analysis assumptions or were, in fact, correct be-
haviour and therefore served to more clearly delineate the bounds of the security
enforced by the model. A number of issues with the model were also identi￿ed dur-
ing tree construction. In the small number of cases these re￿ected potential attacks,
but more often highlighted ambiguities in the speci￿cation of the model that could
potentially lead to undesirable behaviour. As a result, the model was adapted to
take into account these issues and the attack trees correspondingly modi￿ed. These
results show the bene￿ts of the attack tree approach in helping to clarify and re￿ne
the design of a security model being analysed.
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9.2.1 Lack of Availability Protection
The Vaults model has speci￿c security objectives that must be met with respect
to con￿dentiality and veri￿able integrity. In particular, the model is designed to
meet these objectives even if an attacker is able to bypass the security kernel and
access objects directly on the disk. However, there are no stated security goals with
respect to availability. Therefore, while an attacker would not be able to view or
undetectably modify designated protected objects, the scheme has no mechanism
to prevent them from deleting or corrupting such data. This represents a deliberate
limitation of the model’s scope that re￿ects both typical user requirements and the
practical reality that it is very di￿cult, if not completely infeasible, to prevent such
actions by a privileged attacker. In particular, an attacker who can bypass the
security kernel cannot be actively prevented from tampering with protected data
without taking signi￿cant additional measures that go well beyond the scope of the
Vaults scheme. This is therefore an acknowledged limitation of the model.
9.2.2 Limitations of the Analysis
As described in Chapter 6, the attack tree technique was selected as being most
suited to the task of analysing the Vaults security model. In particular, attack trees
can be applied to analyse schemes involving various levels of abstraction and do not
require any speci￿c level of detail. The technique was also well-suited for delineat-
ing the capabilities of a highly privileged attacker with respect to the restrictions
enforced by the model. Consequently, the results demonstrate the ability of Vaults
to maintain its speci￿ed properties when faced with an attacker who can modify
objects stored directly on the disk. It is believed that the comprehensive nature of
the attack trees produced constitutes signi￿cant evidence regarding the degree of
security the model achieves.
However, as with virtually all analysis techniques and methodologies, success is
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always possible for implicit assumptions to be applied by the analyst without these
being recognized. Such unconscious assumptions are generally hard to identify.
As a result, certain valid attacks may be unconsciously excluded when this is not
justi￿ed. More generic errors can also creep in, particularly when a high level of
complexity is involved.
Fortunately, the methodical unstructured nature of attack trees reduces the dangers
stemming from unrecognized assumptions. The logically complementary attack
scenarios technique employed (Section 6.3.3) further minimises this risk. Finally,
to the degree allowed by the large size of the trees involved, trees were checked
(and often rechecked) after construction to verify correctness. The logic expressed
in tree libraries, was also examined and reviewed before incorporating them within
another tree. These practices therefore sought to minimise the risk of errors in the
tree. However, while all e￿orts have been made to reduce the risk of these problems,
the possibility of errors in the analysis cannot be de￿nitively excluded and remains
an acknowledged limitation of the research.
9.2.3 Absence of an Implementation
Many of the schemes that employ cryptography discussed in Chapter 2 have sample
implementations available. However, these implementations are typically little more
than proofs-of-concept and very few have seen deployment beyond their use by
the researchers involved. Furthermore, these implementations provide only limited
information concerning the security of the schemes. The principal objective of
this research was to demonstrate how cryptographic models can be used to improve
security and a prototype or sample implementation would have done little to achieve
this goal.
An implementation would have demonstrated the practicality of the Vaults model.
However, Vaults does not have any fundamental requirements that go beyond the
low-level features typically found in contemporary hardware and widely available
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graphic mechanisms employed by previous schemes, albeit in an integrated and
holistic way. Further, given the number of practical but highly vulnerable systems
in widespread use, the development of a secure system appears to be a bigger and
more important challenge than simply getting a system working.
One practical use of implementations of earlier security schemes has been to obtain
benchmarks in order to assess the impact of the use of cryptography on overall
performance. However, the acceptable performance of these schemes￿even as non-
optimised prototypical implementations￿along with the continuous improvement
in hardware performance, indicate that Vaults performance would be acceptable in
practice1. While the use of cryptography naturally imposes an overhead on per-
formance, the potential security bene￿ts are believed to outweigh these additional
costs. As Schneier & Fergusson [17] have stated: ￿We have enough fast, insecure
systems. We don’t need another one.￿
9.3 Directions for Further Research
9.3.1 Distributed Applications of Vaults
The Vaults scheme was conceived from the beginning as a security model appli-
cable to a single autonomous system. This focus was signi￿cantly in￿uenced by
the view put forward by Loscocco et al. [4], that application and network-based
security mechanisms are fundamentally unable to su￿ciently mitigate increasingly
critical security risks and instead stronger operating system-level security features
are required. Therefore, a central goal of the research was to explore the unique ad-
vantages that the application of cryptography was expected to have in the speci￿c
context of operating system security.
1It is interesting to note that in the paper describing his scheme, Gi￿ord [127] entirely discounts
the impact of cryptography on real-world performance. Given this paper was published in 1982
and, considering the progress with respect to hardware and cipher performance since this time, it
seems likely that fears over the computational costs of cryptography are largely unwarranted
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cability to distributed systems. For example, the assumption that an attacker can
potentially access and manipulate data on a secondary storage device implies sig-
ni￿cant commonality with the threat model of a distributed system. Indeed, an
initial inspection suggests that, under the model, a transparently mounted network
￿lesystem would inherit similar, if not identical, security properties that apply to
local storage. While scenarios involving interactions between multiple autonomous
systems are likely to involve more complexity, the scheme appears amenable to the
use of secondary tickets held on a di￿erent system. This could be done, for exam-
ple, by including both the ticket and certi￿cate in the request, along with a suitable
protocol to authenticate the request and ensure freshness and transport security.
With the rise of cloud computing and questions regarding its security [268], the
relevance of cryptographically-based access control schemes, such as Vaults, seems
likely to increase.
The central issue where multiple systems, and potentially multiple users, are in-
volved is ensuring adequate authentication. While the lightweight PKI presented
here is adequate for inter-user authentication within a single system, more sophis-
ticated features are likely to be required if applied to the distributed context. For
example, mutual authentication between users from two autonomous systems would
require a certi￿cate chaining mechanism and either mutual authentication between
the certi￿cation authorities (CAs) of both systems or a mutually trusted root CA.
Alternatively, an external PKI such as X.509, which already has these features,
could be integrated with the scheme. In any case, with some work, it seems likely
that the Vaults model could be extended and applied within the distributed context.
9.3.2 Assurance Advantages of Cryptography
An ongoing problem in the development of sophisticated modern systems and secu-
rity models is verifying that both the design and implementation are correct. The
di￿culty in obtaining such assurance is directly related to the complexity of the
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the harder it will be to audit and the more likely to contain vulnerabilities [3,15].
A hypothesis arrived at during the design of the Vaults model was that the use of
cryptography itself could have additional advantages with respect to the assurance
level of a system. The ￿rst aspect of this is a natural extension of Gi￿ord’s [127]
notion of a passive protection system. That is, if a protection system does not need
to constantly actively enforce security policy, then it is likely to be both simpler and
more reliable. For example, intuitively, there are less ways for an attacker to breach
the con￿dentiality of a ￿le encrypted with a secure cipher than an unencrypted ￿le,
assuming legitimate access is obtained via an equivalent active security kernel in
both instances.
However, the complexity of the kernel required to control access to encrypted objects
may also be e￿ectively less than that used in a non-cryptographic scheme. Consider
two abstract security kernel implementations, one that employs cryptography and
the other that does not. Assuming the total complexity of both in terms of code
size is essentially the same, a critical part of the cryptographic implementation
will be the routines that perform the various cryptographic algorithms required.
While these routines may be complex, they are also easily veri￿ed for correctness
through the application of standardised test vectors for which the corrects output
are known. In e￿ect, therefore, the use of cryptography may allow a signi￿cant
part of the overall complexity of the code for enforcing security policy to be moved
into a well-de￿ned and easily tested set of routines. While additional routines will
usually still be required to enforce the logic necessary to support the model, in
many cases they may be both smaller and simpler than those in non-cryptographic
implementations. Furthermore, the use of cryptography may mitigate the e￿ects
of any failure in the supporting logic by virtue of the inherently passive nature of
the cryptographic protection system as described. While the limited scope of this
study precluded exploring the validity of these hypotheses, it is believed that the
potential assurance bene￿ts of cryptographic security mechanisms warrant further
examination.
3069.3.3 Further Research on Attack Trees
During the use of the attack tree methodology to analyse the security of Vaults,
a number of observations were made concerning potential research opportunities
to extend the capabilities of this technique. For example, during the analysis, the
library feature of the SecurITree software was used extensively to create reusable
collections of subtrees re￿ecting shared attack components. Since attacks on di￿er-
ent aspects of the model often exhibit signi￿cant commonality, use of libraries can
streamline the process of tree construction. However, a number of limitations of
subtree reuse were identi￿ed during this work. In particular, there is a trade-o￿ be-
tween making the nodes in a library su￿ciently generic to facilitate reuse in a wide
range of attack scenarios and ensuring that the low-level details of a speci￿c attack
are properly described. In many cases, a subtree must therefore be amended to take
into account its low-level context. These changes can range from modi￿cations to
node labels, annotations and attribute values, to the addition or removal of nodes.
This can lead to multiple versions of what is essentially the same subtree applied
in di￿erent contexts, thereby limiting the principal bene￿t of library use. Future
work in this area could involve the parameterisation of attack subtree libraries,
analogous to the parameterisation of code modules, to maximise reusability. Such
an approach would increase library reusability in a ￿exible manner, while incurring
only a small cost in terms of additional complexity.
Another area for possible future research relating to libraries involves identifying
at exactly what level in a tree a subtree should be separated out and placed in
a library. It was identi￿ed during attack tree construction that, if a subtree were
moved into a library too early, this increased the likelihood of problems such as
undetected circularity in tree logic or a disconnect between the goals of the attack
at the higher levels of the tree compared with the speci￿c methods described at the
lower levels. Therefore, consideration of general strategies and methodologies for
identi￿cation of the optimal level for tree decomposition may be a valuable future
research area, perhaps leading to enhanced tool support.
307Section 8.5.2 discussed a number of ways that quantitative metrics of security could
be developed based upon attack tree characteristics, which represent an important
opportunity for further research. For example, intuitively, the sooner any given
attack scenario becomes impossible, the more secure the overall design. By aver-
aging the height above each leaf node that the subtree becomes impossible, it may
be possible to obtain a quantitative picture of overall security. Alternatively, the
security of the model in relation to speci￿c high- and mid-level attacks could also
be quanti￿ed by considering the calculated values at this point. As discussed in
Section 8.5.2, it may also be possible to obtain a quantitative measure of the degree
of defence-in-depth provided by the system by considering the number and distri-
bution of AND nodes within a tree. Quantitative analysis of attack tree structure
and characteristics therefore present valuable opportunities for additional research.
Finally, there may be opportunities to combine attack trees with the argument trees
technique described in Section 6.2.6. While both techniques employ a tree struc-
ture for modelling security-related information, the methodologies are otherwise
e￿ectively opposite in their focus. An attack tree presents a high-level attack goal
and provides a structure for elucidating the detailed methods that may be used to
achieve this goal. Conversely, an argument tree describes an overall security prop-
erty and supports the modelling of the requirements that must be met in order to
provide this property. The two techniques are therefore complementary and further
research to examine the possible bene￿ts of combining them may be worthwhile.
9.4 Conclusion
The Vaults security model presented here leverages cryptography to provide security
properties superior to those available in conventional models, while maintaining
a simpler and more intuitive interface than the alternative mandatory security-
based schemes. The integrated use of the cryptographic features contained within
Vaults is designed to provide maximal leverage from the bene￿ts of employing
cryptography. Consequently, a design objective of the model is to maintain its
308security properties, even if an attacker is able to obtain a high level of privileges
on the system. To assess the ability of Vaults to achieve these goals, a large-scale
attack tree analysis was performed involving the construction of trees describing
hypothetical attacks available to a highly privileged attacker. After analysing these
trees and pruning them by removing branches considered to be impossible, the
results indicated that the Vaults model is, in fact, able to meet these objectives.
Vaults therefore demonstrates the advantages in the use of cryptography as a means
for achieving the enhanced levels of security required in contemporary computing
environments.
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Glossary
active node The node in the runtime digraph for a process that actually deter-
mines that process’s behaviour.
AN See active node.
anonymity The security requirement that one, some or all of the identities of
parties involved in a given transaction not be able to be determined by
one, some or all of the other parties.
application keys Keys held within a vault that have a single, primary purpose
and are therefore used by a speci￿c application.
attack scenario Informally, a speci￿c situation that may lead to an attack. More
formally, with reference to attack trees, an attack scenario is a minimal
subset of nodes from a complete tree that constitutes a valid attack
according to the top-level attack goal.
authentication A process whereby the identity of the parties involved in a given
transaction may be reliably veri￿ed.
availability The security requirement that the allocation of, and access to, com-
puting resources will be ‘reasonable’ and in accordance with security
310policy and expected service quality levels. It is regarded as one of the
primary dimensions of security.
CBC See cipher block chaining mode.
CFS Cryptographic File System (see Section 2.5.1).
cipher block chaining mode A block cipher encryption mode where the plain-
text of each block is XORed against the previous ciphertext block prior
to encryption. The ￿rst block in the message is XORed against a ran-
domly selected initialisation vector, which is then prepended to the mes-
sage in plaintext.
complete tree An attack tree that has not been pruned. See also pruned tree.
con￿dentiality The security requirement that data, either in whole or in part,
may not be viewed by any unauthorised parties. Often this extends to
protecting not only the data itself but any additional metadata that
may reveal any information about the data itself. Sometimes referred
to as secrecy, con￿dentiality is one of the dimensions of security.
DAC Discretionary Access Controls. See discretionary security.
dependency Notionally an object on which another object (generally a program or
program component about to be executed) depends. More speci￿cally
it is a record in a dependency digraph.
discretionary security Security models where users decide the access to others
have to their data.
digital rights management Technology used to control the use and distribution
of copyrighted digital content.
digraph A directed graph data structure. See also dependency digraph.
digraph source In general, a vertex or node in a directed graph (digraph) is nor-
mally only reachable by itself and therefore has an indegree of 1 (only
311a single edge leads to that vertex). In the case of dependency digraphs,
a source has an indegree of 0 since these dependency digraph edges are
irre￿exive and do not link with themselves. Sources in dependency di-
graphs will generally represent an executable program since they are not
a dependency of any other object; however, not all executable programs
will be digraphs sources since many helper and utility applications will
represent dependencies of other programs.
dependency digraph A directional graph structure used to store dependency
data and to show the interrelationships between individual dependen-
cies necessary for correct veri￿cation (see Section 5.2.1, especially p.
136).
dependency record See ￿ngerprint record.
double match Where the matching process identi￿es a match in both GPUB and
the user’s vault (see p. 144).
DRM See digital rights management.
ECB See electronic code book mode.
e￿ective trust level The actual trust level assigned to a process. Note that this
will normally be the process’s speci￿ed trust level (STL) but may be
reduced as a result of a number of factors.
EFS Encrypting File System (see Section 2.5.1).
electronic code book mode A block cipher encryption mode where each block
is individually encrypted.
EP See executing process.
ETL See e￿ective trust level.
executing process The node in a runtime digraph corresponding to the actual
native code currently executing.
312FSO See File System Object.
￿ngerprint A unique representation of a speci￿c piece of data that can be used as
a method of con￿rming its integrity. Normally implemented through a
cryptographic one-way hash function.
￿ngerprint record The hash value and other associated metadata stored with
regards to a speci￿c program or object on the system that is to be
veri￿ed. When discussed in the context of interrelationships between
these objects, a ￿ngerprint record may be referred to as a dependency
record.
￿ngerprint veri￿cation See veri￿cation.
File System Object An object residing on secondary storage. Primarily an ordi-
nary ￿le but can also refer to directories and various ￿lesystem esoterica
such as sockets, FIFOs and symbolic links. The term may be used within
the context of the new model to refer to any object to be protected by
enhanced access controls.
Global Trusted Computing Base Under the new model, the trusted computing
base is divided into two parts. The global part pertains to those parts
of the system upon whose integrity the security of the entire system
depends. For example, if the kernel, login software or vault management
software is compromised and replaced by an attacker with a modi￿ed
version, the security of the entire system will very likely fail. See also
Local Trusted Computing Base.
GPRIV See global private vault.
GPUB See global public vault.
global private vault A system vault, maintained by the kernel and used to store
values for which the con￿dentiality and integrity must be ensured. No
users, including the privileged prime user, are able to directly access
313items held in GPRIV with all interactions being indirect and strictly
mediated by the security kernel (see Section 3.2.2 for details).
global public vault A system vault that stores information intended to be pub-
licly accessible in a reliable and authentic way to all users on the system.
Ordinary users may only read data from GPUB and cannot directly
modify the values it stores. All access to the vault is therefore mediated
by the security kernel.
GTCB See Global Trust Computing Base.
integrity The security requirement that data cannot be modi￿ed by unautho-
rised parties or be modi￿ed in an unauthorised way by those who are
otherwise authorised to modify it. This also implies the result of any
modi￿cation will also be internally consistent and correct. It is one of
the principal dimensions of security.
key In general, a secret value that provides access to something; for example,
a decryption key. Speci￿cally pertaining to the model, a key refers to
an access code or token kept inside a vault that may be provided to
speci￿ed applications and/or utilised internally by the system kernel. It
can also refer to generic sensitive items held within a vault.
L0 The trust level assigned to a process that has not been cryptographically
veri￿ed and has no access to cryptographically protected objects. This
trust level may also be assigned at runtime to cryptographically veri￿ed
programs if certain criteria are met that require the process’s trust level
to be reduced.
L1 The trust level assigned to a program that is to be cryptographically ver-
i￿ed but may only access cryptographically protected objects for which
it has been speci￿cally authorised.
L2 The trust level assigned to a program that is to be cryptographically
314veri￿ed and may access all cryptographically protected objects for which
the user is authorised.
L3 The trust level assigned to a program that is granted direct access to
the contents of the user’s vault for administrative purposes.
Local Trusted Computing Base Under the new model, the trusted computing
base is divided into two parts. The local part refers to programs that
the user depends on for their own security and correspond to their own
security requirements. It does not include parts of the Global Trusted
Computing Base on which all users’ security depends. For example, the
user may have keys in their vault that are bound to speci￿c applications,
such as their PGP passphrase, which is bound to the PGP program
they use. Should the PGP program be modi￿ed to leak user’s keys to
an attacker, the user’s security may be compromised. Hence the user
may ￿ngerprint this application, thus including it in their own LTCB.
LTCB See Local Trusted Computing Base.
MAC Mandatory Access Controls. See mandatory security.
mandatory security A property of some security models where access to data
is decided based on a systemwide policy, rather than individual user’s
discretion.
manual update race condition attack An attack on the integrity of ￿ngerprints
for trusted programs identi￿ed in the attack tree analysis. The attack
involves substituting malicious code for a trusted program that has re-
cently been upgraded prior to the ￿ngerprint of the new program being
calculated and manually updated.
MLS See multi-level security.
matching The process of attempting to identify whether a program about to be
executed has a ￿ngerprint that corresponds to it (see Section 5.1.2).
315MUA Mail User Agent. The piece of software that provides the end-user with
access to an electronic mail system. That is, the software allows the
user to receive, read, write and send email.
multi-level security The ability for data with di￿erent sensitivity labels to coex-
ist securely on a single computer system.
MURCA See manual update race condition attack.
network ￿le system A protocol for accessing ￿les from a di￿erent computer sys-
tem across a network in a largely transparent way.
NFS See network ￿le system.
non-repudiation The technical ability and goal of preventing the sender of a
message from later claiming the message did not originate from them.
parent ETL In the credentials metadata associated with each process, this ￿eld
speci￿es the ETL of the parent of that process.
parent VID In the credentials metadata associated with each process, this ￿eld
speci￿es the VID of the parent of that process.
partial match A possible outcome of the matching process that occurs when there
is evidence to suggest a ￿ngerprinted program exists corresponding to
that being executed, but it is not clear that the ￿ngerprint is intended
for this program. This essentially corresponds to a situation where the
name of the ￿le being executed matches that of a ￿ngerprint, however,
the fully-quali￿ed path names do not match and the normal response
to this is to deny execution (see Figure 5.1).
PETL See parent ETL.
PKI See Public Key Infrastructure.
primary ticket A ticket possessed by the subject who has protected a given ob-
ject. Possession of a primary ticket allows the subject to grant access
316to other subjects (via a secondary ticket), to revoke access previously
granted and to remove protection from an object.
principal An entity participating in an authentication protocol. Typically the
protocol will result in the principals involved having mutually authen-
ticated.
process trust level Under Vaults, each process is assigned a trust level labelled
from L0 to L3, depending upon the information that relates to this
program as stored in the vaults. To some degree, a process’s trust level
dictates what it may do in regards to its interaction with the user’s
vault and the protected items managed within it (see Section 3.4.2 for
more details).
protected A term pertaining to the new model designating the use of an enhanced
access control on an object for either read protection through encryption
or write protection using a MAC.
protection status The status of a ￿le with respect to whether or not the ￿le
has been cryptographically protected by its owner (see Section 4.5 for
further details).
protection status authenticator A piece of ￿lesystem metadata, stored for ev-
ery ￿le on the system, that is used by the kernel to securely determine
the protection status of that ￿le (see Section 4.5 for further details).
protection status index A sequential number in the protection status table used
to identify and look up protection status information for each ￿le on the
system (see Section 4.5 for further details).
protection status table The tabular data structure held securely by the kernel
in GPRIV that contains protection status information for each ￿le on
the system (see Section 4.5 for further details).
317protection mode Whether a ￿lesystem object is granted read or write protec-
tion.
pruned tree An attack tree that has had a set of pruning criteria applied to it to
remove all nodes not valid according to those criteria. See also complete
tree.
pruning The process of removing impossible attack scenarios from an attack tree
to leave only those valid for the speci￿ed criteria.
PSA See protection status authenticator.
PSI See protection status index.
PST See protection status table.
Public Key Infrastructure A system whereby public keys may be authenticated
as actually belonging to the party named on the key.
PVID See parent VID.
revocation The annulment of a speci￿c privilege in an access control model. It
may also refer to the cancellation of a token such as a certi￿cate used
to authenticate a party.
RDVM See runtime dependency veri￿cation model.
Runtime Dependency Veri￿cation Model The process by which dependen-
cies of a program are veri￿ed essentially in an on-demand manner at
runtime, taking into account di￿erences between dependency types (see
Section 5.4).
runtime digraph The merged digraph consisting of dependencies from both the
user’s vault and also GPUB (local and global TCBs) that applies to an
application throughout its execution lifetime for the veri￿cation of its
dependencies.
318recipient In an exchange of messages, the recipient receives the ￿rst message.
scenario See attack scenario.
secondary ticket The class of ticket granted to a subject by the owner of a pro-
tected object who wishes to grant that subject access to that object.
secrecy See con￿dentiality.
sender In an exchange of messages, the sender initiates the exchange.
set UID In Unix, a program that always executes with a speci￿c, ￿xed UID
regardless of the UID of the user who runs it.
speci￿ed trust level The trust level speci￿ed for a program in its ￿ngerprint
record.
STL See speci￿ed trust level.
TCB See trusted computing base.
TCFS Transparent Cryptographic File System (see Section 2.5.1).
target A fully-quali￿ed path name, including ￿le name, that completely de-
scribes of ￿lesystem entry to which a speci￿c dependency record applies.
Since a single ￿lesystem object may be referred to by several di￿erent
names, each dependency record may have more than one target to which
it applies. The term is also used in reference to the process of matching
an object against a speci￿c dependency record (see Sections 5.2.1 and
5.2.4).
ticket An unforgeable token that grants the user access to a speci￿c item.
ticket ID A unique identi￿er of a secondary ticket used to indicate whether the
ticket is still valid or has been revoked (see Section 4.3.3).
ticket class Whether the ticket concerned is a primary or secondary ticket. The
ticket class therefore re￿ects the relationship that the ticket holder has
with the designated protected object.
319ticket mode The mode of access granted by possession of a ticket, being either
read or write access.
TID See ticket ID.
TPM See trusted platform module.
Trojan horse A program that appears to one that performs some legitimate func-
tion but in fact performs some additional, covert and malicious action.
trusted computing base The collection of system components responsible for
enforcing security policy that must be protected and remain unaltered
for policy to be enforced correctly.
trusted ￿ngerprint A one-way hash of a ￿le or application believed to be in some
legitimate and unaltered form. The ￿ngerprint is then stored in a vault.
trust level See process trust level.
trusted path A guaranteed means through which a user can interact directly with
a system’s trusted computing base such that they may be sure they are
not interacting with some malicious program such as a Trojan Horse.
trusted platform module A hardware component of commodity computer sys-
tems that serves as the foundational component of the Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG) security architecture (see Section 2.6.4).
trusted process A term that may be generally used to refer to some process that
has been subject to some form of validation or assurance and/or to one
that plays a critical part in some aspect of security. However, the term
is used to refer speci￿cally to a process which is executing at a trust
level of L1 or above and therefore has access to the user’s vault. See
also untrusted process.
trust elevation A term developed to refer to the trust relationships between a
process and objects that it deals with, most particularly in relation to
320the trust relationship between a parent and child process. This becomes
problematic when a parent process spawns a child that will execute at
a higher privilege level; the trust elevation problem (see Section 5.6.2).
UID See user ID.
untrusted process A process with a trust level of L0 and which therefore does
not have access to the user’s vault. See Section 3.4.2. See also trusted
process.
user ID Identity-based label associated with a user and their processes.
vault A structure used by the Vaults model for the storage of sensitive and
secret data. Access to a given repository is carefully restricted.
vault ID A value constructed by hashing a user’s public key and which is used
to identify a particular user vault and consequently the set of privileges
associated with this vault.
veri￿cation The process of ensuring that the data corresponding to a previously
matched program and its dependencies has not been modi￿ed based
upon comparing trusted ￿ngerprint values with those values that apply
to the data in its current state (see Section 5.1.2).
VID See vault ID.
VPKI Vaults Public Key Infrastructure. The PKI utilised by the Vaults ar-
chitecture.
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List of Symbols Used in Equations
H(x) The application of a one-way hash function to some value x.
if The inode value corresponding to ￿le f.
K(x) The symmetric encryption of some value x with a given key K.
Kf The protection key corresponding to ￿le f.
KfR The read protection key for ￿le f.
KfW The write protection key for ￿le f.
KIDf The Key ID corresponding to ￿le f.
KIDfR The Key ID corresponding to the read protection key for ￿le f.
KIDfW The Key ID corresponding to the write protection key for ￿le f.
KPS The protection status key.
KTr
f The ticket key used to construct a secondary ticket for recipient r to
access ￿le f.
KV A key used by a speci￿c user for encryption and decryption of their
vault V .
KF
V The Fundamental Key for system vault V .
322MAC(x) The application of a message authentication code (MAC) to some value
x.
nf The number of links corresponding to the inode for ￿le f.
P The public key belonging to a speci￿c user.
P(x) The encryption of some value x with public key P.
p The private key belonging to a speci￿c user.
pf The path of a speci￿c directory entry for ￿le f.
pf1 The path of the ￿rst directory entry for ￿le f.
pfn The path of the nth directory entry for ￿le f.
PSAf A Protection Status Authenticator (PSA) value corresponding to a given
path for ￿le f.
PSAf1 The PSA value corresponding to the path of the ￿rst directory entry for
￿le f.
PSAfn The PSA value corresponding to the path of the nth directory entry for
￿le f.
PSIf The Protection Status Index (PSI) for ￿le f.
t1 The protection timestamp for a given ￿le.
t2 The timestamp for the creation of a speci￿c secondary ticket for a given
￿le.
tE The time at which a speci￿c secondary ticket expires.
T1
f The primary ticket for access to ￿le f.
T2
f The secondary ticket for access to ￿le f.
T1
fR The primary ticket granting read access to ￿le f.
323T1
fW The primary ticket granting write access to ￿le f.
TIDr
f The ticket ID corresponding to the secondary ticket constructed for
recipient r to access ￿le f.
tPSf The protection timestamp corresponding to ￿le f.
TF
V A fundamental ticket to access vault V .
V A given vault.
VID The vault ID of a given user.
VIDo The vault ID of the owner of a given ￿le.
VIDP The vault ID of the prime user.
VIDr The vault ID of the recipient of a secondary ticket for a given ￿le.
z A randomly selected value.
 The exclusive-OR (XOR) operation.
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Attack Tree CD-ROM Guide
C.1 Directories
Confidentiality Property Attack tree for analysing the Con￿dentiality property.
Integrity Property Attack tree for analysing the Veri￿able Integrity property.
Trusted Fingerprinting Attack trees for analysing the Trusted Fingerprinting
mechanism.
Libraries Complete set of attack tree libraries used by the three trees.
C.2 File Formats
Trees are presented in four di￿erent ￿le formats; some that are native to the Secu-
rITree software and others that may be viewed in freely available programs. The
￿le formats used are summarised in Table C.1.
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326Appendix D
Protection Status Veri￿cation
Routines
The following are routines used internally by the security kernel as part of the
protection status veri￿cation process when performing various operations on ￿les.
CalcPSI Calculates the PSI value for the ￿le being accessed according to the PSA
and other parameters stored in the inode metadata as described in the Sec-
tion 4.5. This routine underpins all the others involved in protection status
veri￿cation tasks.
CalcPSA Generates a new PSA value from supplied parameters as described in
Equation 4.6.
GetPS Used when accessing a ￿le in order to obtain its protection status. This
routine signals the veri￿ed protection status of the ￿le or otherwise ￿ags an
integrity violation and aborts the access process. The routine involves the
following steps:
1. Obtain the PSI value from CalcPSI.
2. Retrieve protection status from the PST using the PSI. If no PST entry
is found, this indicates an integrity violation and the process is aborted.
3273. Con￿rm timestamp values tPSf from PST and inode metadata are the
same. If this is not the case, ￿ag an integrity violation and abort.
4. Return KID values (read and write) to indicate protection status.
PSVerifyAll Performs the same steps as GetPS but performs CalcPSI for all PSA-
path pairs for that object, verifying that the PSI values for each are identical
and that there are the correct number of PSA-path pairs. Note that for the
majority of ￿les that have only one link, the e￿ect is the same as GetPS.
UpdatePS Uses CalcPSA to regenerate all PSA values for a given inode with speci￿ed
parameters, and updates the timestamp value tPSf in the PST and inode
metadata.
AddPSA Generates a new PSA value for a new path using CalcPSA and then writes
it to inode metadata along with the new path, updated link count and new
protection status timestamp. All PSA values are also updated to re￿ect the
new parameters and a new value for tPSf is changed in the PST.
DeletePSA Deletes the speci￿ed PSA-path pair, decrements the link count in the
inode metadata for a given ￿le, updates all remaining PSA values to re￿ect
the new parameters, and also updates tPSf in the PST.
DeletePSI Deletes the entry for a speci￿ed PSI in the PST.
328Appendix E
Matching Algorithm
The algorithm in Figure E.1 describes the process of matching a program to be
executed against the dependency records in a speci￿c digraph. For reasons of clarity,
low-level details of traversing the digraph are deliberately abstracted as they are
not central to the matching process. Instead, each dependency record is represented
as a node in a linked list with the list of targets for each represented as an array.
In practice, these nodes would be extracted by a separate routine that maximises
performance by returning source node Program dependencies prior to other types
when executing a program. Descriptions of the identi￿ers used in the algorithm are
given in Table E.1.
The algorithm works by iterating through the list of dependency records, searching
for a target path amongst those matching that of the program being executed. If
Identi￿er Description
thisdep Pointer to current dependency being processed.
firstdep Pointer to ￿rst dependency in the list to be processed.
targets List of pathnames to which the dependency applies.
next Pointer to the next dependency to be processed.
tindex Counter variable for iterating through the list of targets.
length Length of the list/array.
found Boolean value indicating whether a match has occurred yet.
run Data structure holding information relating to the program about to be run.
pathname Field in the run data structure representing a fully quali￿ed path and ￿lename.
Table E.1: Key to identi￿ers in the matching algorithm
329thisdep = firstdep
found = false
while thisdep != NULL AND NOT found
for tindex = 0 to thisdep->targets.length
if thisfpr->targets[tindex] == run.pathname
found = true
break
if NOT found
thisdep = thisdep->next
if found
return thisdep
else
return 0
Figure E.1: Fingerprint matching algorithm
such a path is found, matching has been successful and the search is halted. The
routine then returns the matched dependency record for veri￿cation. However, if
all dependencies are searched without a match being found, the routine returns 0
to indicate this and the program will execute as untrusted.
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